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iPREFACE
This thesis examines the rule of Mohammed RezaShah Pahlavi of Iran 
(1953-1979) in the context of his regime's 'dependence' on the United 
States in the 1950s for its survival, and his attempts, in the 1970s, to 
transform Iran into a major pro-Western regional power with aspirations 
to eventual world power status. In this, it critically reviews both 
the domestic and foreign policy objectives and behaviour of the Shah.
It basically argues that despite all his achievements, the Shah's goals 
and policies were full of inherent contradictions and weaknesses. They 
were not responsive to the needs of Iran and failed to achieve even 
their own objectives. In fact, they unleashed the very trends and 
developments which ultimately led the Iranian people to launch the 1978 
mass movements against the Shah's rule, forcing him from the throne on 
the grounds that he was the 'enemy' of Iran and 'puppet' of the United 
States.
In completing this research I owe much to many institutions and 
individuals. I wish to thank the Colombo Plan authorities, the 
Australian Government and the Australian National University (ANU) for 
their financial support and sponsorship of a field trip which took me to 
Iran, Britain, and the United States in 1976. Among individuals I am 
very much indebted to Professor JIL. Richardson of ANU and my super- 
visors, Dr J.A.A. Stockwin and Mr Geoffrey Jukes for their valuable 
advice, encouragement and guidance, and their help with many administra­
tive problems at all stages of my research. I would also like to
express my gratitude to Dr Gordon White, who provided me with the very
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h e l p f u l  s u p e r v i s i o n  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  ray r e s e a r c h ,  an d  G e o f f  
C h a n d l e r  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  D ev e lo p m en t  A s s i s t a n c e  B u re a u ,  who p l a y e d  an  
i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  e n s u r i n g  t h e  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  my Colombo P l a n  aw ard  and  
o r g a n i s i n g  my f i e l d  t r i p .  Among nu m ero u s  f r i e n d s ,  I  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  t h a n k  
M ara M o u s t a f i n e  f o r  h e r  e n c o u ra g e m e n t  a n d  a d v i c e ,  and  e s p e c i a l l y  Amanda 
T h o r n t o n  -  f o r  h e r  t r e m e n d o u s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  an d  m o ra l  s u p p o r t  t h r o u g h o u t  
t h e  r e s e a r c h  p e r i o d .  I  s h o u l d  a l s o  l i k e  t o  t h a n k  Dr P a u l  K e a l  and  J o h n  
A t k i n  f o r  r e a d i n g  p a r t s  o f  t h e  d r a f t  o f  t h e  t h e s i s .
I n  T e h r a n ,  I  w is h  t o  th a n k  many i n d i v i d u a l s  f o r  t h e i r  i n f o r m a t i v e  
d i s c u s s i o n s  an d  e n c o u r a g e m e n t .  They i n c l u d e d  t h e  fo r m e r  P r im e  M i n i s t e r  
A m ir A bbas H oveyda ,  t h e  fo r m e r  E d u c a t i o n  M i n i s t e r  M anuchehr G a n j i ,  an d  
t h e  f o r m e r  I n f o r m a t i o n  an d  T o u r i s m  M i n i s t e r  D a ry u sh  Hymoyoon, a s  w e l l  a s  
s e v e r a l  s e n i o r  o f f i c i a l s  an d  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  m o s t  o f  a l l ,  Dr F a rh a d  
M eh ran ,  Dr M a j id  T e h r a n i a n ,  Dr Harmoz H ekm at, Dr M ansur F a r s a d ,  Mahmoud 
F a r o u g h i , Amir T a h e r i ,  C y ru s  E l a h i ,  Reza S h e i k h - u l - I s l a m i , Dr A l i  N ik -  
Kha, Am ir A n saw ri  an d  H a ssa n  A r f a ,  n o t  t o  m e n t io n  s e v e r a l  members o f  t h e  
o p p o s i t i o n  who r e f r a i n e d  fro m  g i v i n g  me t h e i r  r e a l  names f o r  r e a s o n s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  e x p e d i e n c y .  M o re o v e r ,  I  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  t h a n k  R i c h a r d  Bash o f  
t h e  A m e r ic a n  Embassy an d  C h r i s t i n e  W hite  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Embassy f o r  
f a c i l i t a t i n g  my r e s e a r c h  i n  I r a n .
I n  B r i t a i n ,  I  am g r a t e f u l  t o  P e t e r  A v ery  an d  M alcolm  M a c in to s h ,  who 
b o t h  e n r i c h e d  me .w i th  t h e i r  k n o w led g e  o f  I r a n i a n  p o l i t i c s  an d  f u r t h e r e d  
my e n t h s i a s m  a b o u t  t h e  p r o j e c t .  I  a l s o  w is h  t o  th a n k  L ew is  T u r n e r  f o r  
h i s  c o n v e r s a t i o n  an d  J a n e t  C a l v e r  o f  A u s t r a l i a  House f o r  f a c i l i t a t i n g  my
s t a y  i n  London .
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I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  I  owe much t o  P r o f e s s o r  M arv in  Z o n i s , who 
s p e n t  h o u r s  w i t h  me i n  h e l p i n g  me t o  s h a p e  w h a t  i s  now t h e  t o p i c  o f  
t h i s  t h e s i s .  I  a l s o  w i s h  t o  t h a n k  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  o f f i c i a l s  an d  s c h o l a r s  
f o r  t h e i r  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  an d  h e l p ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  B r i t i s h  A m b assad o r  S i r  
P e t e r  Ram sbotham , A l v i n  C o t t r e l l ,  B ru ce  Van V o o r s t ,  R o b e r t  H a u p t ,  '>
W i l l i a m  G r i f f i t h ,  L i n c o l n  B l o o m f i e l d ,  G e o f f r j /  Kemp, R i c h a r d  G o ttam , 
R o h u l l a h  R am az an i ,  L e o n a rd  B i n d e r ,  C o l o n e l  B i l l  Thom as, L lo y d  H e n d e r s o n ,  
G eo rg e  G re e n ,  S e p e h r  Z a b i h , G eorge  L en c zo w sk i  a n d  R i c h a r d  F r y e .
M o re o v e r ,  two p e o p l e  who a c t i v e l y  f a c i l i t a t e d  my s t a y  w e re  M a r g a r e t  
G ray  an d  J o n a t h a n  T h w a i t e s  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  E m bassy .  I  am a l s o  g r a t e ­
f u l  t o  t h e  W a sh in g to n  P o s t  and  H oover I n s t i t u t e  f o r  l e t t i n g  me u se  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  l i b r a r i e s . A l l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  ( e x c e p t  w h e re  o t h e r w i s e
i n d i c a t e d )  and  any  e r r o r s  o f  f a c t  a r e  e n t i r e l y  my r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Until the beginning of 1978, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran was 
generally regarded as one of the world's most powerful and richest 
rulers. He ruled his strategically and economically important Islamic 
kingdom with absolute authority and spent its enormous oil income as 
he saw fit. His publicly avowed goal was to transform Iran into a 
'progressive' pro-Western self-sustaining industrial and military power 
before its exportable oil ran out, as the Shah estimated it would, by 
the end of the century. In order to achieve his ;goal, he pursued a
forceful policy of domestic political repression, and worked hard to 
maximise Iran's economic and military capabilities on the basis of its 
growing oil wealth, particularly from the early 1970s. In this, he 
was extensively supported by his major Western allies, led by the 
United States, which found him a most reliable ally to look after 
Western interests in the Iranian region. The Shah was personally 
convinced of the strength and popularity of his leadership. He 
believed that he was rightly leading a majority of his 33 million 
subjects (of several ethno-linguistic-tribal origins) to achieve one 
of the highest standards of living in the world, with maximum peace 
and security, within the shortest space of time possible; and he 
believed that over 99 percent of Iranians, who had placed his commanding 
portrait wherever they lived and worked, were behind him in this task.
During 1978, however, the strong Shah was suddenly beset by nation­
wide mass riots, demonstrations and strikes against his rule, which 
progressively undermined his authority at considerable human and material 
cost. By the beginning of 1979, amid increasing bloodshed, paralysis of
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t h e  s t a t e  m ach in ery  and o f  th e  economy, and th e  im m inent l a c k  o f  s o l i d  
s u p p o r t  from h i s  armed f o r c e s ,  th e  S h a h 's  power d e c l i n e d  p r e c i p i t a t e l y .
He c o u ld  no lo n g e r  command any s u b s t a n t i a l  s u p p o r t  from e i t h e r  h i s  
p e o p le  o r  h i s  l e a d i n g  a l l y ,  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s ,  w hich found  i t  
i n e x p e d i e n t  t o  back  him any more. A f t e r  25 y e a r s  o f  a b s o lu t e  r u l e ,  
t h e  Shah had  no c h o ic e  b u t  t o  l e a v e  I r a n  on 17 J a n u a r y  f o r  a ' t e m p o r a r y '  
s t a y  a b ro a d  — a d e p a r t u r e  which h a s  p r o b a b ly  r e s u l t e d  i n  h i s  p e rm an en t  
e x i l e .  T h is  paved  th e  way f o r  h i s  c h i e f  r e l i g i o u s - p o l i t i c a l  o p p o n e n t ,  
A y a t o l l a h  R o h u l lah  K hom eini,  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  I r a n i a n s '  
a n t i - S h a h  ' r e v o l u t i o n ' ,  t o  r e t u r n  t o  I r a n  a f t e r  14 y e a r s  o f  e x i l e  a t  
t h e  han d s  o f  th e  Shah , and p r o c l a im  th e  c o u n t r y  an ' I s l a m i c  R e p u b l i c ' .
Khomeini has  n o t  y e t  d e t a i l e d  what p r e c i s e l y  w i l l  be  th e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  h i s  ' I s l a m i c  R e p u b l ic '  and how i t  w i l l  f u n c t i o n  i n  I r a n  — a c o u n t r y  
w hich  w en t  th ro u g h  an i n t e n s e  s t a g e  o f  c a p i t a l i s t  o r i e n t e d  s o c io -e c o n o m ic  
g row th  d u r in g  th e  S h a h 's  r u l e .  From th e  l i t t l e  t h a t  i s  known, how ever , 
th e  ' I s l a m i c  R e p u b l ic '  ( a c c o r d in g  t o  Khomeini) w i l l  be  e s s e n t i a l l y  
g u id e d  and g ove rned  by th e  Q u r 'a n i c  c o d e s ,  a s  o r d a in e d  by A l la h  and 
p r a c t i c e d  by th e  P r o p h e t  Mohammed and h i s  Companions. Most im p o r ta n t  
among t h e s e  i s  A l i ,  f a v o u r e d  as th e  f o re m o s t  s u c c e s s o r  o f  Mohammed by 
th e  S h i ' i t e  s e c t  o f  I s l a m ,  which i s  dom inan t  i n  I r a n .  Khomeini 
c o n s i d e r s  t h i s  t o  be th e  c o r r e c t  way t o  f r e e  I r a n  from w hat he s e e s  
as  t h e  t y r a n n i c a l ,  im m oral and c o r r u p t  a s p e c t s  o f  th e  S h a h 's  r u l e ;  
t o  c o n s e rv e  I r a n i a n  o i l  w e a l th  o n ly  f o r  t h e  w e l l - b e i n g  o f  t h e  I r a n i a n  
p e o p le  (as  a g a i n s t  t h e  S h a h 's  d e s i r e  t o  s e r v e  f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t s  and 
t u r n  I r a n  i n t o  a r e g i o n a l  gendarm e);  and t o  g u id e  a l l  I r a n i a n s ,  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e i r  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  l e a n i n g s ,  t o  l i v e  in  p e a ce  
p r o s p e r i t y  and u n i t y  a g a i n s t  d o m e s t ic  ' e v i l s '  ( a n y th in g  r e p u g n a n t  t o  
Is la m )  and f o r e i g n  i n t e r f e r e n c e ,  and t o  l i v e  a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e i r  own
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means and needs.
Thus Khomeini has undertaken to end not only the 2500 year old 
Persian monarchy and therefore the Shah's dynastic claim over it, but 
also most of the Shah's policies, particularly those underlining the 
pro-Western transformation of Iran into a primarily regional power.
These events have been dramatic and world-shattering in many ways.
They have caught by surprise even most of those said to be best informed, 
including the CIA, for very few could foresee such a rapid collapse of 
the Shah's apparently well entrenched and powerful administrative, 
security and military apparatus. This has caused mounting debate and 
discussion around the world, especially in Western academic circles.
The basic question confronting everyone, however, is: why and how did
the whole development come about?
Clearly this question could be approached from several points of 
view. Two approaches, however, may be mentioned here. One would be 
simply to apply particular conceptual frameworks which have been worked 
out by Western scholars on the basis of case studies and which 
essentially reflect Western experience. The other is to refrain from 
applying these frameworks as such, but nevertheless to seek help from 
them on those occasions where for analytical purposes they seem appropriate
The first of these approaches is likely to be more misleading than 
helpful in exploring and evaluating the complexity of Iranian politics.
As Bernard Lewis succinctly writes:
It is no doubt tempting to try to explain Middle Eastern phenomena 
in terms of European, or North and South American experience ...
But on the whole such comparisons —  perhaps analogies would be a 
better-word -- obscure more than they explain. No doubt Middle 
Eastern societies and politics are subjected to the same human
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vicissitudes, and therefore to the same rules of interpretation, 
as those of the West, and [have] adopted Western outward forms in 
the organisation and expression of [their] political and social 
life, [but] it is fatally easy for the Western observer to take 
these alien outward forms as the element of comparison, and to 
disregard or misrepresent the deeper realities which they do 
imperfectly express. The Islamic society of the Middle East, 
with its own complex web of experience and tradition, cannot 
adequately be labelled and classified with a few names and terms 
borrowed from the Western past.1
In order to acquire a better understanding of the "deeper realities", 
this thesis will attempt to examine the case of Iran largely on its 
own. In this, it will avoid the application of any specific model of 
analysis based on other countries' experiences and pecularities. It 
will go beyond the Western journalistic evaluations which flooded the 
world press and other media, praising the 'success' of the Shah (and' 
occasionally criticising him) in the few years prior to 1978, as well 
as stories about opposition mass movements which preceded his demise.
The thesis will explore the major root causes of the Shah's downfall by 
largely looking at the basic political and socio-economic features of 
Iranian society in the context of its contemporary history, the way the 
Shah assumed effective power, with US help, in 1953, and the Shah's 
subsequent goals and policies and their consequences for Iran in relation 
to his perception of the country's domestic, foreign and particularly 
regional needs and interests. This will be done mainly at macro-level 
with special reference to: (i) the 'dependence' of the Shah's regime
on the United States and its consequent vulnerability to that country 
in the 1950s at the cost of Iran's relations with many of its regional 
neighbours, most notably the Soviet Union; (ii) the Shah's sttempts 
in the 1960s to diversify his sources of 'dependence', normalise his 
relations with the USSR, and move towards realising Iran's potential as
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an 'oil power' largely through a policy of accommodation with the West; 
and (iii) the Shah's goal in the 1970s of turning Iran into a strong 
regional economic and military power with global influence.
In this thesis, moreover, the use of the term 'dependence' must
not be confused with that of 'dependency', as used in the 'dependencia
tradition', based largely on the experiences of Latin American 
2countries. Nor should the term 'regional power' be understood
in the same sense as that employed by various scholars of international 
relations in case studies and in classifying of world political units
3as 'small', 'medium' and 'super' powers. 'Dependence' will be
used mainly in determining the pattern and substance of the Shah's 
early political, economic and military reliance on the United States and 
his consequent alliance with the capitalist world against strong feelings 
of domestic and regional insecurity. It will also be used in analysing 
the consequences of this for Iran's socio-economic development and 
foreign policy position. This will be fully developed in Chapter III, 
where certain conceptual tools provided by the 'dependencia tradition' 
will be utilised. The term 'regional power' will be used to define the 
role which the Shah wanted Iran to perform within the limits of what he 
thought to be Iran's 'region', given his perception of the country's 
national and regional security and interests within the framework of his 
alliance with the United States and the West. This will be discussed 
in the Introduction to Part II and in Chapter VI, The crucial link 
between the Shah's initial dependence (plus the short and long term 
consequences of this for Iran) and his ultimate desire to transform 
Iran into a mighty pro-Western regional power will be discussed in the
concluding chapter.
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In order to pursue this approach, this thesis will be divided into 
two parts. The first part will be composed of Chapters II-V, which 
will explain and analyse trends and developments leading to his rise 
to power and the formulation of his goal to turn Iran into a regional 
power as a prelude to becoming a world power. Thus, Chapter II will 
provide a historical sketch of the development of Iranian politics from 
the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries in the context of a 
growing major power rivalry over Iran, with its consequences for the 
country and the Iranian responses to this rivalry.
Chapter III will examine the nature and mechanisms of the Shah's 
'dependence' on the United States, his continuous search for a Western, 
mainly American, source of security, and the consequences of this for 
Iranian politics. Chapter IV will discuss the Shah's efforts, in 
accommodation with American wishes, to implement a number of selected 
socio-economic reforms in the 1960s within the framework of what he 
called 'the White Revolution'. This will be analysed mainly in terms 
of the Shah's desire, in reaction against his vulnerability to American 
pressures, to expand his domestic power base and mobilise mass support. 
In so doing he hoped to achieve more flexibility in the conduct of his 
foreign relations, particularly with the USSR, from a position of 
growing domestic strength. In this way he would be able to diversify 
his sources of 'dependence' to some extent. Following on from 
Chapters III and IV, Chapter V will trace the development of the Shah's 
oil policy through various phases, leading to his success of the early 
1970s in maximising Iran's control over its oil resources and in 
realising the country's potential as an 'oil power'. This will be
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assessed largely in conjunction with the emergence of the Organisation 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as an effective bargaining 
cartel. It will be seen that the Shah was able to use OPEC, in the 
context of evolving changes in regional and international politics, so 
as to strengthen his position against both the international oil 
companies and the world at large, as a prelude to turning Iran into a 
regional and ultimately a world power.
The second part of the thesis, which will consist of Chapters VI-IX, 
will deal mainly with the Shah's vision and his policies to transform 
Iran into an effective economic and military regional power. Thus, 
Chapter VI will outline the Shah's vision of Iran as a 'regional power', 
the regional factors which influenced him in shaping his vision, and the 
policies which he therefore adopted in order to bring it to reality. 
Chapter VII will analyse the policy programmes and actions which he 
undertook in order to build up Iran's economic and military capabilities 
to the point of establishing the country's position as the type of 
regional power he wished it to be. Chapter VIII will seek to identify 
the pattern of the Shah's regional behaviour while he was engaged in 
maximising Iran's resources capability and defining the country's 
regional role. Chapter IX will examine critically the repercussions 
of both his domestic and regional policy behaviour in terms of their 
consequences for the Iranian people, the Shah's rule and regional 
politics. Chapter X will conclude this thesis.
8 .
Chapter II
Iran and Traditional World Powers' Rivalry
The recent political history of Iran, particularly since the early 
nineteenth century, largely reflects the country's importance in a 
zone of growing major power rivalry. Iran's strategic importance, 
enhanced during this century by its increasing significance as a major 
source of oil, has frequently stimulated the rival powers to seek 
domination of the country in order to strengthen their security and 
politico-economic interests in the context of changing world politics.
In modern times, it was Great Britain and Czarist Russia that began the 
rivalry over Iran. This rivalry was already under way by the turn of 
the nineteenth century, when Britain succeeded in entrenching its 
colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent. Anglo-Russian rivalry, which 
after 1917 was replaced by an Anglo-Soviet confrontation, continued 
through different phases until its transformation into a conflict between 
the Soviet Union and the United States following World War II. This 
continuous interaction between the powers, at times resulting in the 
division of Iran into spheres of influence and occupation, has been 
instrumental in shaping Iranian politics.
This chapter will mainly trace the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry 
and its eventual transformation into American-Soviet rivalry through 
its various phases. We shall discuss its consequences for Iranian 
politics and the responses of different Iranian leaders, particularly 
Reza Shah (1925-1941) and Dr Mohammed Mossadeq (1951-1953). In doing 
soy we shall provide the necessary background to three major developments 
which will be central to the argument of this thesis: (1) the effective
9 .
assumption of power by Mohammed Reza Shah, with American backing, in 1953; 
(2) the development of Iran's outright dependence on the United States 
against the Soviet Union and its supporters in the 1950s; and (3) the 
Shah's eventual attempts to turn Iran into a mighty 'regional power' 
in the 1970s.
Early Rivalry
The Anglo-Russian rivalry over Iran originally began in the second 
half of the eighteenth century as a direct result of British colonial 
expansion into the Indian subcontinent and, subsequently, parts of the 
Lower Persian Gulf en route to it. The strategic location of Iran in 
a zone between Europe and Asia, the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean and, 
above all, the Czarist Empire and the British colonial sphere, which 
was expanding rapidly in South Asia, had placed the country not only 
within the geographical perimeters of Russian security and aspirations, 
but also on the margin of British colonial expansion as well as on its 
imperial lines of communication. While Britain sought to enlarge and 
secure its colonial rule in Asia, and Russia opposed such foreign 
control close to its borders, Iran's strategic position rendered it 
vital to both powers for the security of their respective imperial 
domains.^ They consequently regarded Iran, along with Afghanistan,
Turkestan, and Transcaspia, as a 'buffer zone' which separated and 
protected them from engaging directly. In order to ensure Iran's 
buffer position, both powers engaged in a prolonged and exhausting 
tussle aimed at rebuffing each other's encroachment into the country, 
in terms both of territorial ambition and political-economic penetration.
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This resulted in what may be regarded as the Anglo-Russian 'grab' 
for Iran, which during the second half of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries manifested itself largely in a quest for respective 
'spheres of influence' within the country. While the Russians tried to 
gain influence over the north, the British endeavoured to control the 
south. Thus both sides sought to divide Iran into Russian and British 
zones of influence separated by a central buffer area under the administration
of the Tehran Government, which was to be vulnerable and responsive to 
their pressures and needs. Each zone was to be dependent on its 
respective 'patron' power for protection and the conduct of its political 
and economic affairs.2 By the late nineteenth century, Lord Curzon, 
the British Viceroy of India and an outstanding upholder of British 
imperial power, considered Iran to be essential for the defence of India 
or what he called "... the inalienable badge of [British] Sovereignty 
in the Eastern Hemisphere". For this, he believed that Iran, together 
with Afghanistan, Turkestan, and Transcaspia, constituted "the pieces on 
a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the domination of 
the world... The future of Great Britain... will be decided not in 
Europe... but in the continent whence... [the British] emigrant stock
first came, and to which as conquerors their descendants have returned".2 
Curzon, of course, at the time did not realise that Iran, apart from its 
strategic importance, was also destined to offer Britain an economic 
bone of contention, namely oil, which was to impel Britain to work
even harder to heighten its influence for strategic and economic goals, 
not just in southern Iran but in Iranian politics as a whole. Anglo- 
Russian rivalry thus continued for most of the first half of the 
twentieth century, even though the Soviet regime replaced that of 
Czars in 1917. The discovery of major oil wells, mainly in southern Iran,
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and its consequent emergence as an important oil producer introduced a 
new dimension to Anglo-Russian rivalry. Although a detailed discussion 
of this development is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is necessary 
to look at it briefly before outlining the major implications of this 
rivalry for Iranian politics.
The discovery of oil in commercial quantities at the beginning of
the twentieth century added to Iran's strategic importance and pointed
to a promising future. The major deposits happened to be in southern
Iran where, by now, the British influence was at its strongest.
Although the Russians had forced Tehran in 1872 to annul a concession
which it had given to a British subject, Baron Julius de Reuter, for
4"... exploitation of all minerals throughout Persia", the Iranian 
monarch, Muzafre-ed-Din Shah, granted the first oil concession to an 
English entpreneur, William Knox D'Arcy, in 1901. Under the Concession, 
D'Arcy gained the exclusive rights to explore, produce and refine oil in 
an area of about 480,000 square miles, covering all of Persia except the 
five northern provinces for sixty years. In return he undertook to 
set up one or more companies within the following two years, to pay the 
Iranian Government 16 percent of his annual profits, as well as 
£20,000 in cash and £20,000 worth of stock in the enterprise.5 He
formed the First Exploitation Company in partnership with the British 
Burmah Oil Company in 1905; but it was not until 1908 that oil was 
struck in commercial quantities in the foothills of the Zagros Mountains, 
about 150 miles from the Persian Gulf coast.
Having realised the future importance of oil as an energy source 
the British Government immediately intervened. Its representatives 
bought up D'Arcy's shares and formed the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-
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Iranian) Oil Company with an initial capital of £ 2 million in 1909, to 
take over all the rights and privileges of the First Exploitation 
Company.^ in 1912 it linked the major oil well of Masjid-i-Suleiman
by a pipeline to Abadan, an island in the mouth of Shatt-el-Arab in the 
Persian Gulf, where it was building the world's largest refinery. In 
1913, the British Admiralty, after instructing the Royal Navy to change 
from coal to oil firing, purchased on behalf of the British Government 
a controlling share in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company by payment of
7£2.2 million of the new £4 million capitalisation. The British were
soon able to develop the Iranian oil industry into a leading export 
sector with almost invaluable 'forward and backward linkages' to the 
Iranian economy. The net production of Iranian crude rose dramatically 
from 82,097 tons in 1912/1913 to 1,407,531 in 1919/1920 and 6,549,244 in 
1932 (just before the replacement of the D'Arcy Concession by the '1933 
Agreement'), of which 37,000, 936,000 and 6,006,298 tons respectively
3were exported by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Under the D'Arcy
Concession's arrangement, the Company in conjunction with the British 
Government made huge profits compared with what the Iranian Government
9earned in royalties, taxes and profit sharing.
The rapid evolution of British ownership and expansion of the oil 
industry tilted the balance of relations between Iran, Russia and 
Britain in favour of the latter. It provided Britain with a solid base 
to further its presence and influence in southern Iran and expand its 
share in guiding and controlling Iranian economic and for that matter 
socio-political affairs. Moreover, Iranian oil proved very beneficial 
to Britain in helping its domestic industrial development. It helped 
fuel its Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean Fleet —  the largest fleet in the
13.
region and the badge of British supremacy —  for both military and 
diplomatic purposes and thus increased its offensive capacity; it 
also aided it financially in maintaining its far-flung empire.
This speedy growth of British economic entrenchment in Iran and its 
political implications developed at a time when the Czarist regime was 
in decline. On the internal front, it was facing growing opposition; 
the abortive revolution of 1905 had shattered the basis of Czarist auto­
cracy and consequently St. Petersburg was full of anxiety from socio­
political disturbances. On the external front, it had been defeated 
and humiliated by Japan, an Asian power, in the Manchurian war of 1904-5 
and it, therefore, no longer impressed its neighbours, including 
Iranians, as a powerful force to be trusted and relied upon.^
It was against this weakening position of Czarism and growing
British influence in Iran that Britain pressed for formalisation of the
long-standing but informal Anglo-Russian spheres of influence. The
two powers consequently reached an agreement in the Convention of
St. Petersburg in August 1907 whereby among other things, they agreed to
a division of Iran into three zones; a Russian zone of influence in the
north, a British one in the south and a narrow central buffer zone under
the control, at least nominally, of the Tehran Government. They still,
however, pledged to respect the territorial integrity and independence of
Iran. The Russian line started from Kasr-i-Shirin, crossed and included
"Isfahan, Yezd and Kakh, ending at that point on the Persian frontier
where the Russian and Afghan frontiers intersected". The British line
commenced from the Afghan frontier extending "via Gazik, Birjand, Kerman"
12and ending "at Bandar Abbas". Thereby Czarism recognised existing
and future British claims over oil fields and resultant political- 
economic influence not only in Iran but also in the Persian Gulf region
14.
as a whole; this meant a renunciation of its own aspirations to reach 
either India or the Persian Gulf. Tehran was not a party to this 
agreement, nor was its consent sought.
The major question, however, was whether Tehran could do anything
about it. She could do very little. There is no doubt that the
Anglo-Russian rivalry over Iran had caused a marked weakening of Iranian
politics. In building their respective zones of influence, which often
operated independently of the Tehran Government, the two imperial
powers not only forced Tehran to lose most of its initiative in the
conduct of Iran's domestic and foreign policies, but also sought to
pressure, buy off, and weaken successive Iranian leaderships so that
they could become obedient to and dependent on them for their survival
and consequently act according to the interests of the two powers. For
this, they used policies of 'divide and rule', whereby they established
liaisons with different tribal authorities in their respective zones of
influence and exploited their ethnic, religious and political differences
not only against each other but also against Tehran. They had often
obtained legal sanctions for their actions in the various treaties
which they had imposed on Iranian leaders. These treaties included
that of Turkomanchi (1828) between Iran and Russia, and the Treaty of
1857 between Iran and Britain, which among other political and economic
13favours gave the foreign powers capitulation rights. All this made
a large contribution to the socio-political disintegration and economic 
impoverishment of Iranian society.
It is also true, however, that the frailty of political and 
socio-economic structures in Iranian society helped the imperial powers 
to weaken the country. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
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centuries, Iran, a feudalistic society composed of different tribes, and
bound together largely by a common religion, was ruled by the weak but
autocratic, absolute and bankrupt Qajar dynasty. The authority of the
Qajar kings rested largely upon divine claims and centralisation of
political power in the traditional institution of monarchy, to the supreme
position of which the Iranian people had become accustomed for over
two thousand years. While the word of the king was "the supreme law,
14against which there was no appeal", the Qajar dynasty suffered from
steady decay, inefficient and corrupt administration and the lack of 
a strong, loyal army. Its system allowed little room for socio-economic 
reforms which were necessary to strengthen Iran's position against 
British and Russian activities. In the face of foreign powers' 
interference, the system did not have the necessary potential to hold 
itself together. This, consequently, led to domestic instability, and 
struck serious blows at Iran's very shaky national unity and nationhood. 
The Iranian nationhood was already based on a very fragile structure.
It was faced with the country's difficult terrain, a widely dispersed 
population, the absence of an efficient communication network and, above 
all, a volatile society. The society rested upon a complex and delicate 
web of interactions between the different tribes, which opposed one 
another on a wide range of social and political matters."^
It was against this situation that at the start of the twentieth 
century a movement, spearheaded largely by Western-inspired intellectuals, 
merchants and clergy, began to articulate demands for constitutional 
reforms in an attempt to subject the power of the monarchy to the rule of 
law and somewhat 'liberalise' the Iranian socio-political system. The 
movement, whose members subsequently became known as 'Constitutionalists', 
was shortlived and limited in its achievements. It initially succeeded
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in drafting the Iranian Constitution of 1906, prescribing a monarchical 
parliamentary government and broader mass participation in the national 
political process, and in establishing a lower house of parliament 
(the Majlis) and in putting some other provisions of this Constitution 
into effect during 1909-1921. But since its first objective was to 
weaken the Qajari despotism as a precondition for reforming Iranian 
domestic politics, after which it would seek to repel foreign 
intervention, the movement had to face stiff opposition from the 
monarchy and its supporters. While the Constitutionalists found it 
initially imperative to seek British help in their struggle, which 
placed them at odds with Russia, the monarchy sought favours from both 
British and Czarists against the Constitutionalists in return for accepting 
the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. This, and the Constitutionalists' 
own disharmony of principles and interests led to the failure of their 
movement. Thus, the Constitutionalist movement failed to develop 
national politics based on majority support and understanding, and failed 
to reform the domestic system to the extent whereby the Iranians could 
raise a national challenge to', rather than being largely manipulated by, 
the foreign powers.^
Consequently, Anglo-Russian rivalry and attempts to strengthen
their respective spheres of influence within Iran continued unabated, with
Britain becoming increasingly the main beneficiary. When the Czarist
and Qajari regimes were beset by serious internal problems, but Britain
still "enjoyed the advantage of bigger financial and commercial resources,
better diplomacy, and presence of an armed force in India stronger and
17more mobile than the Czar's army in Turkestan", the outbreak of the 
First World War provided Britain with further opportunity to enhance its
17.
position. Ironically, the war brought the two traditional rivals,
Britain and Russia, into a war-time alliance against a common enemy,
Germany. Tehran declared Iran's neutrality, but this was not respected
by the warring factions. The north-west of Iran became a battle-ground
for Turks and Russians. In the south-west where the two major tribes
of Bakhtiari and Qashgai had become disloyal to the central government,
resentful of the British, and consequently, receptive to German activities,
the British landed forces to safeguard their recently acquired oil fields
and installations, their Residency in Bushir and imperial security
against German threats. Moreover, the British exploited the situation
by raising their own Iranian security force, called the South Persian
Rifles, to assist in protecting and possibly expanding their zone of
influence, especially in Khuzistan province, the location of most of the
18British run oil industry.
This rapid strengthening of the British political, economic and
military entrenchment in Iran contrasted with the continuously weakening
position of Russia. At a time when the war had been taking heavy toll
on Russians, the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution of 1917 overthrew
Czarism and in 1922 declared the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.
Given its immediate needs of domestic consolidation, the new regime
swiftly made peace with Turks and Germans. In January 1918, it
announced its desire for friendly relations with its southern neighbours,
and assured Iran of its friendship and support for its independence and
territorial integrity. It declared all Czarist claims on Iran based on
the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, and other accords to be null and 
19void. Thus in effect, it limited the Iranian Government to resist
the British with Soviet support and called on the British to reduce
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their activities in Iran. Tehran, indeed, responded favourably to this
Soviet assurance and welcomed it as a bargaining lever against expanding
British influence. But Britain considered the Bolshevik regime and its
ideological bid for world-wide revolution as a serious threat to the
existence of British Empire and the political and economic values which
it upheld. Consequently, Britain decided on armed intervention against
the Bolsheviks, resolved at all costs to stop the spread of communism
to Iran, and to use it as a frontline base in its anti-Bolshevik campaign.
The British kept their wartime lines of communication going through Iran
from Mesopotamia to the Caspian and extended active assistance to anti-
Soviet forces, including white Russians, who had established bases in
the Czarist zone of influence in northen Iran. Moreover, British troops
occupied the Iranian port of Enzlie on the Caspian, from where the Turks
had made thrusts into the Russian Baku oil fields; and a British naval
detachment also arrived to patrol the Caspian. Thus, "Persia north and
west of a line drawn from Khunaqin to Enzlie became in effect a zone of
20British occupation". Furthermore, a British Indian force stretched
out from Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf to Meshed in North-East Iran.
In the meantime, Lord Curzon instructed the British new minister in 
Tehran, Sir Percy Cox, in September 1918, to secure the agreement of 
the Iranian Government to a new Anglo-Iranian Treaty, replacing in 
effect the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 which had recently been denounced 
by the Soviet Government.
Given the initial uncertainty over the future of the Bolshevik 
regime, the British occupation of a large part of Iran, the domestic 
weakness of the Iranian Government and its growing financial dependence 
on Britain, as well as Iran's socio-economic disarray, Sir Percy succeeded
19.
in making the Iranian leadership sign a new treaty in 1919, pending the
approval of the Iranian Majlis. The major feature of this treaty was
that it provided for the British to take over complete control of the
21Iranian army and finances. Had this treaty been implemented, it would
have in effect reduced Iran, like many Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms, to a 
British protectorate. This would have meant a full realisation of the 
hidden potential of sphere of influence politics, Britain would have 
achieved the prerogative to make the conduct of Iranian internal socio­
economic and political affairs and external relations dependent on British 
colonial needs. Had this happened,Iran's relationship with Britain 
would have been transformed into one between a colonial periphery and an 
imperial colonial central power with serious repercussions for the Soviet 
Union and regional balance of power. Meanwhile, attempts to overthrow 
the Bolsheviks having failed, the British cabinet early in 1920 ordered 
all active British intervention on behalf of the counter-revolutionary 
forces in Russia to cease and subsequently British forces withdrew from 
Transcaucasia, Transcaspia and northern Iran. Although this took the 
pressure off Moscow to a considerable extent, the Soviet Government,.as 
would have been the case with its predecessor, naturally opposed the 
impending Treaty proposal and sought its immediate abolition.
In a surprise move Soviet troops occupied the Iranian port of
Enzlie (now Pahlavi) on the Caspian in April 1920, just a few weeks
after the British had left. This was followed by the setting up of
the Iranian Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan in northern Iran and by
Soviet sponsorship of a pro-Moscow Iranian communist group, which led
to the development of the Iranian Communist Party, called Tudeh (masses)
22in 1942. The Soviet long-run objective in these actions seems to
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have been to keep the British out of northern Iran and counterbalance 
the British build-up in Iran as a whole. In the short-run, however, 
it aimed at exerting pressure on both Tehran and London to revoke their 
recent treaty, which needed the approval of the Iranian Majlis.
Otherwise, Moscow appeared to have no other aim in its actions which could 
justify a British assertion, upheld by pro-British Iranian circles, that
t
the Soviets wanted to extend their Marxist revolution into Iran. In
fact, Moscow was very careful to refrain from any action which could
increase Iran's dependence on Britain at the time. This was evident in
the common view held by Lenin and Rothstein, the Soviet Commissar of
Foreign Affairs, that "... any attempt on .... [the Soviet] part ... to
start revolution in any part of Persia would immediately throw it into
the arms of the British, who would be received as the Saviours of the 
23Fatherland". This view had a considerable impact on Soviet policies
concerning Iran in the coming years; and perhaps this is why the Soviet
occupation and its support for the Gilan Republic were short-lived. As
soon as the British, who had also concurrently come under mounting
pressure from a wave of anti-British nationalist feeling in the region,
particularly in India and Turkey, completed their withdrawal from
northern Iran and reduced their forces in the south of the country, the
Soviets withdrew from Iranian territory, abandoned their support for the
Gilan Republic and signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Iranian
24Government on 26 February 1921. In this treaty, the USSR recognised
Gilan as part of Iran under Iranian sovereignty and expressed its support 
for Iranian independence and territorial integrity. But in return it 
secured the right to intervene in Iran whenever the country was being 
used by a third party to threaten the security of the Soviet Union and 
its allies. Thus, by implication, Moscow mounted its pressure on Tehran 
not to ratify the new Anglo-Iranian Treaty. This, however, coincided
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with the dramatic rise to power in Iran of an Iranian commander, Reza 
Shah, on 26 February 1921. Reza Shah's response to the traditional 
Anglo-Russian rivalry was different from that of his predecessors.
The Rule of Reza Shah
When Reza Shah rose to power Iran was deep in socio-political chaos
and economic impoverishment; the successive Constitutionalist governments
had failed to achieve a necessary degree of domestic stability and
democratic reform; many Iranians particularly in the towns had become
disillusioned and frustrated with chronic instability in government,
lack of rapid reform or amelioration in their standard of living, and
25continuous foreign interventions; the two powers, Britain and the
USSR were coming close once again to reaching some power-parity in their 
relationship in Iran and their pressing respective domestic problems had 
compelled them to avoid further escalation of their rivalry; and nationalist- 
reformist movements had become important in most parts of South Asia and 
the Islamic world, where Ataturk in Turkey and King Ammanullah in 
Afghanistan stood high in their struggle for internal reforms and 
against foreign domination.^
Reza, the commander of the Russian-trained Cossack Brigade, the 
only disciplined force in Iran, seized power in a show of force. He 
became 'sardar sepah' or the commander-in-chief of all the armed 
forces and entrusted his political collaborator Sayed Zia, a pro-British 
intellectual, with the prime ministership. Subsequently, however, in 
a skilful display of disciplinary statesmanship, he replaced Sayed Zia 
in 1923 and succeeded to the throne of Persia in 1925 by a vote of the 
Majlis and a constitutional amendment, thus becoming the Shah of Iran.
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He established his own Pahlavi dynasty and single handed absolute rule—
a rule which appealed to Iranians both socially and traditionally — ,
but retained the Constitution of 1906 and its symbol of expression, the
Majlis, as a source of legitimacy for his actions. Although he had
come from the north and was a Russian trained Cossack officer, he was
trusted by the British and many even saw him as a British agent.
Judging by his ideas and deeds, he was however, a nationalist, deeply
27inspired by pro-Western reformist ideas. In ruling Iran until 1941,
he produced a strong dictatorial reformist regime, which strengthened 
the internal politics of Iran against Anglo-Soviet rivalry, but did 
nothing to save him politically once his grip over power was shattered 
by the Allied occupation of Iran in 1941. Judging from his actions in 
general, one of Reza Shah's main national goals was to reduce Iran's 
dependence, on Britain and the USSR, and hence insulate it from their 
rivalry. For this, he deemed it necessary to achieve two major objectives: 
first, the consolidation of internal politics under the authority of the 
Central Government and, therefore, the initiation of certain essential 
socio-economic reforms in order to create internal stability and unity; 
second, the establishment of a regional friendship and close relationship 
with a third power to secure a counterbalance against Anglo-Soviet 
intervention and rivalry. In one of his very first acts, he asked the 
Majlis to reject the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 and ratify the Iranian- 
Soviet Treaty of 1921. This was carried out with little opposition in 
the Majlis much to the dismay of the British, who were now deeply 
pre-occupied with nationalist uprisings in the Indian subcontinent and 
many parts of the Islamic world. In domestic politics, after 
reorganising and improving the armed forces, he moved swiftly and 
forcefully to consolidate the power of the Central Government vis-a-vis
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tribal and group powers, and banned all political parties and factions,
which had flourished during the so-called 'quasi democratic' period, some
of them having been sponsored by Britain and Russia in their own interests.
His forces crushed the secessionists, including the local rebels,
Kuchek Khan in Gilan and Sheikh Khazel in Khusistan, who had been
sponsored and manipulated by Russia and Britain respectively. He
consequently succeeded in establishing the authority of the Central
2 8Government almost throughout Iran.
In the economic sphere, he gave priority to certain important
developmental projects which laid the bases for the future Iranian
economic infrastracture. His Government built highways, and the
Trans-Iranian railway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian, and
established an airline and industrial complexes largely on the basis of
29the limited Iranian oil and internal revenues. In the social sphere,
his Government devoted attention to improving health and education and 
laid the foundations of the University of Tehran. In a drive to 
'secularise' the state and therefore reduce the power of the clergy in 
Iranian politics, he reduced religious holidays and introduced a new 
legal code modelled on the Napoleonic Code in what was a predominantly 
Islamic society. His social reforms also included allowing women to 
discard veils and asking men to drop turbans. It was largely these 
reforms in the context of his dictatorial rule in a traditional and 
strictly Islamic society which caused the violent mass uprisings of 
1935, resulting in the burning of the Majlis and, consequently, the 
violent crackdown on all opposition and closure of the Majlis by the 
Government. The political party which suffered most in the process was 
the pro-Moscow Tudeh, operating underground, whose leaders were prosecuted 
and i m p r i s o n e d . I n  implementing his reforms, he attempted to
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balance Anglo-Soviet participation by seeking expertise and technical
assistance from many other sources, including France, Germany, the
31United States, Austria and China. In the long run, Reza Shah's
reforms were not greatly rewarding as he failed to undertake a coherent 
and comprehensive programme of action in either socio-economic or 
political terms to restructure the feudal, traditional, economically 
backward and socially fragmented Iranian society. In the short run, they 
did, however, result, in a temporary social and economic stability which 
Reza Shah needed in order to reduce pressure on Iran from outside powers.
In foreign policy, the Soviet leadership was deeply preoccupied with
Stalin's policies of mass mobilisation, collectivisation and "socialism
in one country", while Britain was entangled with growing nationalist
revolts in its South Asian and Middle Eastern colonies as well as with the
consequences of the Great Depression. Reza Shah thus found the
opportunity to seek to balance Iran's relationships with Britain and the
Soviet Union. He acted to reduce Iran's dependence on Britain and to
increase the country's oil revenues which he needed to finance his
reforms and military build-up. For this, he needed to restrain the
increasing British economic and even political control in southern Iran.
His regime was aware that any achievement in this direction would lessen
the grounds for Soviet hostility towards Iran. At the time Iran's
income from its oil was "... the only assured and substantial bloc
of revenue, (providing) the unobtrusive but essential background to the
32country's economy". But, largely due to the international depression,
the Anglo-Persian Company paid markedly reduced royalties to the Iranian 
Government in 1931-1932. This drop in royalties was enough to bring 
to the surface the long-standing dissatisfaction of influential circles
2 5 .
in the Iranian Government with the amount gained under the D'Arcy
Concession of 1901 and with the way the Company had monopolised the entire
Iranian oil industry as an expoert-oriented sector benefiting mostly the
33Company and the British Government. Reza Shah therefore cancelled
the original Concession in November 1932 and demanded a renegotiated 
agreement. The British, in a display of "gunboat diplomacy", which was 
to be repeated about twenty years later, refused to give in and this 
precipitated a crisis in Anglo-Iranian relations.
The British Government, after a strong protest note to the Tehran
Government and a display of naval strength in the Persian Gulf, took the
matter to the Council of the League of Nations. Tehran considered the
dispute a matter between it and the Concessionaires, not a concern of
either the British Government or the League of Nations. The Soviet
attitude to the crisis was essentially one of 'wait and see', but
34commending Reza Shah's action as a "nationalist-reformist fight".
As the crisis became prolonged, the British Government grew anxious about 
the fact that any loss for British interests in Iran would not only 
seriously affect the British economy and its imperial power in South Asia 
and the Persian Gulf-Middle East region, but would also reduce Iran's 
dependence on Britain in favour of the Soviet Union. Consequently, 
while the debate on the issue was before the League of Nations, the 
British, on 29th April 1933, signed a new Concession with Iran which was 
to be valid for sixty years and could not be cancelled unilaterally again. 
Under the new Concession, the Company agreed to pay Iran "annually 20 
per cent of dividends on ordinary shares in excess of £671,250 and 
royalties on oil fixed at 4 s. a ton sold and exported". These figures 
were later increased. The area of the new Concession was limited to 
100,000 square miles and provisions were made for participation by
26,
Iranians in managing the Company and running the oil industry.35 
Reza Shah's regime was unable to achieve a better deal than this. As 
a result, the British succeeded in retaining their monopoly of the 
Iranian oil industry from production to shipment.35 This, with 
the British reluctance to implement the new agreement in its entirety, 
left many Iranian grievances unanswered and eventually prompted 
Dr Mossadeq's government to nationalise the Iranian oil industry in 
early 1951.
The showdown with the British, however, provided Reza Shah with 
some leverage to widen Iran's foreign policy options and improve its 
relations with the Soviet Union, and with other neighbouring countries, 
as well as to seek closer ties with a third power to deflect the Anglo- 
Soviet rivalry -- his second objective. He devoted himself to 
strengthening Iran's relations with Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan with 
the aim of forming 'a small power bloc' "strong enough to resist outside 
pressure from the Great Powers".37 This eventually resulted in the 
conclusion of the Saadabad Pact of non-aggression and consultation 
between Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan. in his search for
closer ties with a third power, Reza Shah preferred the United States 
mainly because it was a geographically distant and largely a non-colonial 
power, presumably less ready than others to intervene in Iranian affairs.
Given, however, the United States' policy of low key involvement in 
world affairs at the time, particularly in a region which it had 
traditionally recognised as a British sphere of influence, Washington was 
unprepared to commit itself to close ties with Tehran. After direct 
approaches had failed, Tehran attempted to develop relations by involving 
Amsrican Oil Companies in the Iranian oil industry. It arranged a visit
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by a representative of the Standard Oil Company in late December 1939 in
search of a major oil concession. The mission, however, proved
ineffective for two main reasons: (i) the State Department completely
disassociated the US Government from the mission and its purpose; and
(ii) Moscow demanded that, if the American Company were granted an oil
concession, the Soviet Union should be given an equal concession also,
39which Tehran was not prepared to grant. Tehran therefore went even
so far as to provoke Washington into closer ties by threatening to 
strengthen its relations with Moscow. After concluding a Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation with the USSR in March 1940, which promised
closer ties between the two countries and made considerable economic
40concessions to the Soviet Trade Ministry and Trade organisations,
Tehran approached Washington with the details of the Treaty in order to 
induce it to conclude a similar treaty with Iran. Moreover, it sought 
to purchase military hardware from the United States. Washington, 
however, still remained reluctant to make any serious commercial,
financial or military commitment to Iran and consequently, Reza Shah
41could secure nothing more than limited diplomatic and trade ties.
The situation, however, changed dramatically after Reza Shah's death in 
1944, when Washington began to commit itself to the security of Iran 
and hence gradually to replace Britain as the major Soviet rival in the 
region.
The other power with which Reza Shah had sought to forge close ties 
was Germany. The rise of Germany as a nationalist and anti-British 
power had impressed the Iranian leadership as it had many other nationalist 
governments and movements in Asia and the Middle East. Reza Shah had 
considerable success in furthering friendship with Germany. In his
28.
attempt to weaken the British position. Hitler rendered generous
economic and technical assistance to Iran, as he did to Turkey and
Afghanistan. By the end of the 1930s more than six hundred German
experts had been employed in various industrial, commercial and educational
projects in Iran. Trade developed rapidly and by 1938/39 Germany
4 9accounted for 41 per cent of the total foreign trade of Iran.
Consequently, as Churchill put it, "German prestige stood high" among 
43Iranians. This alarmed Britain, but Moscow treated this
development calmly and because of its treaty of friendship with 
Germany, saw no danger in Iranian-German friendship. In fact, to the 
Soviet leadership it was a fruitful anti-British development. The out­
break of World War II, however, changed the whole situation since the two 
traditional rivals, Britain and USSR, were once again forced to enter a 
war-time alliance against a common enemy, Germany. Given Iran's 
friendship with Germany, this resulted not only in the joint occupation 
of Iran by Anglo-Soviet forces in August 1941 but also in the replacement 
of Reza Shah by his 20 year old son, Mohammed Reza. Thus neither
Reza Shah's domestic politics of centralisation of 
power and 'defensive modernisation' nor his external politics of 
'regional cooperation' and 'close ties with a third power' survived a 
change in the Anglo-Soviet relationship.
Iran in World War II
Under heavy pressure from the advancing German forces, Moscow 
requested London to open a second front against Germany in Europe. 
Churchill, however, did not consider this to be politically or 
militarily expedient; instead he promised all other possible help to 
the Soviet Union in carrying on the war in its own front. He was
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determined to keep the Soviet front viable. He declared: "It is
our duty and our interest to give the utmost possible aid to the 
44Russians ... . Interestingly enough, London chose Iran as the most
suitable and quickest corridor, with its railway connection from the
Persian Gulf to the Caspian, through which Western aid (war supplies)
could be transferred to the Soviet Union. For this, Churchill asked
Stalin to join him in making a request to Reza Shah. Declaring
Iran's neutrality in the War and wishing to preserve his friendship
with Germany, Reza Shah rejected the Anglo-Soviet request.
Consequently, without further ado, London proposed to Moscow a joint 
45invasion of Iran. Stalin agreed because he badly needed war
supplies. The Anglo-Soviet forces, with American support, occupied 
Iran almost in the same pattern as had been prescribed by the two 
powers' agreement of 1907,though with one major difference, that their 
respective zones of influence were now transformed into zones of occupation. 
The Soviets occupied the north, the British took over the south, while 
the capital, Tehran, and the sovereignty of the whole country (though 
acknowledged to the Tehran Government) were placed provisionally under 
the joint protection of the two powers.
The rewards for both powers were several. The Soviets secured a 
viable supply route and freed themselves from anxiety over the British 
view that the Germans might make a thrust from Iran against the Soviet 
oil-fields at Baku. The British placed their interests, particularly 
their oil-fields and oil installations, under their own direct protection 
as Churchill had ordered. They made themselves immune against the 
possible use of Iran by Germans to implement Hitler's 'Oriental Plan' 
in an attempt to weaken the British Empire. They helped to keep the
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Soviet front active by facilitating, with the aid of the small American 
Persian Gulf Task Force, the transit of war supplies to the Soviet 
Union. Meanwhile, Churchill ordered British forces to ensure "that the 
Russian influence [in Iran was] kept within reasonable bounds" and to use 
"... the leverage of a possible Russian occupation" of Tehran against the 
Iranian Government in order to obtain all facilities Britain required,^ 
and finally to make "the Persians keep each other quiet while we get 
on with the war".^
Iran was, however, humiliated and lost its real sovereignty.
The.conduct of its domestic and foreign affairs was directly subjected 
to the dictates of the occupying forces. Under pressure, Reza Shah 
abdicated in favour of his son and went into exile in South Africa, 
where he died in 1944. Mohammed Reza Shah was young, inexperienced 
and wielded little real power, given the circumstances of his succession, 
but he suited the Allied forces in their desire to legitimise their 
actions in Iran.
The end of Reza Shah's absolute rule and the beginning of Allied 
occupation opened a new phase in the development of Iranian politics.
This resulted in the loss of control by Tehran over a large part of 
Iran, the loosening up of the autocratic and centralised system which 
Reza Shah had built, and the sinking of Iran into growing disorder, 
socio-political- disarray and economic hardship. Numerous socio­
political groups, including tribes, with demands for domestic reforms 
and tribal autonomy reappeared in the Iranian political scene. They 
included some which followed either the British or Soviet line. Some 
sought the evolutionary institution of some sort of 'democratic' mass
participatory system with the retention of monarchy; and others demanded
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revolutionary 'socialist' structural changes with Iran becoming a 
48republic. This was, moreover, highlighted by the rapid development
of a nationalist current, supported by those Iranians who were anxious 
because of the chaotic domestic situation as well as the humiliation 
and instability which Iran had suffered at the hands of foreign powers.^ 
While foreign powers were using their favoured socio-political groups 
and tribes against each other, the Majlis consequently emerged as a 
credible national forum for diverse political expressions, agitations 
and demands. The conservative traditional institution of monarchy, 
however, still controlled the demoralised Iranian armed forces and 
symbolised Iran's sovereignty, while the 'old guard' which upheld this 
institution still dominated a government notorious for its corrupt 
and inefficient bureaucracy.^
In the meantime, with their traditional zones of influence transformed 
into zones of occupation, the British and Soviet rivalry in Iran became 
more acute. Each wishing to keep the other's influence at bay and 
secure a government in Tehran friendly and dependent upon itself, the 
two powers once again engaged in a stable but intense tussle to entrench 
their respective positions. While Churchill had already ordered the 
British forces to ensure that Soviet influence be kept "within reasonable 
bounds" and to make "the Persians keep each other quiet", the Soviets 
found the opportunity to solve their problem with regard to Iran once 
and for all. They, consequently, began what may be called 'Sovietisation' 
of their zone of occupation.
Shortly after their occupation began, they closed their zone to 
free entry; those Iranians and foreigners who wished to visit the zone 
were required to obtain special passes from the Soviet Embassy in Tehran.
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They embarked upon a number of long-range policies designed to effect 
basic socio-economic and political changes in the northern Iranian 
provinces (especially Azerbaijan and Kurdistan) under their control.
This eventually led to the establishment of a pro-Soviet Tudeh 
government in Azerbaijan independent of the Tehran Government.
Some of the major measures involved the issuing of new regulations that 
would favour the peasantry as opposed to land owners with regard to 
sharing of crops, though this fell short of a land reform; the 
confiscation or compulsory purchase of large amounts of grain from 
private individuals and government stores; and the taking over of some 
estates and the establishment of model farms to be operated with the 
help of the Red Army. These, together with a ban on the export of 
staple foodstuffs from the Soviet to the other zones, enabled the Soviets 
to claim a better economic growth as against the British zone and thus 
attract increasing support from Iranian intellectuals, anti-British 
factions and the lower working classes.51 More significantly, the
Soviets promptly and forcefully revived and strengthened Iran's 
previously banned pro-Soviet Communist Party.
In his campaign against all organised opposition, Reza Shah had 
banned the Communist Party in 1937. Under the general amnesty of 1941, 
however, fifty-two leading members of the party were released from prison. 
With Soviet help and under the leadership of the strongly pro-Moscow 
Ja'afar Pishawari, they soon reorganised the party and renamed it 
Tudeh (the masses) with its base in the Soviet zone. The renaming was 
largely an attempt to disguise its ideological leanings and avoid 
alienating those Iranians who believed in reform but not in communism.
The party was a major critic of the Tehran Government and opposed the
institution of monarchy and the British 'colonial-imperialist' presence
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and interference in Iran. It advocated socialist reforms and autonomy
for the province of Azerbaijan, with which Soviet Azerbaijan shared
53common geographical, ethnic and religious affinity. Similarly, it
encouraged the Iranian Kurd community to stand up for its autonomy against 
, , 54the Tehran Government. Eventually, the Tudeh succeeded in establishing
an autonomous regime in Azerbaijan, where in 1944-45 the Tehran Government 
was barred from appointing a provincial governor and revolts against the 
central government increased day by day. Drawing on this, General Arfa, 
at the time Iranian Joint Chief of Staff, alleges that the Soviets' 
ultimate aim was to establish a pro-Moscow government in Tehran.
He, fails however, to substantiate this or to consider the possibility 
that it was being used as a threat and bargaining lever by the Soviets 
against what the British had been doing in the rest of Iran.
The British were certainly alarmed by these Soviet activities in the 
north. Prompted by their own interests, the British interpreted the 
Soviet measures as imminently dangerous to their security. They 
certainly overlooked the possibility that the measures were largely a 
Soviet reaction to their uncertainty concerning the future of Iran 
and consequently concerning their own security as well as a response to 
what the British had been doing in Iran for years. Britain and its 
closest ally, the United States, charged the Soviet Union with 
violating the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942, 
under which the allied powers undertook "to safeguard the economic 
existence of the Iranian people against the deprivation and difficulties 
arising as a result of the present war" as well as "to respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran and withdraw their forces
from Iran "not later than six months" after the end of hostilities in all
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war theatres.' This had been subsequently reiterated by the
57Anglo-American-Soviet Declaration of December 1, 1943.
Meanwhile, in counter-moves, the British had already begun to
reinforce their past policy of 'divide and rule' in Iran. This time,
it basically meant the reinforcement of the politics of 'conservatism'
and 'tribalism' against the forces which sought 'radical' changes appearing
either against the British position or in favour of the Soviets. In
this way, the British sought to check the activities of the anti-British
forces and the Soviet influence in Iran. They exploited 'conservative'
beliefs against 'radical' ones, religious (Islamic) against 1concervative'
convictions and nationalist against religious feelings. In general,
they vigorously supported 'conservative' elements (largely tribes,
religious zealots and the institution of monarchy), though, at times,
they played the same forces against each other. The stability of tribes
in contrast to the weakness of the Tehran Government influenced British
policy. The "... tribes, imbued with conservatism, resented radical
change. The Soviet policy of Tudeh stood for change: Hence the tribes
5 8were naturally inclined to be hostile to communism".
Moreover, to oppose the strengthening of the Tudeh party, the
British eagerly assisted the formation and activities of a pro-Western
but anti-communist political party called 'Eradehyi-Melli' (National
Will). They used the threat of a Soviet occupation of Tehran as a
leverage in enlisting the support of the Tehran Government for this
party. The party was led by the former Iranian Prime Minister, Sa'ied
Zia-ed-Din, whom Reza Shah had replaced and sent into exile partly
59because of his strong pro-Western sentiments. He was brought back
by the British. The Party's "... press organs waged a relentless
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struggle against the Tudeh, accusing it of treason, subversive activities, 
anti-religious propaganda, violence, sabotage, hooliganism and 
hypocrisy".^
These measures and counter-measures in response to accusations and 
counter-accusations, inherent in British-Soviet relations over Iran 
before their occupation of the country, reactivated their traditional 
rivalry contrary to their policy of war-time friendship and cooperation. 
Consequently, "... a local but very important 'cold war' was being waged 
in Iran between the Soviet Union and Great Britain during World War II".^ 
This local 'cold war' was waged at the time when the United States as 
a major power was Britain's closest ally and was committed not only to 
the Atlantic Charter, but also to the Tehran Conference and had tacitly 
approved the Tripartite Treaty. While the British position as a 
leading world power was in decline, the position of the United States 
as a superpower■was on the rise and it could not remain aloof from Iranian 
developments any longer.
As was mentioned earlier, up to 1940 Iran had a very small place 
in the arena of American foreign policy. The United States had neither 
significant military and economic interests in Iran, nor were there many 
Iranian voters, compared to other ethnic groups (such as Polish), in 
the United States. Given the American policy of low-key involvement in 
world affairs at the time, Reza Shah failed to secure any major American 
political and economic commitment towards Iran. After the occupation 
of Anglo-Russian forces, however, the situation began to change. As 
their close ally, during 1942 and 1943, the British called a number of 
American troops from the US Persian Gulf Command, composed of about 
30,000 men, into Iran to speed up the supply of American lend-lease aid
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and other war materials to the USSR. The Americans were to take care
of the railway from the Persian Gulf to Tehran and Russians from
Tehran to Bandar Shah on the Caspian. Also, an Anglo-American agreement
"... provided that British troops would ensure security measures in
the southern zone while technical operation would be left to the 
6 2Americans". Although this American physical involvement was in
conformity with Tehran's search for better ties with the United States,
the Soviet Union considered it as the advent of yet another "imperialist"
force at work in Iran. From the Soviet point of view, the presence of
American troops in Iran without any agreement with the Iranian and
6 3Soviet authorities was illegal. Nonetheless, because of its war-time
alliance with the United States, because it needed aid and, moreover, 
because US policy was not initially very clear, the Soviet Union 
refrained from debating the issue publicly at the time.
In the meantime, Washington was becoming increasingly conscious
of the growing strategic importance of Iran to the West, and its
economic importance in respect of oil. It had become apparent to a
number of American policy makers that if Iran fell to Soviet communism
all Western economic and political interests in the whole Persian Gulf
region would become vulnerable to Soviet penetration. In the early 1940s,
a report had already been submitted to President Roosevelt by the
American Commission of experts, which stated: "The future of the Great
Power, oil, no longer lies on the American continent. The center of
gravity of the world's petroleum output is shifting more and more from
the area of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean to the area around the
Persian Gulf. This trend will continue in the future, leading to an
64ultimate rearrangement". It was such considerations that prompted
the State Department as early as late 1941 to appeal to American
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missionary schools in Iran to keep up their good work by "countering
bad (communist) influences at work there". Wallace Murray, Chief of
the Near Eastern Division, urged the Presbyterian Board of Foreign
Missions to see that its school at Tabriz restrain "Soviet separatist
and ideological activities in that area, of which much has already been
heard". He also advocated the resumption of trade negotiations with
Iran "for reasons of political expediency and in order to safeguard
American trade interests in Iran during the post-War period", and make
sure that American oil companies interested in Iran could be welcomed 
65in the region. As a result, when the British requested lend-lease
funds to build several pipelines across Iran, Washington asked for assurances
that these pipelines would be made available to American companies after
the war.^k Meanwhile, Patrick Hurley, American special ambassador,
upon his return from a Middle East tour, advised President Roosevelt that
the United States needed to put much greater effort and exert much more
leadership if Iran were to remain independent in the postwar era.
He, moreover, advised Washington to help Iran in building a "democratic
G Vgovernment", based upon a "system of free enterprise".
It was in the context of these reports and suggestions that Washington
committed itself to the development of close political, economic and
military ties with Iran so that America's position should not "lapse
68again in any way to that of relative unimportance" in the country.
It bolstered its military mission in Iran, which was there to expedite
lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union, by dispatching additional
69military experts and advisors to the Iranian Government. It sought
to have a substantial role in the Iranian economy and oil resources.
In responding to a request of the Iranian Government, it assisted an 
American financial mission to Iran in 1943, headed by Arthur C. Millspaugh,
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not only to reorganise the Iranian financial system, but also to pave
the way for promoting American interests there. Millspaugh subsequently
wrote: "Our control of revenues and expenditure not only served as a
stabilising influence but also was indispensable to the full effectiveness
70of Americans in other fields". In February 1944, moreover,
Washington stepped up its Legation in Tehran to Embassy status and also 
came out publicly in full support of the Iranian and British governments 
against the Soviet moves to entrench its position in Iran. Thus before 
the war ended, Washington's 'New Deal' diplomacy had been extended to 
Iran in opposing the Soviets and promoting its own intersts.
This rapid change in American policy, from limited to extensive involvement 
in Iran, brought sharp public criticism from the Soviet Union, and this 
increased during the so-called "oil crisis of 1944".
The 'oil crisis' was largely precipitated when during the first
half of 1944 two American oil companies, Standard Vacuum and Sinclair,
sought to negotiate oil concessions with the Iranian Government without
informing either the British or the Soviets. In the background of
rapidly growing American involvement in Iran, this added to the discomfort
of the Soviet Union, which had already been troubled by the increasing
influence of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the biggest in Iran. In a
counter-move, consequently, Moscow also demanded an oil concession that
would cover all the five northern provinces of Iran, stretching from
71Azerbaijan to Khorasan under Soviet occupation. The Soviet objectives
in this demand were to rebuff the American and any further British 
demands for oil concessions, and thereby to undercut their influence in 
Iran. They wished also to combat the Western monopoly of the Persian 
Gulf-Middle Eastern oil and its possible future use by the Western
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powers against the Soviet Union in the arena of international politics.
On the grounds, however, that Iran would become a victim of a
round of foreign competition because of its oil at a time when the
Tehran Government was weak and the rival forces had occupied Iran,
the Iranian Prime Minister Sa'ed refused any oil concession to any of the 
72powers. He ordered all the talks about oil concessions to be
postponed until the end of the war. The Majlis promptly passed a bill
to this effect, prohibiting any government official from either discussing
or signing any oil concessionary agreement with any foreign company 
73or person. The principal author of the bill was Dr Mohammed
74Mossadeq. Sa'ed's refusal was very displeasing to the Soviets, 
who suspected the Iranian Government of having made its decision in 
collusion with the United States and Britain. On October 24, 1944 the 
Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Trade, Kavtaradze, denounced the 
Iranian decision and declared: "the disloyal and unfriendly position
taken by Premier Sa'ed toward the Soviet Union excludes the possibility
of further collaboration with him". The Soviet and Tudeh press
criticised the Iranian Government as "reactionary" and an agent of
"Western imperialism".^ In responding to the Soviet criticisms, the
American ambassador to Tehran, Leland B. Morris, revealed that
Washington "... recognised the sovereign right of Iran to refuse the
granting of oil concessions and did not reproach the Iranian government 
77on that account". This strengthened Soviet suspicion of Iran's
collusion with the West. As a result, Izvestia provocatively questioned
the legality of the presence of American troops in Iran. It questioned
how their presence without a treaty with the Iranian Government
"tallies with Iran's sovereignty and independence". 78
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The final blow, however, to Washington-Moscow relations over Iran,
came when the Soviet Union showed reluctance to honour its treaty
commitments to withdraw its forces from Iran within six months after
the termination of the war. The final date for troop withdrawal as
agreed at the three powers' foreign ministers' conference of September
791945, had been set for March 2, 1946. But as the war neared its
end the Soviet Union continued on the contrary to strengthen its forces
in northern Iran. Meanwhile, an autonomous communist regime under
Tudeh Party leadership was formed in the two Soviet occupied provinces
80of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. This, together with the Soviet
reluctance to withdraw its forces, not only angered the Iranian
Government but also deeply concerned the administration in Washington
and London. In January 1946, the Iranian Government with US and
British support formally charged the Soviet Union before the Security
Council under the United Nations Charter with creating "a situation which
might lead to international friction" by interference in Iranian 
81internal affairs. In reply, the-Soviet Union introduced formal
charges against Britain over Greece and Indonesia and argued that the
dispute over Iran "was not a matter which that body (the Security
82Council) was competent to handle". This provoked the British
Foreign Secretary to comment that "... many ... were discouraged at 
the disintegration of the great wartime coalition behind a front of
diplomatic verbiage which kept up the appearance of good relations and
of unity but avoided the central problem, the adjustment of relations
83between east and west ...". Thus, the Anglo-Soviet dispute over
«I
Iran, which so far had been kept at regional level, finally assumed its 
place in the arena of global politics with the United States in the
forefront of the dispute.
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On January 26, 1946, however, Premier Sa'ed was replaced by Ahmad
Qavam, who was known to favour a compromise with the Soviet Union,
and proposed to enter direct negotiation with Moscow. The Security
Council consequently agreed to let the two parties settle their
differences bilaterally. While British and American troops had withdrawn
from Iran formally on January 1, President Truman, who had just succeeded
Roosevelt, cast serious doubt on Qavam's chances of success in direct
talks. He later wrote: "it was, of course, unlikely that Iran would
be able to resist Russian demands while Soviet troops were still
occupying her territory. ‘Under such conditions there could hardly
84be any equality at the bargaining table". As a result, in a
coordinated drive, Washington and London sent two separate protest notes
to the Kremlin, demanding immediate Soviet withdrawal. The American
note explained the US obligations to the UN Charter and certain
treaties concerning its commitment to Iran and warned Moscow that
Washington "cannot remain indifferent" and stressed that "... the
Government of the Soviet Union will do its part by withdrawing
immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Iran, to promote
the international conference which is necessary for peaceful progress
85among the peoples of all nations". For President Truman, as for
the British Foreign Secretary, the dispute over Iran was no longer regional.
"(The) ... Russian activities in Iran", Truman wrote, "threatened the
peace of the world". He, moreover, stressed: "If the Russians were to
control Iran's oil, either directly or indirectly, the raw material
balance of the world would undergo serious damage, and it would be a
86serious loss for the economy of the Western world". Hence, the
United States must fight Soviet influence in Iran at all costs. There 
were a number of factors which this statement disregarded, including
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Stalin's concerns about Soviet security, which had been threatened for
years by British activities in Iran, the vulnerability of the Baku oil-
87fields to attack from Iran, and the Soviet desire, as a world power,
to have a share in the "exploitation of world deposits", particularly
88those in the Persian Gulf region.
Against this build-up of tension between the Soviet Union and 
Western powers, there was, however, a sudden but major breakthrough in 
the bilateral talks between Tehran and Moscow. On March 24, 1946,
Moscow unexpectedly announced that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn 
from Iran at once, pending the conclusion of an agreement between Iran 
and the Soviet Union in April. The two sides agreed that: (i) the
Red Army would evacuate within one month and a half after March 24, 1946;
(ii) a joint stock Irano-Soviet oil company was to be established and 
ratified by the Fifteenth Majlis within seven months after March 24; and
(iii) Iran would carry out improvements in Azerbaijan in accordance with
existing laws (under Tudeh leadership) and in benovolent spirit toward
89the people of Azerbaijan. The reasons why Moscow so easily agreed
to withdraw its troops and abandon the autonomous Tudeh regime in 
Azerbaijan, have not yet been documented. Washington claimed that this 
was largely because of its pressures, whereas London credited Churchill's 
Fulton speech, which recommended to the Western democracies a policy of
"sedate and sober strength" against the Soviet Union, with some impact
90on the Soviet leadership. These may have made some contribution.
But it seems that the Soviet decision was mainly a result of Moscow's
increasing preoccupation with its interests in Eastern and Southern Europe
91and Qavam's political shrewdness in handling negotiations.
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The Irano-Soviet agreement provided both sides with an honourable
way out of the dispute and it was, indeed, a partial victory for Moscow
at the time. But before the year ended things changed dramatically in
favour of the Tehran Government. The entire Azerbaijan issue had a
marked impact on the Iranian people's view of the Soviet Union.
It had not only reinforced the traditional conservative beliefs that the
Soviets were still determined to transform Iran into one of their
socialist satellites as part of their plan for a world-wide revolution,
but also disenchanted many other Iranian groups, which adhered strictly
to their own traditions and independence. The Iranian monarchy,
heading the conservative forces including the bureaucracy, as well as
the British and Americans capitalised on this extensively in order to
strengthen the anti-Soviet tide and consequently their own position in 
92Iran. In the meantime, the US had stepped up its military and
economic aid to the Tehran Government. The American police and military
advisory missions had become active in reorganising and reequipping
93Iranian security and military forces. Millspaugh and his team of
financial advisors had been engaged in reorganising the Iranian financial
system, though they had run into difficulties with many Iranian personnel
94and had been forced to leave Iran by 1946. Later, however, Max
Thornburg, formerly petroleum advisor to the State Department, headed a 
group of American advisors in planning the Iranian economy and
95eventually drafting Iran's First Seven Year Development Plan in 1949.
The Iranian Government welcomed the increasing role of the United States 
in Iran as against both the USSR and Britain.
By October 1946 the Iranian Government was thus in a relatively 
strong position to undertake certain bold anti-Soviet actions. Under
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the Shah's command (possibly at Anglo-American urging) Tehran forces
96crushed the secessionist Tudeh regime in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.
Also, Premier Qavam urged the newly elected Majlis to denounce the 
whole Irano-Soviet Agreement of April 1946. In October 1947 the
97Majlis, led by Mossadeq did so with a majority of 102 to 2 votes.
This resulted in four major developments. First, Irano-Soviet 
relations returned to a situation of mistrust and unfriendliness.
Second, for the first time, the young Shah exerted his constitutional 
position as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces by personally 
commanding the military operation against the secessionist provinces.
This bolstered his leadership and the power of the monarchy in Iranian 
politics. Third, Iran became further dependent on the West, mainly the 
United States, for its protection against any possible Soviet reaction. 
Fourth a severe blow was struck against the crumbling harmony of East- 
West relations: previously, the Western powers had accused the Soviet
Union of disregarding its "own solemn promises" by not pulling its 
troops out of Iran as scheduled, but now, from the Soviet point of view, 
the same Western powers supported Iran in disregarding its agreement 
with the Soviet Union. It was, indeed, a hard pill for the Soviet 
leadership to swallow, to let its southern neighbour slip into the 
Western camp at a time when the US international behaviour was being 
guided increasingly by Truman's doctrine for the containment of communism 
within the Soviet borders. Moscow, therefore, stepped up its underground 
support for the Iranian communists and anti-government groups, whose
role in Iranian politics, particularly during Dr Mohammed Mossedeq's 
nationalist and reformist government (1951-1953) provided London 
and Washington with an ultimate excuse to engineer the overthrow of 
the Mossadeq government.
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Mossadeq And 'Oil Nationalisation'
During the war, as mentioned earlier, the loosening of central 
authority under Allied occupation allowed various social and political 
"groups' with reformist platforms but diverse ideological orientations 
to emerge and develop on the Iranian political scene. The Anglo-Soviet 
intervention had resulted in a strengthening of the pro-Moscow Communist 
Tudeh and Pro-British Eradehyi-Melli into major political parties.
These, along with tens of other factions, dominated the Majlis which had 
become the seat of political power and symbol of 'democracy' in Iran.
But their disunity and group animosities had become largely responsible 
for political instability and social disturbances. As a result, the 
life span of no government was more than a year in the 1940s and 
successive governments had failed to initiate and implement serious and 
necessary reforms. After the war and the Azerbaijan affair, however, 
the Tudeh and Eradehyi-Melli parties had been weakened and, subsequently,
because of an attempt on the Shah's life in February 1949, the Tudeh party
98 99was officially banned. Consequently, Qavam's Democratic Party,
which had attracted a balanced membership from various political circles, 
assumed control of the 15th Majlis and Qavam became prime minister once 
again. He was respected as a remarkable political tactician in the way 
he handled Iran's dealings with the Soviet Union. But soon an inner 
party crisis resulted in his loss of support in the Majlis on 10 December 
1947 and his party disintegrated. From then on until 1951 there were 
three different cabinets, none capable of commanding a working majority 
in the Majlis for more than a short period. Amid growing socio­
political unrest and constant attempts by the conservative forces, headed 
by the monarchy, to assert their control over the Majlis, "(n)either 
the prime ministers nor the Majlis displayed significant activity, and
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debate and procrastination were substitutes for decisions".100 
It was, however, during this period that the Majlis approved (1949) the 
programme of Iran's First Seven Year Development Plan and authorised the 
establishment of a Plan Organisation to execute its projects. The Shah 
also paid his first state visit to the United States and pressed for 
economic and military aid; and Washington announced the extension of 
its first Point IV (economic aid) programme to Iran in 1949101 and
agreed to supply the country with arms under the Mutual Defense Aid
• r _ 102 programme m  1950.
In the meantime, a Majlis deputy, Dr Mohammed Mossadeq was emerging
rapidly as a leading nationalist-reformist figure. He had been a
prominent political activist, with controversial background, since early
this century. He had consistently advocated the creation of a
parliamentary 'democratic' system with the power of monarchy limited
and regulated by law; the exertion of Iran's ownership and control over
its resources, particularly oil; and the implementation of rapid
fundamental socio-economic reforms. It was primarily in support
of these interrelated objectives that, after supporting the
Constitutionalist Movement in the 1910s and, subsequently, being elected
to the Majlis, Mossadeq led a small group of deputies in opposing Reza
Shah's succession to the throne of Persia in 1925 on the grounds that his
103rule could only be dictatorial. He had been imprisoned in the 1930s
for his opposition activities, but returned to political life in 1941
under the Allied occupation and was elected to the Majlis from Tehran.
He subsequently initiated the bill of 'no oil concession' to any power
in 1944 and played a leading role in the Majlis' rejection of the Irano-
104Soviet Agreement of April 1946.
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By the late 1940s, Mossadeq gained increasing support, both inside 
and outside the Majlis, from the newly emerged National Front (Jebheyi 
Melli) , which was basically a loose grouping of diverse elements: the
Iran Party, the Toilers' Party, the Neo-Nazi Sumka Party, the ultra- 
nationalist Pan-Iran Party, the religious fanatics of the Devotees of 
Islam, and the rabble-rousing religious leader, Sayyid Abol Qassem 
Kashani Mossadeq consequently, emerged as the leading spokesman
of the Front. He advocated first of all, the assertion of Iran's 
ownership and control of its oil industry. The underlying considerations 
were to maximise Iran's income from its most viable source of capital, 
minimise the reasons for both British direct activities and Anglo-Soviet 
rivalry in Iran and, as a result, improve Iran's relations with the 
Soviet Union as a leverage against the British influence in Iran. 
Consequently, he wished to harness Iranian resources in order to initiate 
and implement structural domestic political and socio-economic reforms.
In this, Mossadeq was greatly assisted by two major factors. First, 
the British monopoly of the Iranian oil industry and their development 
of the industry as mainly an export sector to benefit mostly the British 
Government and British Petroleum (BP), which owned the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC),had proved to be very costly for Iran. According to one 
analysis:
... the magnitude of direct influences of the oil industry during 
the 1910-50 period was, for all practical purposes, negligible, 
and that the industry remained economically divorced from the rest 
of the Iranian economy. The only major connecting link between 
oil and the domestic economy was provided by payments of royalties, 
taxes and dividends to the government. These payments, too, were 
of limited benefit, largely because of their relative order of 
magnitude in the over-all budget. Only owing to the limited scope 
and magnitude of Iranian non-oil exports and the growing needs of 
Iran for both civilian and military imports, the supply of foreign 
exchange in oil royalties and sterling conversion into rials (for 
the economy's domestic expenditure) was of relatively notable help 
to the Iranian economy.106
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In this light, one of the AIOC officials called the Company's half a
107century effort "crudest exploitation".
Second, the issue of oil was a popular one. By now a broad cross-
section of the Iranian people, irrespective of their socio-political
leanings, had become not only conscious of their oil potential and
its exploitation by the British against their interests, but also easily
persuadable, following defeat, humiliation and pressure by the Allied
occupying forces, to rally for a cause which could restore their dignity.
Consequently, while rejecting an oil concession to the USSR in early 1947,
Mossadeq firmly demanded a better deal from AIOC with growing popular
sanction. In view of the popularity of the demand, the Majlis
appointed Mossadeq to head a committee to consider the issue. Although
108by 1949 BP had devised a 'supplemental agreement', which would have
about doubled royalty payments made by AIOC, the concurrent Aramco
offer of 'fifty-fifty percent profit sharing deal' to the Saudi Arabian
Government prompted the Majlis' Oil Committee under Mossadeq to reject
the agreement unanimously. The British refusal to enter a 'fifty-fifty'
deal with Iran angered the Iranians and consequently the Oil Committee
109recommended the full nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry.
While this infuriated the British, Prime Minister Ali Razmara, a 
conservative general and the Shah's choice as prime minister since 
June 1950, appeared before the Majlis on March 3, 1951 in an attempt to 
persuade the deputies against full nationalisation on the grounds that 
Iran could not override its international obligations and lacked the 
capacity to run the oil industry on its own. But Razmara was shot dead 
within four days of his appearance by a member of the Fedaiyani Islam 
(Devotees of Islam), which two days later threatened to kill the Shah 
and other leading members of government. Amid growing public
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unrest in support of nationalisation, the Majlis accepted its Oil 
Committee's recommendation and on March 15 passed a bill providing for 
the nationalisation of AIOC; the bill was approved by the Senate on 
March 20.^^ Meanwhile, when Premier Ala, Razmara's successor, failed 
to reach any agreement with the British, the Majlis voted Mossadeq to the 
prime ministership on 30 April 1951.
Despite its foreseeable consequences, Mossadeq declared AIOC 
nationalised on May 1 and in return promised compensation. He set up 
the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to take over from AIOC. The 
nationalisation meant Iranian ownership and control of the oil industry; 
it did not, however, provide that the former Company should withdraw all 
of its British employees and expertise. Mossadeq believed that the
nationalisation would not result in economic losses as many anti­
nationalisation elements were vigorously arguing. He considered 
nationalisation the most viable measure to procure sufficient capital 
for improving socio-conomic conditions. On June 21, 1951, he declared:
"Our long years of negotiations with foreign countries concerning 
the legitimacy of our claims to ownership of the industry, which 
no power in the world can deny us, have yielded no results this 
far, however. With the oil revenues we could meet our entire 
budget and combat poverty, disease, and backwardness among our 
people. Another important consideration is that by the 
elimination of the power of the British company, we would also 
eliminate corruption and intrigue, by means of which the internal 
affairs of our country have been influenced. Once this tutelage 
has ceased, Iran will have achieved its economic and political 
independence.
The Iranian state prefers to take over the production of 
petroleum itself. The company should do nothing else but return 
its property to the rightful owners. The Nationalisation law 
provides that 25 percent of the net profits on oil be set aside 
to meet all the legitimate claims of the company for compensation ...
It has been asserted abroad that Iran intends to expel the 
foreign oil experts from the country and then shut down oil 
installations. Not only is this allegation absurd; it is utter 
invention. The Iranian government has never considered such a 
step. Rather, it will make every effort to carry out
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nationalisation as smoothly as possible, so as not to interfere 
with production. Thus deportation of the foreign specialists 
is out of the question. H 2
Nevertheless, Mossadeq had already declared that it was possible that the 
nationalisation might not result in great economic gains immediately; but 
it was the moral aspect of the measure which concerned him most.
Outlining his views on the matter on November 6, 1950, Mossadeq had 
stated:
I believe more in the moral than economic aspect of nationalisation 
of the oil industry. Assuming that we could not extract and sell 
as much oil as the company we should be able under any circumstances 
to satisfy domestic consumption and secure the equivalent of the 
current revenues received from the company; the remaining oil 
should stay in the ground until the future generation could better 
benefit from it".-^3
Mossadeq's nationalisation, however, happened at a wrong time for
Britain, which was still recovering from the war and the degradation of
losing, as Lord Curzon would have put it, the "badge" of its "imperial
sovereignty' in the Eastern hemisphere, India. It was facing mounting
post-war economic difficulties at home and was battling, both politically
and psychologically, against accepting the fact that its position as the
Western world's leading power was being rapidly taken over by the United
States. Meanwhile, Iran had become "the jewel in the crown of BP",114
whose chairman, Sir William Fraser, was convinced that BP could and should
hold on to the monopoly of Iranian oil. This was significant in the
face of the fact that BP had emerged "with far greater importance to
115Britain, as the cornerstone of Middle East Oil", and, together with
six other Western international oil companies, it had the monopoly of
world oil outside the Soviet bloc from production to shipment and exercised
tremendous political power in the conduct of the Western world politics. 116
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This meant that there was no way that Britain, at this stage, would have 
given in to Mossadeq.
The British Labour Government at the time was just as convinced as
its immediate Conservative successor in October 1951 that to give in to
Mossadeq would mean not only the loss of British prestige, but also the
crippling of BP and the British economy since it would also threaten
investments and other interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle
East, particularly in the face of growing Arab nationalism.117
This negative position was encouraged by the AIOC officials and
Sir William Fraser, who argued that since Mossadeq lacked manpower,
technical skill, a tanker fleet and access to the world market, he
would have to retreat from nationalisation in the end provided Britain
exerted enough pressure on him and if required intervened militarily.'*'18
Britain, consequently, rejected the nationalisation as illegal and 
 ^ 119unacceptable. The affair precipitated a crisis in Anglo-Iranian
relationships which in its consequences for Iran was more far reaching
than anyone could have predicted. As the British stepped up their
pressure, Mossadeq became more militant and his militancy was
encouraged by an outspoken American Ambassador in Tehran, Henry Grady,
a first generation Irish American, "who did not conceal his hatred for
British imperialism and who encouraged the Iranians —  quite
misleadingly —  as it turned out —  to believe that Americans would
120support them against the British".
While the British government took its case to the United Nations 
and International Court of Justice, though unsuccessfully, amid a display 
of gunboat diplomacy (reminiscent of its actions in 1932) with HMS 
Mauritius cruising into the Persian Gulf and British troops being
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reinforced in Iraq, it was divided over military intervention. The
Foreign Secretary, Minister of Defence and BP's chairman all favoured it,
but Prime Minister Attlee succeeded in convincing them that the use of
force was unwise and damaging to the position of Britain in the region.
Events,however, moved very swiftly. By the end of 1952, the British had
withdrawn their assets and advisors from Iran and had frozen Iran's
conversion privileges of deposits in the Bank of England. Moreover,
they had warned all other fleets that they would be liable to
prosectution if they shipped or marketed Iranian oil and BP obtained an
agreement with its sister international oil companies not to enter any
121agreement with Iran replacing the AIOC. BP and Aramco immediately
doubled their production in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq and thus
compensated for the loss of the Iranian oil so that no hardship was
felt in Britain and the British public was rallied behind the cause of
AIOC. These all amounted to an economic blockade of Iran and, as a
result, the entire Iranian oil industry came to a virtual standstill,
with oil production dropping from 241.4 million barrels in 1950 to 10.6 
122million in 1952. This reduced Iran's oil income to almost nil and
caused a severe strain on the implementation of Mossadeq's promised 
domestic reforms, thus increasing Iran's economic plight.
The Soviet Union viewed the dispute as the surfacing of a long­
standing contradiction in Iran's relationship with the West. It hailed 
Mossadeq's nationalist stance and urged Tudeh's support for him, but
held a cautious view of nationalisation becasue it would have meant
123no concession to the Soviet Union either. The United States,
however, with its growing interests in Iran and in the Iranian region, 
and its global campaign against communism could not remain aloof from
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the crisis. Summing up the US Government's view, Dean Acheson, the then
Secretary of State, subsequently wrote that the American "... interest
lay in the threat that this controversy held for everyone's interest in
the Near East: it upset relations with the oil producing states and
opened rare opportunities for communist propaganda; Britain might
drive Iran to a Communist coup d'etat, or Iran might drive Britain out....
124Either would be a major disaster". This view reflected a
consideration of the situation solely in terms of Washington's interests 
in the region and involvement in the Cold War against the background of 
a widening rift between Washington and London over their post-war
125competition in the Middle East and relationship over Western Europe.
The British Government and the AIOC bureaucracy, of course, rejected
Washington's reading of the situation. Sir Anthony Eden, the British
Foreign Secretary at the time, later wrote: "I did not accept the
argument that the only alternative to Mussadeq [sic] was communist rule.
I thought that if Mussadeq [sic] fell, his place might well be taken by
a more reasonable Government with which it should be possible to conclude
a satisfactory agreement. I knew that the country was possessed of an
126elasticity and resilience which appearances did not suggest".
To Eden the alternative to Mossadeq was a pro-Western conservative 
government, headed by the institution of monarchy in Iran. But 
Britain needed American support in this. After American mediation had 
failed several times to bring about a settlement, Acheson concluded that 
the British were "destructive and determined on a rule or ruin policy
in Iran".127
Finally in October 1952, just three months before the Eisenhower 
administration was due to take over from President Truman, Acheson
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decided that the United States should try an independent initiative to
end the crisis quickly. For this he needed the help of the major
American Oil Companies, BP's international 'sisters', which had the
capacity to buy and market Iranian oil and hence try to save Iran from
further political and economic disasters which could pave the way for
128the communists to take over. But Acheson's efforts were seriously
hampered by the battle which was in progress between the US Justice
Department and the American International Oil Companies under anti-trust
laws, in which the Justice Department was charging the Companies with
forming an "International petroleum cartel", dividing the world markets
between them and sharing pipelines and tankers throughout the world for
129major interests of their own. The State Department, however,
intervened, arguing that since the companies were, for all practical
purposes, major instruments of American foreign policy towards, the oil
producing countries and against the spread of Soviet communism in those
countries, the case against them might seriously impair American foreign
policy aims and weaken political stability in the Middle East. It had,
therefore, urged that a new commission should study the inter-relationship
of anti-trust, security and foreign policy so that the important role
of the companies in the execution of American policy abroad was not 
130overlooked. Despite the Attorney General's rejection of this on
the grounds that the companies' cartel as "an authoritarian, dominating
power over a great vital world industry ..." could be damaging rather
131than crucial to National Security, the State Department's argument
eventually won the approval of President Eisenhower and, the Justice
Department dropped the case. Eisenhower ruled that the global battle
132against communism must take precedence over anti-trust laws.
This was too late for Acheson but early enough for the new hardline anti-
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communist Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Dulles acted swiftly 
first to overthrow the Mossadeq Government and then to involve American 
companies in a settlement of the Anglo-Iranian dispute.
The anti-trust laws, however, having prevailed against Britain in the
UN and International Court of Justice before Eisenhower's ruling, now
reinforced Mossadeq's position against AIOC. In early January 1953,
before. Eisenhower took office, Mossadeq cabled him in an attempt to
secure American understanding and support for the Iranian people's
"... aspirations for the attainment of ... life as [a] politically and
133economically independent nation ...". Eisenhower's reply to a
proud and non-communist Mossadeq was one of hope that the future
American-Iranian "relationship would be completely free of any suspicion"
134during his administration. While international opinion favoured
Mossadeq, the situation began quickly to sour for him at home. The
British blockade of Iranian oil and their intervening actions for
Mossadeq's downfall resulted in serious economic hardship and
polarisation of Iranians into pro and anti-Mossadeq forces. The
anti-Mossadeq forces were centred around the monarchy, which had the
support of a large section of the armed forces. The situation worsened
when, amid increasing unrest inside and outside the Majlis, Mossadeq
attempted to take over the constitutional position of the Shah as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rule by emergency powers
legitimised by a referendum and bypass the responsibility of the Majlis.
He consequently isolated himself from some of his close colleagues
including Maulana Kashani, the Speaker of the Majlis, laid himself open
to criticisms of dictatorial rule, and faced a direct confrontation
135between his government and the conservative forces.
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By now, the Eisenhower administration, under the growing impulse 
of American global strategy against communism, and of British propaganda, 
(supported by the Iranian conservatives) to the effect that Mossadeq was 
being influenced by Tudeh, had been convinced that a reliable alternative 
to Mossadeq's administration would be a government headed by the anti­
communist, but pro-Western monarchy. As a result, in a dramatic turn­
about, Washington hardened its position against Mossadeq. When, on 
May 28, 1953, he appealed directly to Eisenhower for American economic 
assistance against Iran's "great economic and political difficulties"
because of the "action taken by the former company [AIOC] and the British 
136government", Eisenhower refused to "bail Mossadeq out". He wrote
that in the wake of the "failure of Iran and of the United Kingdom to
reach an agreement with regard to compensation ... it would not be fair
to American taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any
considerable amount of economic aid to Iran" so long as Iran could have
137access to funds derived from its own resources. This provided London
and Iranian conservatives with much satisfaction, though the latter
disapproved not of nationalisation but of Mossadeq's method of bringing
it about. In the struggle, which followed the American refusal of aid,
between Mossadeq and the conservatives, the Shah at first failed and left
Iran for Rome in mid-August. But less than a week later he was back,
with his throne restored largely as a result of a successful operation 
138by the CIA. - The latter in conjunction with the American embassy in 
Tehran, rallied thousands of non-partisan Iranians by distributing 
thousands of dollars to them to support the conservative forces, which
139were being led by the Shah's loyal colleague, General Fazollah Zahedi.
The people who played a major role in the operation were Allen Dulles, 
the head of the CIA and a major shareholder in the Middle Eastern oil
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industries, Lloyd Henderson, the American ambassador to Tehran, and 
General Schwarzkopf, formerly commander of the New Jersey State Police 
and now a member of the CIA attached as Military Specialist to the 
American embassy in Tehran.
Mossadeq was arrested and subsequently sentenced to three years
solitary confinement. This was humiliating for him, but it did not
make him a martyr. The triumphant CIA-backed Shah resumed his reign in
order to restore the absolute rule of monarchy against both strong
internal and external, particularly Soviet and growing 'radical' Arab,
opposition. He later condemned Mossadeq for bowing to Communists and
committing "treason" against his country. He wrote that Mossadeq
preached "a definite doctrine of ... 'negative equilibrium', which
stressed the ending of Iran's suffering from the influence and domination
of foreign powers" by granting "no concession to any foreign power and
accepting no favour from any": and that he extended such "negative
141approach ... to domestic as well as foreign policy". The Shah
called his own regime's politics "positive nationalism", which will be 
looked at in the next chapter. However, given the prevailing 
circumstances, under which anti-British sentiment was widespread in 
Iran, the Shah could not establish his regime without relying heavily on 
the United States. He consequently sought urgently extensive economic 
and military aid from the US and worked to build a 'special' relationship 
and alliance with that country. This proved highly effective as 
Washington was only too happy to follow up its initial support for the 
restoration of the Shah's throne, seek both the transformation of Iran 
into an anti-communist state, and secure an American share in the Iranian 
oil industry. This resulted in three major developments: (i) Iran's
growing dependence on the United States and alliance with the West in
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the 1950s; (n) Iran's assumption of outright opposition to communism;
and (üi) the transformation of the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry 
into American-Soviet rivalry, since from then on the United States, not 
Britain, was the major protaganist in Iran and the world against the
Soviet Union.
59.
Chapter III
Iran's Dependence: 1953-1963
The fact that Washington's support of the pro-Shah forces was 
largely responsible for overthrowing Mossadeq's Government caused a 
’dependence situation' whereby the Shah's regime became dependent on the 
United States for its immediate survival and continuity. This initial 
dependence led to the narrowing down of the regime's policy options to 
a pro-Western, mainly American, stance in both its domestic and foreign 
policy behaviour. The regime consequently committed itself to a formal 
alliance with the West and tied not only Iran's foreign policy but also 
the country's process of socio-economic development to the interests 
of the capitalist world. These constituted the basis for the 
development of Iran's 'dependence relationship'^ with the United States 
at the cost of the country's traditional policy of non-alignment. The 
relationship had two major aspects. One underlined the status of Iran 
as a dependent state and made it, therefore, extremely vulnerable to 
pressures exerted by Washington. The other provided the Shah with the 
necessary security and economic-military leverage to achieve his 
prime objective: the consolidation of his rule, as swiftly as possible,
in the face of what he perceived to be strong internal opposition and 
regional, particularly Soviet and the growing 'radical' Arab, threats.
This chapter will focus largely on the development of this 
dependence relationship and its consequences for Iran during what may 
be regarded as the first phase of the Shah's rule (1953-1963). We 
shall evaluate the nature and enforcing mechanisms of the relationship, 
and examine the leverage it offered to the Shah to achieve 
his prime objective of swift domestic consolidation by
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seeking to suppress internal opposition, deter perceived regional 
threats, undercut the chances of any possible alliance between the 
domestic and regional opposition, and create a relative internal 
political-economic stability.
The violent overthrow of Mossadeq's Government saved the Shah his 
throne. Backed by Washington, he immediately reassumed his traditional 
and constitutional position as Iran's monarch and commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces. Under his leadership, General Zahedi, formed a 
military government and put Iran under indefinite marshal law. The
Shah's principal aim was now to consolidate his regime and establish 
his absolute dynastic rule as quickly and forcefully as possible so that 
never again could the Majlis limit the power of the crown and never 
again could a figure like Mossadeq challenge his position. At the 
time, however, this was beyond the Shah's means, given the prevailing 
strong domestic opposition to and Soviet dislike of his regime as well 
as the national socio-economic disarray. Internal opposition came 
largely from four major sources: (a) the National Front supporters
of Mossadeq, although the latter had been arrested and his influential 
foreign minister, Fatimi, had been shot; (b) the Tudeh Party, whose 
supporters had grown and whose activities had been tolerated to some 
extent under Mossadeq (although the Party had been officially banned 
in 1949); (c) the non-partisan intellectuals as well as pro-British
elements, including former politicians, bureaucrats and professionals 
as well as organised clergy, who were now frightened at the prospect 
of the Shah restoring the dictatorial rule of monarchy with American 
support; and (d) the anti-monarchist tribes, particularly Quashqai 
in southern Iran.^
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This broadly-based internal opposition was coupled with some
regional disapproval of the Shah's regime, emanating from two main sources,
the Soviet Union and 'radical' Arab nationalists. Moscow referred to
the grabbing of power by the regime as an "... offensive by the
3imperialists and the Iranian reaction". It was, however, cautious
not to denounce the regime outright because of the veaZpoZitik dictates
of its foreign policy. The 'radical' Arab nationalists, who had just
manifested their strength in the anti-monarchical and anti-colonial
Egyptian Revolution of 1952^denounced the Shah's regime as an 'agent
of Western imperialism', whose existence was contrary to the Arab
nationalist and revolutionary struggle against Western colonialism 
4and imperialism. This 'radical' Arab opposition was subsequently
accentuated by Tehran's decision to pursue a policy of cooperation with 
Israel and claim the Island of Bahrain as part of Iran. The Soviet 
and 'radical' Arab reaction will be discussed in more detail later on.
But it suffices here to say that the Shah's regime felt acute regional 
threats from these sources and the possibility of an alliance between
5them and the domestic opposition.
The internal opposition and the perceived regional threats in the 
face of the disturbed state of the Iranian economy and the country's 
weak armed forces (which formed the original domestic power-base of 
the Shah's regime) meant that the Shah's regime could not bring the 
domestic environment under its control by itself. This, together with 
the fact that the regime came to power largely because of American 
intervention, left the regime with little choice but to persevere with its 
original reliance on the United States for its survival. Consequently, 
as a matter of conscious policy, it pressed for further 
American help in order to achieve its prime objective of speedy 
domestic consolidation. Washington's response was one of all-out
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commitment to ensure the continuation of the Shah's regime.
Its purpose was to strengthen its influence in Iran, which was both
rich in oil and strategically important as a front-line state against
the Soviet Union. In doing so, it hoped to safeguard its growing oil-
economic interests and political influence in the Persian Gulf-Middle
East region, where the land was rich but politics was becoming
7increasingly volatile.
The Eisenhower administration first of all extended two important 
grants to Tehran in the second half of 1953: $23,400,000 under the
US Technical Assistance Programme, which had been resumed to Iran in 
1950; and a $45,000,000 emergency grant-in-aid. This was to enable 
the Shah's regime to meet quickly Iran's immediate economic problems of 
an empty treasury, unemployment and lack of foreign exchange, which 
largely resulted from the economic crisis of Mossadeq's period, and to
gimprove its security forces. In the meantime, Washington sought
long term American involvement in the Iranian oil industry, the
9economy, the armed forces and social affairs. It was the rapid
US involvement in these major areas and the continuous feeling of 
insecurity on the part of the Shah's regime that conditioned the speedy 
development of the internal mechanisms of Iran's dependence on the 
United States and alliance with the West. Before evaluating the 
exact nature and consequences of this dependence, it would be 
helpful to outline briefly the development of its enforcement 
mechanisms in the above areas.
The Oil Industry
Given the desperate need of the Shah's regime for capital and the 
West's desire to keep the communist bloc out of having any share in
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Iranian oil resources, both Tehran and Washington deemed it desirable and
necessary to settle the Anglo-Iranian dispute as soon as possible.
Since the United States rather than Britain now had the initiative
in Iran, in October 1953 John Foster Dulles commissioned Herbert Hoover Jr.,
a petroleum advisor and the son of the ex-president, to find a solution
for the Anglo-Iranian dispute, but to make sure that this time the US
companies had a share in the Iranian oil industry. Hoover's
endeavours, which lasted several months, finally resulted in the
formation of an international consortium of all major Western oil
companies to take over the operation of the Iranian oil industry from the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Consortium was originally composed of
the British Petroleum Oil Company, with a 40 percent share, five American
companies (Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of
California, Texaco, Mobil and Gulf), each with 8 percent or a total of
40 percent, Shell 14 percent and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 
10(CFP) 6 percent.
Theoretically, the Consortium was to act as a customer of the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) —  a legacy of Mossadeq's nationalis­
ation. It was to operate in an area of 100,000 square miles; its 
contract was to be for 15 years, but renewable for three more five 
year periods; the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was to receive handsome 
compensation in cash and assets from both NIOC and the eight 
Consortium members. The area outside the Consortium's operation, 
together with the refinery of Nafti Shah was to be conceded to NIOC, 
which was entitled to make use of both its proven and unproven oil 
reserves in whatever way it wanted. As for Mossadeq's nationalisation, 
the Consortium was to acknowledge the Iranian ownership of its oil 
resources. Moreover, Iran was to receive more in royalties than it had
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in the past and was to share the Consortium's profit on a fifty-fifty
basis, as was the case between the Saudi Arabian Government and
_ 11 Aramco.
The major architects of this arrangement, Dulles and Hoover, hoped 
to keep everybody happy and meanwhile seriously undercut the chances for 
a recurrence of Mossadeq type actions against a single monopoly.
The participation of the American companies in the Consortium was, 
of course, contrary to the anti-trust laws; but president Eisenhower 
had already overruled the laws for the sake of national security and the 
fight against communism. The arrangement was urgently accepted by all 
parties concerned and an agreement to this effect was signed in 
November 1954. It proved rewarding for all, the United States,
Britain, the Shah's regime and Western international companies, but 
largely at the political and economic cost of Iran. It enabled 
Washington for the first time to secure a key position in Iran's 
leading economic sector, which was heavily to influence the 
direction and intensity of Iran's future economic development and, 
for that matter, political changes. It also enabled it to strengthen 
the American position against the USSR and contrary to British interests 
in the region. From now on any event in Iran which affected oil 
either directly or indirectly concerned the United States. Britain 
could not hope for anything better than the Consortium deal. Sir 
William Fraser and Sir Anthony Eden had finally to accept the fact that 
Britain was a declining power not only in relation to the Soviet Union 
but also in relation to the United States. The Shah, although adamant 
in his aim to boost his position and national image and erase "the 
indignity of his dependence on the CIA',' secured the resumption
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of oil outflow and hoped for the necessary capital inflow, which he
needed badly. In announcing the agreement in the Majlis, he declared
that it was the best he could secure, given his regime's weak domestic
13and regional position.
The agreement, however, fell far short of achieving nationalisation
on Mossadeq's model. On paper the Consortium acknowledged Iran's
ownership of its oil industry and NIOC's right to operate and produce
oil outside the Consortium's area with whatever local or foreign
interests it wished to. In practice, however, the Consortium
assumed full control of the Iranian oil industry from production to
pricing and marketing. It did so through its capital, expertise,
managerial capacity, its tanker fleet and, above all, its monopoly of
markets. The member companies of the Consortium "... were ... [soon]
14the effective masters of the oil production". The NIOC could
not exercise its right to operate outside the Consortium area effectively.
Since it had neither the necessary capital nor the know-how and access
to markets, it had to undertake subsequently joint ventures with
foreign companies, all of which happened to be American except one,
the 'Societe Irano-Italienne des Petroles' (SIRIP).^  This
placed the international oil companies in such a powerful position
that it enabled them to run the Iranian oil industry as their interest
dictated. They increased and decreased production and prices and finally
controlled supply and demand in markets to whatever degree and in
whatever way suited them best.
It has come to light recently that for this, the Consortium even 
embarked upon a clandestine operation under a 'participant agreement', 
which was signed by its eight member companies and was kept secret from the
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public and the Iranian Government until 1974. The agreement described 
not only the terms under which the member companies would buy oil, but 
also how they would restrict production to avoid a glut and decline in 
their profitability, even though this was detrimental to Iran because any 
drop in production or sale of oil by the Consortium meant less revenue 
for Iran. The Consortium was supposed to share its profit on a 
fifty-fifty basis with Iran. The aim of the 'participant agreement' 
was achieved largely by the formula of the 'Aggregate Programmed 
Quality' (APQ). Anthony Sampson explains: "The APQ calculated total
amount of oil that was to be 'lifted' from Iran in the following year, 
and it was reckoned by listing the needs of each participant, divided 
by their percentage share in the Consortium, in order of magnitude, 
and then taking the last figure after seventy percent of the holdings 
had been listed. A company wishing to take more than its quota would 
have to pay more for it ...". This system "... effectively held down 
production in Iran to the levels required by the least demanding of the 
companies. If Exxon and Texaco, for instance, were to want less oil 
(as they always did) because of their commitments in Saudi Arabia and 
elsewhere, BP and Shell would have to restrict their production, too".^
Thus, the system not only enhanced the controlling power of the
American companies within the Consortium and, for that matter, over
the Iranian oil industry, but also enabled the Consortium to become
17the real "arbiter of Iran's future growth". Moreover, the
Consortium like its predecessor, the AIOC, pushed for the development 
of the Iranian oil industry as an exporting sector which meant in 
effect that there would be restricted forward and backward linkages 
connecting it with the rest of the Iranian economy. This and Iran's 
gain from its oil will be discussed in detail in Chapter V. But it
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suffices here to note that under the Agreement of 1954 Tehran
essentially relinquished Mossadeq's nationalisation, for ownership
without control of the oil industry meant very little. The
International Consortium substituted AIOC and the United States
replaced Britain in influencing Iranian politics and socio-economic
development. Once again the West and its international companies,
rather than Iran, succeeded in gaining most from Iranian oil, at least
for the time being. As for stimulating the distressed economy, the
Shah's regime still had to rely on extensive American economic aid and
American involvement in the non-oil sector of the Iranian economy because
the regime's income from oil was initially insufficient both to cater
for the Shah's counter-Mossadeq operations and to help the ailing economy
at the same time. Iran's oil income grew steadily from $22.5 million
18in 1954 to $92.5 million in 1955 and $285 million in 1960. On the
average, the Government allocated only 55 percent of this oil revenue
19annually to the Plan Organisation for economic development. But
this was not enough, given the disturbed state of the economy. There­
fore, American aid was crucial in supplementing the oil revenue.
President Eisenhower foresaw the need for such aid in 1953 when he wrote: 
"Of course, it will not be so easy for the Iranian economy to be
restored, even if her refineries again began to operate ... . However,
20this is a problem that we should be able to help".
American Economic Aid
In spite of its continuous reluctance in the past to respond 
favourably to requests by successive Iranian governments for economic 
aid, Washington after Mossadeq's fall found it necessary to give 
millions of dollars of economic aid urgently to the Shah's regime.
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Under its various programmes and agencies, including AID and the Export-
Import Bank, the United States provided the regime during 1953-57
alone, with a total of $366.8 million economic-financial aid. From
this, $250.6 million was in the form of grant-in-aid and $116.2 million
was in loan. The inflow of such aid continued at an average of
$45 million a year for the next three years. In 1961, when at the time the
Iranian economy had failed to make substantial progress, Washington
increased its aid to $107.2 million: $35 million in grant and $72.2
21in loan. By now Iran had become the recipient of one
of the largest quantities of American economic aid outside NATO members
in the postwar period. This increased aid, in supplementing Iran's oil 
income, would enable the Shah's regime not only to meet the needs of its 
empty treasury and administrative and welfare expenditure but also to 
ensure the speedy implementation of the remaining projects of the 
First Seven Year Development Plan (1949-56), which had been stalled 
during the nationalisation crisis and the entire programme of the Second 
Development Plan (1956-1962) as the necessary step in stimulating the 
economy and creating relative socio-economic stability.
Along with the inflow of American aid, a large body of US 
official advisors, technical experts, aid agencies, technical and 
commercial organisations and private investors came to Iran. They 
were to assist the Iranian Government in its economic planning and 
allocation of American aid, to provide technical know-how, and establish 
joint ventures with both the Iranian Government and enterpreneurs, who 
were now once again confident that Iran was firmly set in developing a 
free enterprise system. By the beginning of the 1960s there were 
more than 900 American economic and technical experts active in various 
capacities in Iran. ^  They helped in drafting and implementing Iran's
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Second Development Plan, which stressed the essential role of both
public and private sectors in Iranian economic development and called
for increasing foreign investment. To this end, the Government had
promulgated the "Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign
Investment" in 1955. The underlying objectives of this law were to
encourage foreign participation in economic development, particularly
in the industrial sector, to safeguard the interests of foreign firms
mainly against confiscation, and to upgrade foreign investors to an
23equal status with private domestic sectors.
The American investors played a major role in stimulating the banking
system and, most importantly, in creating the Industrial and Mining
Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI) in 1959. The IMDBI supplemented the
existing 'Revolution Loan Fund' (RLF) as a principal source of credit
extension to the private sector. It drew capital from a variety of
domestic and foreign, private and official sources. Of its "... initial
capital of $42.4 million, equity amounted to $5.3 million, divided in
the proportion of sixty-forty between domestic and foreign, notably US 
24investors". Following its establishment, the Bank was very
important in advancing private industry and in providing financial,
technical and advisory assistance to the private investors. During
the second half of the 1950s, while American investors provided a large
part of foreign investment, private investment more than tripled and
25imports of capital goods increased six-fold. A number of key
economic projects went to American firms and th-is was an extension of 
the fact that they were financed largely by US aid and investment.
The other foreign firms, which either helped the American firms (or 
were commissioned by them) or entered private contracts with Iran, were 
mainly West German, French and British. By the early 1960s, US direct
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private investment in Iran was estimated in excess of $200 million.26 
At the same time, the United States was Iran's leading trade partner 
with the balance of trade well in favour of the former. In 1963, for 
example, Iran's imports from the United States amounted to $103.7 
million and its exports to the US reached $40.4 million.27 This rapid 
entrenchment of the American position in the Iranian economic 
planning and economic operations was re-enforced by the concurrent US 
involvement in building up the country's armed and security forces, 
which acted as yet another paramount mechanism, governing Iran's 
dependence on the United States.
American Military Aid
The armed forces had traditionally been instrumental in consolidating
the power base of monarchy in Iran. The Iranian kings in the past had
used it as the most obvious means available to manipulate and govern the
behaviour of their subjects. in this respect, as was discussed in
Chapter II, Reza Shah scored highly. The military, traditionally and
constitutionally, had been controlled and commanded directly by the
monarchy. It had, therefore, been trained to obey only the monarchy and
operate under the command of only that authority. This, however, was not
the case for some of the Qajar kings, who, as a result, eventually lost 
2 8their throne. When Mohammed Reza succeeded his father, one thing
to which he paid most attention was the defeated, but not entirely 
demoralised, Iranian armed forces which he took special care to 
reorganise and expand. For this purpose, he attracted the support of 
an American military advisory mission in 1942, which led to the development 
of the United States Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian Army 
(ARMISH) in 1943. In the immediate postwar years (1946-1952), when
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Iran adopted a tough stance against communism Washington provided Teir.an 
with two parcels of aid to help in improving the efficiency and capability
of its armed forces: $25 million credit to strengthen ARMISH; and a
. 29$16.6 million grant for arms purchases.
It was the loyalty to the Shah of a major section of these ariaed
forces that eventually helped General Zahedi and the CIA in leading thue
royalist forces to victory against Mossadeq. Following the latter's
fall Iran was placed under military rule, which lasted until 1957.
The armed forces under the direct command of the Shah formed his major
domestic power base and assumed a special role in helping him to
consolidate his rule. This necessitated the expansion and modernisctiion
of the armed forces, particularly against the domestic opposition.
The American ambassador, John C. Wiley, had already stressed in 1950 thiat:
"Iran needs an army capable primarily of maintaining order within the
country, an army capable of putting down any insurrection —  no matter
where or by whom inspired or abetted".30 As a result, Washington
extended massive military aid in arms, training and expertise to the
Shah's regime in the following years. The total US military grant-in— aid
to the regime during 1953-1963, the period of the Mutual Security Act,
31amounted to $535.4 million. This was the largest military grant
that Washington had offered to a non-NATO country. During the saire
period the number of American personnel present in Iran, as M. Zonis
32put it before a Congressional Sub-committee, exceeded 10,000.
American aid and personnel played a decisive role in helping the Shah's;
regime, between 1953 and 1960, to reorganise and expand its army fram
about 100,000 men to 190,000 and build up a modern airforce and nav/ wi.th
338,000 and 4,000 trained personnel respectively. Between 1950 and
1965, some 2,000 Iranians received military training in the United 3tat:es.
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In the meantime, at least three US military groups entrenched their
operations in Iran: ARMISH, which was mentioned earlier; MAAG —  the
Military Assistance Advisory Group; and GENMISH —  the United States
Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. ARMISH was
officially assigned to advise and assist the Iranian Minister of War,
the Supreme Commander's Staff and the Commanders and Staffs of the
Army, Navy and Air Force in matters concerning plans, organisation,
administration and training. MAAG was essentially to execute the
objectives and ensure the effective implementation of the Mutual Defence
Assistance programme in Iran. GENMISH was to advise and assist the
Interior Minister in improving the organisation and operations of the
35Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie.
In 1957, moreover, the CIA helped Tehran in establishing the
Iranian 'State Intelligence and Security Organisation' ('Sazeman-e-
Attela'at Va Amniyati Keshvar or SAVAK), which was subsequently
assisted by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service.36 The
Organisation was affiliated to the Office of Prime Minister and its
Chief was directly appointed by the Shah and held the portfolio of
Assistant to the Prime Minister. From its establishment, SAVAK
bore principal responsibility for all types of intelligence and
counter-espionage activities; for preventing 'subversion, sabotage
and all such activities harmful to the security and independence of
the State; and for checking and prosecuting all Iranian groups and
37individuals opposing the Shah's regime. Its officials were '
members of the armed forces and by the virtue of its duties it
shouldered many civilian responsibilities so that it became by far
3 8the most efficient organisation in Iran. It soon grew to become
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an omnipotent and brutal force in running the affairs of the State,
39under the Shah's direct control.
Iranian-Western Alliance
The rapid development of extensive American involvement in the
above major fields was coupled with the growth of a formal military
alliance between Iran and the West. Under the impulse of the Cold War
politics and American global opposition to communism, Washington had
expressed its willingness, prior to the overthrow of Mossadeq, for an
alliance with Iran as a member of a regional pact. In February 1953,
President Eisenhower professed a definite need for a US sponsored
"system of alliance" in the Iranian region against what he called the
40US "... enemies [communists] who are plotting our destruction".
His Foreign Secretary, Dulles, subsequently envisaged the concept of 
'Northern Tier' alliance, comprising Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. He 
believed that these countries were aware of their common enemy 
[communism] and that they could not only defend themselves with 
American support but also could prevent the spread of communism to 
'core Arab', the area south of Euphrates down to Egypt, where the 
Arab revolution could be more receptive to communism.41 The idea, of 
course, could not have impressed Mossedeq at all. In spite of his 
desire to have a close friendship with the United States as a leverage 
against Anglo-Soviet pressures on Iran, Mossadeq was opposed to any such 
alliance, which could have undermined his nationalist stance and 
jeopardised Iran's relations with the Soviet Union and nationalist
Arab forces.
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The Shah's regime was, however, very receptive to such an alliance,
given its need for American or Western support and security against
its domestic and regional insecurity. Of course, Dulles' idea of a
'Northern Tier' Alliance did not materialise largely because of
opposition by Britain (which wanted to include its regional client,
Iraq) and because of Washington's refusal of this on the ground that
42other Arab states, particularly Egypt, would be offended. When,
however, in 1955 the largely British-sponsored military and economic
Baghdad Pact was announced between Britain, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan
43(with the United States also expected to join), the Shah's regime was
44determined to join it too.
Before securing formal membership of the Pact, the Shah paid an 
official visit to Washington in early 1955 in order to enlist the full 
backing of the latter on the issue. In giving its support, the
Eisenhower administration agreed with the Shah on the need to build up 
the Iranian armed forces and equip them with modern arms, and to 
construct strategic roads and airports in Iran.^~*
After Washington had sent General Carlson to Tehran to assess the
military and defence requirement of Iran, Premier 'Ala, who had just
replaced General Zahedi, announced Iran's formal accession to the
Baghdad Pact on 11 October 1955. The Shah subsequently wrote that he
considered "... the system of alliances and mutual aid" between states
with common interests as the most effective way to ensure the stability
46and security not only of Iran but also of the world. Iran's entry
into the Pact was widely opposed by the Iranian public, including a number
47of the Majlis' deputies. Premier 'Ala even became the target of
an unsuccessful assassination attempt while he was on his way to a 
Baghdad Pact meeting, but given its needs and commitment to the West,
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the Shah's regime persevered with its policy of alliance. In July 1958,
when a 'revolutionary' republican group overthrew the pro-British
Hashemite monarchy in Iraq and withdrew that country from the Baghdad
Pact, (.which led to the Pact being redesignated the "Central Treaty
Organisation" (CENTO)), Tehran simply transferred its membership from
48the former to the latter. in the meantime, however, the failure
of the Baghdad Pact either to prevent or reverse the Iraqi events or help
regional members in their regional disputes made the Shah's regime
disillusioned with the effectiveness of the Pact and its successor,
CENTO, as a source of support and security. The regime, therefore,
pressed for an exclusive defence alliance with the United States.
As a result, a bilateral military treaty was concluded between the two
sides on March 1959. Under Article 1 of the Treaty, Washington
committed itself to take, in case of aggression against Iran, "such
appropriate actions including the use of armed forces as may be
49mutually agreed upon".
This military alliance, along with the extensive American
involvement in other major spheres of the Iranian policy and the
resultant incrase in Western socio-cultural influence particularly
among those educated urban Iranians who found the Shah's regime and its
pro-Western stance desirable and beneficial, consolidated an overall
structure of Iran's dependence on and, consequently, vulnerability to
the United States. Within this structure, Iran's socio-economic
development and foreign policy objectives were closely tied to the
50interests of the capitalist world. This confirmed the country's
formal opposition to communism, at both national and regiona/international 
levels, at the cost of its relationship with the Soviet Union —  a
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relationship which, had it been improved, could have been used by 
Tehran as an effective lever to counter its dependence on the United 
States to some extent. All this underlined the status of the Iranian- 
American relationship as one of dependence during the first decade of 
the Shah's rule. In this relationship, Washington acted as a 'patron 
power' in upholding and securing the Shah's regime and influencing the 
direction and substance of its policies in convergence with the Western 
regional and international interests; Iran, however, was weak and 
vulnerable with no effective counter-dependence leverage and had to 
conduct itself largely in line with the United States and consequently 
act and appear as a dependent state in the sense that its national 
development and foreign policy behaviour were now heavily conditioned 
and governed by its dependence on the United States and alliance with 
the West. As a result, by the start of the 1960s, the Shah's regime was 
so vulnerable to Washington that the latter was capable of influencing, for 
example, the Shah's choice of who should be the prime minister of 
Iran. The successful American backing of Ali Amini as prime minister in 196: 
in spite of the Shah's unwillingness will be discussed in detail later 
on. The Shah was not in a position to complain, for it was his leader­
ship which served as the necessary 'bridgehead' in the whole process of 
the rapid transformation of Iran from a cautiously non-aligned nation, 
opposed to any type of domination by outside powers, to a state 
dependent upon the United States. In order to justify and enforce this 
transformation, as early as December 1954, the Shah noted:
The potentialities of friendly and close relations between the 
people of Iran and the United States are immense. There is a 
deep and fundamental identity of national interests, which overshadows 
everything else. We both believe that the individual is the 
central figure in society, and that freedom is the supreme blessing ... 
Iran has a great deal in common, in convictions, with the Western 
world regarding freedom and democracy. The way of life of the 
Western world fits in with our scheme of Islamic values. 51-
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In this context, he subsequently declared that "Westernisation is 
52our ordeal". He, however, branded his regime's politics "positive
nationalism" against what he called Mossadeq's politics of "negative
equilibrium". He claimed that, as a doctrine, "positive nationalism"
implied "a policy of maximum political and economic independence
consistent with the interests of one's country. On the other hand it
does not mean non-alignment or sitting on the fence. It means that we
make any agreement which is in our interest, regardless of the wishes
53or policies of others". But since, for the Shah, Iran's interests
were served best in alliance with the West, he declared that it was his 
regime's determination to combat "internal communism" or "the new 
totalitarian imperialism", inspired by Moscow, as a necessary condition 
for building a modern, strong and prosperous Iran with "social justice".
The prize that the Shah, however, expected out of Iran's dependence 
on the United States and alliance with the West, was to achieve his 
prime objectives: the swift domestic consolidation of his rule. In
this respect, his efforts were, indeed, rewarding to some extent. The 
rapid build-up of Iran's special relationship with the West not only 
provided him with an external source of security but also offered him 
considerable political, economic and military leverage, which enabled 
his regime to survive and strengthen its control over the domestic 
environment swiftly. By the end of the 1950s, he had consequently 
succeeded in establishing his rule almost throughout Iran and in 
surviving both strong domestic opposition and his perceived regional 
threats. The major question remains: how did he manage this?
Iran's Dependence and Domestic Politics
In order to achieve its prime objective, following the overthrow 
of Mossadeq, the Shah's regime found it essential to manipulate the 
organisational-institutional setting in which it acted, the internal 
setting of the state itself, and the external setting of the state in 
an attempt to create relative political-economic stability and unleash 
incentives for the socio-economic forces, which were receptive and 
vulnerable to the type of rule being developed by the Shah. In this 
context, the regime's foreign policy became its domestic policy writ 
large; and the conduct of the former was conditioned largely by the 
needs of the latter. The Shah, consequently, along with strengthening 
his regime's links with the United States, sought to centralise 
politics, perhaps more vigorously than had ever happened in Iran's 
modern history, around the institution of monarchy. He engaged in a 
counter-Mossadeq operation, involving a very forceful rearrangement of 
Iran's national setting and goals. He drew heavily on Washington's 
economic, military and political support in carrying out this operation 
largely by the methods of 'economic manoeuvring' and political repression.
(a) 'Economic Manoeuvring1
The essence of this method lay in the Shah's attempt to stimulate the 
economy and meanwhile manipulate the process of economic development 
as well as the interactions between economic groups and organisations, 
and government for political ends —  the stability and security of his 
regime. In this respect, American aid plus the reactivation of the oil 
industry and the resumption of the Government's income from this sector 
played readily into the hands of the Shah.
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As mentioned earlier, during the oil nationalisation crisis the
First Seven-Year Development (1949-56) was largely abandoned and
recessionary conditions set in, causing serious economic hardship for a
majority of the Iranian people and disillusioning many of Mossadeq's
followers. Seizing upon the opportunity, the Shah's Government,
assisted by Americans, urgently drew up the Second Seven-Year
Development Plan (1956-62) with reliance on increasing oil revenues and
American aid. The Plan, which was ratified by the Majlis in early 1956,
called initially for a total outlay of Rls. 70 billion ($933 million),
almost a quarter of which was to be used to complete some of the
unfinished projects of the First Plan. A year later the figure was,
however, raised by 20 percent to Rls. 84 billion ($1,120 million).
Of this sum 40.48, 29.88, 11.19 and 18.45 percent were to be spent
respectively on transportation and communication, agriculture and
55irrigation, industry and services, and social affairs. The Plan
called for both public and private investments and stressed the role of
private industries as vital for the industrialisation of Iran. Most
of the needed finance for the public sector of the Plan was to come from
Government's oil income and foreign loans repayable out of the future
oil revenues. At first about 80 percent of oil revenues was envisaged
for development purposes annually. But this target was never achieved;
the Government could not manage more than 55 percent per year throughout
the Plan, given its inefficiency and high military, security and
56administrative expenditures as well as rising inflation; it
therefore had to rely increasingly on American aid and smaller amounts 
of aid from other Western sources, namely West Germany, France and Great
Britain.
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In economic terns, however, the Plan's achievements were very
limited. It was not based on a philosophy of economic development
that involved comprehensive socio-political changes, including
redistribution of wealth. Rather, it aimed for some economic
expansion in certain areas, and this was utilised by the Shah's regime
for political gains. The Plan could have hardly been called a 'plan'
in the strict sense of the term. It was "... more in the nature of
financial allocations"; and it "... did not contain physical targets
or explicit statements regarding the philosophy and strategy
57underlying the expenditures". Meanwhile, in its implementation,
the Plan suffered from numerous "lingering administrative difficulties".
The uncertainties surrounding the magnitude of available 
financial resources (particularly foreign loans), the 
comparative inexperience in large-scale planning, lack of 
coordination among various government agencies, and other 
operating hurdles were instrumental in causing some delays 
and frustrations. Thus, many programs did not hold closely 
to their original allocations; projects that were started 
early naturally established themselves as preferred claimants 
for funds.58
These difficulties were exacerbated by inefficiency and corruption, 
which were features of the Iranian political-economic system at all 
levels.
The Plan was, however, somewhat politically rewarding for the 
Shah's regime. It was within the framework of the Plan's policies and 
expenditures that the regime made some progress towards several 
important interrelated objectives: first, to increase the intensity
of economic activity and commercial transactions as well as expand the 
job market; second, to restore the confidence of certain limited but 
influential entrepreneurial groups, which were given incentives under 
the Plan (these groups were receptive to the Shah's regime against the
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background of Mossadeq’s nationalisation and his attempts to curb
their power and malpractices, which resulted largely from their
interactions with outside interests); third, to appease and buy off
those professional and bureaucratic groups and individuals who had at
first supported Mossadeq but had then become disillusioned with him
because of the growing political and economic instability; fourth,
to concentrate more on the uneducated rural masses, who were largely
politically inactive but traditionally obedient to the monarchy
(this was attempted by improving direct communication links between
the Government and the rural people and by initiating numerous rural
projects whereby the rural people could be preoccupied in their own
rural areas away from the major urban centers, where opposition to the
regime was strong and active); and fifth, to reactivate the Plan
Organisation in order to work out and implement new economic plans, as
an indication of the regime's determination to play a central role in
creating economic stability and prosperity, but without apparently
59undermining the role of the private sector.
In the meantime, the leadership made sure that economic 
organisations, agencies and groups, both public and private, operated 
largely independent of each other but that they checked and balanced 
one another in a way that would be favourable to the leadership's 
political needs. The Shah so far as possible would never allow 
separate groups' to join together and possibly undermine his authority. 
For example, the Iranian planners and their American advisors found it 
imperative for the Government to reactivate the Plan Organisation and 
entrusted it with the execution of the Second Plan. It had been 
originally set up as a semi-independent body by an act of the Majlis
in 1949 so that it could operate largely free of the prejudices and
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influences of the political structure. Meanwhile, however, the 
leadership directly encouraged self-seeking local entrepreneural groups, 
which provided part of the private sector of the Plan, to compete with 
the Plan Organisation in securing a bigger share in the implementation 
of the Plan. This caused serious competition between the private and 
public sectors, allowing entrepreneural groups to influence the operation 
of the Plan Organisation in their own interests. The head of the 
Organisation, Abul Hassan Ebtehaj, a competent economist, who had 
assumed office with a pledge to purge the Plan Organisation of endemic 
nepotism, inefficiency and corruption, opposed the entrepreneurs' 
interference in the operation of the Organisation.^ As a result, a 
conflict developed between the two sides, and Ebtehaj could not 
survive, given the support which entrepreneurs received from the
Government. He resigned in 1959, though he was regarded as a very
4- 4. 6 1  competent manager.
This episode impeded the accomplishment of the Second Plan, but 
proved politically rewarding for the Government. The Shah personally 
did not favour the statutory status of the Plan Organisation and the 
power which it wielded. He therefore utilised the new situation and 
brought the Plan Organisation swiftly under the control of the Prime 
Minister s Office, which by now had become well subordinated to his 
personal power. This homogenised further economic planning and 
development under the direct control of the Shah as part of his overall 
d^ive for rapid centralisation of power, though the private sector was 
encouraged to increase its participation in a Government dominated 'free 
enterprise economy'. The Shah was the major protaganist of such 
manipulations and interplays of 'divide and rule1. As Peter Avery
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concludes: "A major part of his actions of the last ten years [since 
1954] is to be explained in terms of divide et impera". This was 
also enforced by another vigorous method: political repression.
The Shah's main instrument in this method was the armed forces and 
security forces, which were extensively reorganised, trained and built 
up by the United States.
(b) Political Repression
One of the major features of the Shah's rule in the 1950s, upon
which most of the analysts of the Iranian politics agree, was its
62intensive political repression. Following Mossadeq's overthrow, in a
counter-revolutionary manner the Shah's regime moved swiftly to suppress
all opposition, imposed strict censorship on the mass media, and banned
all forms of political organisation, activities and even literary
expression which it found threatening to its security. It maintained
the Constitution of 1906 and permitted the Majlis to function, but only
as a source of legitimacy for the regime's actions. In managing this,
the security forces, which after 1956 were spearheaded by SAVAK, were
6 3used excessively and indiscreetly. This could have not been done
without extensive American assistance in increasing the efficiency and
capability of the forces. Capitalising on their efficiency and loyalty,
the Shah entrusted the armed forces with two major tasks: to establish
a monopoly over the means of physical violence; and to take over the
civil power in many areas, though the Shah's encouragement was perhaps
64less explicit in the second respect.
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It was with regard to these two tasks that the brutal intervention 
of the military in the political sphere became a 'pervasive' characteristic 
of the Shah's rule. The military and SAVAK were used effectively in 
crushing and demoralising opposition of all political colouring, 
manipulating the behaviour of citizens and controlling and redirecting 
public opinion for the benefit of the regime's stability and security.
In this, the military and secret police executed, imprisoned and exiled 
hundreds almost indiscriminately. With respect to the organised 
opposition groups, they forced the disintegration of the National 
Front and of Tudeh and crushed uprisings by some southern tribes. One 
of the most serious cases was the army purge in late 1954. About 600 
officers, alleged to have been Tudeh supporters, were purged and tried
65by a military tribunal, resulting in massive executions and imprisonment.
By the late 1950s, the capacity of Tudeh to operate as an organised 
opposition was severely weakened and many of its leaders were living in 
exile in Leipzig.^
Although a new Majlis was opened on 18 March 1954, which gave a
vote of confidence to General Zahedi's Government, the regime quickly
moved to reverse the role of the Majlis to what it had been under
Reza Shah. Its procedures were brought under the control of the
executive power and its members were elected on the basis of
6 7selections made by the regime. Its function was reduced to that of
a 'rubber stamp', legitimising what the political leadership required 
68it to do. The Shah approved the formation of a two party system in
1957 on the basis of his assertion that a one-party system was
'communistic' and 'dictatorial', and could not be permitted in a
69Western-inspired Iran. This was to serve two purposes: signal
to the West his intentions to 'democratise' Iranian politics; and
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placate the internal opposition and his regime's pro-Western 
supporters.
In practice, however, both the parties were instigated and controlled
by the monarchy. The Hezbi Melliyun (Nationalist Party) was
commissioned to form the government under Prime Minister Minuchehr
Iqbal, who succeeded 'Ala. The Hezbi Mardum (People's Party) was
asked to serve as the Opposition under the leadership of the Shah's
most trusted colleague, Assadullah Alam7° The record of the
Opposition performance shows very rare deviations from its support of
71the Government policies. The regime allowed no other political
activities outside these two parties. It enforced strict press censor­
ship and warned the press against any criticism of the royal family and 
military as well as Americans, whose support was crucial for the Shah 
to continue his political repression. Literature of a 'radical' 
nature was suppressed and instead literature in support of the regime 
and the United States was widely published and disseminated. For 
this purpose, the American Franklin Publishing Institute was set up 
in Tehran and was followed by the establishment of the Imperial 
Foundation for Translation and Publishing. They both played a major 
role in reeducating the public about the 'evils of communism', and in
support of the Shah's regime and its endeavour to build a state dominated
72capitalist system, and on the value of friendship with the West.
This had a marked impact on the reorganisation of the Iranian educational 
system in gearing it towards training youth with these values and pro­
moting the Shah as the sole and unchallengeable leader of the nation.
In order to silence dissident students, intellectuals and political 
activists a method of 'cooptation' through "... intimidation, 
bribery, and selected concessions ..." became the order of the day.-3
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Through the methods of economic manoeuvring and political repression,
based largely on the strength which it acquired from its dependence on
the United States, the Shah's regime by the end of the 1950s had
largely succeeded in establishing absolute rule in Iran. The Shah's
personal executive power had expanded to the extent that no branches of
74government could act independently of his instructions. In this
sense, he had considerable success in achieving his prime objective; 
but this did not mean that he had secured a majoritarian base, safe­
guarding the continuity of his regime. The underlying causes of 
instability had not been redressed but were temporarily submerged.
He succeeded in weakening internal opponents; but he could not prevent 
their occasional re-emergence in both physical and literary forms 
whenever they found the opportunity. He slowed down their public 
agitation considerably inside the country but could not stop their 
underground activities at home and their public criticism of his rule 
abroad, which at times re-activated his feelings of insecurity in the 
conduct of both domestic and foreign affairs.
A number of examples will suffice to establish this point. In
1958, a coup attempted by General Qarani "came within hours of succeeding.
75The number of cooperating officers was impressive". There were
enormous, often violent, anti-regime mass demonstrations from 1960, 
which continued over the next three years to demonstrate the 
displeasure of a sizable portion of the Iranian people with the regime's 
behaviour and the discouraging socio-economic conditions, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. Those displeased with the state of 
affairs, comprised not only the supporters of the National Front and 
Tudeh but also a large number of non-partisian students, intellectuals, 
professionals, craftsmen, small businessmen, landowners, religious
87.
zealots and finally tribesmen. .. r •_ They culminated in the
well-known massive uprisings of 1963, which resulted in a widespread
confrontation between civilians and the armed forces and in hundreds of
civilians being shot and arrested. The uprisings were spearheaded by
religious leaders, who opposed the Shah's oppressive rule, land-reform
77and Westernisation measures. Moreover, the Majlis elections were
aborted in 1960 and during 1960-63 the Majlis was closed down twice,
7 8a state of emergency was imposed and Iran was ruled by royal decrees.
Outside the country, the voice of the Iranian dissidents, largely students,
particularly in the United States, grew stronger against the regime 
79day by day. Against this domestic situation, the regime could
not claim any major improvement in Iran's regional position either, 
though the leverages of its dependence on the United States and 
alliance with the West helped it to deter its perceived regional threats. 
This leads us to the next section.
Iran's Dependence and Regional Position
The rise of the American-backed Shah to power against Mossadeq was 
liked, as we have seen, neither by Moscow nor by the Arab nationalist 
forces, which criticised him as an agent of Western imperialism in the 
region. The Soviet dislike was not because Moscow particularly liked 
Mossadeq, with whom the Soviet leadership had already become 
disillusioned. Mossadeq was basically an aristocrat and a big land- 
owner, and was the author of the 1944 bill of 'no oil concession' to any 
foreign power, at a time when Moscow was seeking such a concession; 
he favoured friendship with the United States to counter-balance 
Anglo-Soviet pressures, was distrustful of Moscow and sought little 
halp from it during the nationalisation crisis. The Soviets could
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have forgiven him neither for these actions nor for his renewal of the
agreement concerning American aid to the Iranian armed forces in April
1952. Immediately after Mossadeq's fall, they had no misgiving in
criticising his government on the grounds that in its struggle with
Britain it failed to "... rely upon the democratic forces within the
country [i.e. Tudeh], as well as on the countries of the democratic
camp [i.e. the USSR], but attempted to manoeuvre between them and the
imperialist powers. It took no radical actions to stop reactionary
provocations and intrigues. All of this created favourable conditions
80for an offensive by the imperialists and the Iranian reaction".
The main reason, therefore, for the initial strong Soviet dislike 
of the Shah's regime was the US involvement in its support in Iran.
81Moscow viewed this as detrimental to its own security and interests.
Iran's rapid drift into the Western camp irritated the Soviet leadership
further, and this irritation often manifested itself in a violent
propaganda campaign. When Tehran announced Iran's membership of the
Eaghdad Pact, Moscow reacted sharply and warned Tehran that its
membership is "... incompatible with the interests of strengthening
peace and security in the area of the Near and Middle East and is
incompatible with Iran's good neighbourly relations with the Soviet
82Union and the known treaty obligations of Iran". The reference
to the latter part was to draw Tehran's attention to article 3 of the
Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1927, whereby "... each of the contracting
parties undertakes not to participate, either in fact or formally, in
political alliances or agreements directed against the security on land
cr at sea of the other High Contracting Party, or against its integrity,
8 3its independence, or its sovereignty". As a result, the Tehran-
Moscow relationship was further strained and the Soviets cancelled a
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tour of their musicians to Iran and rejected a purchase of 40,000 
tons of Iranian rice. ^
Similarly, Moscow vehemently denounced the Iranian-American bilateral
military treaty of 1959. This treaty was concluded against the
background of a number of developments, which favoured Moscow but
heightened Tehran's feelings of regional insecurity. First, Moscow
was rapidly developing a close friendship with Egypt and Syria.
Second, these two countries had just entered a formal union which meant
an increase in the strength of Nasserism against the conservative
forces of the region, including the Shah's regime. Third, the Suez
crisis of 1956 had resulted in the establishment of Egyptian sovereignty
over the Canal, through which Iranian oil was exported to the West and
now this was largely at the discretion of Cairo. Fourth, the outbreak
of a civil war in Lebanon in 1958 had brought Egyptian intervention,
supporting the pro-Nasserite forces against the pro-Western forces,
85which upheld the Eisenhower Doctrine, in the country. Fifth, and
most importantly, the pro-British Hashemite monarchy, as we have seen,
was overthrown by a revolutionary republican army group in Iraq in
July 1958. This, as far as Tehran was concerned, meant the extension
of Nasserism and of prospective pro-Soviet regimes on Iran's doorstep,
though the new Iraqi regime under Staff Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassem,
86was far from being Nasserite. This, coupled with some restiveness
in the Iranian armed forces (reflected in General Qarani's unsuccessful 
coup attempt) and the Shah's realisation that CENTO was not intended by 
its Western sponsors to help the regional members in their domestic 
problems and regional disputes, prompted the Shah to conclude the military
treaty with Washington.
90.
Moscow perceived this treaty to be a source of legitimacy enabling 
Washington to establish military, particularly missile, bases in Iran 
against the Soviet Union. It immediately condemned the treaty and 
noted that the treaty was concluded against a Soviet offer of a non­
aggression pact to Iran, although Tehran claimed that such an offer, in
return, demanded Iran's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact —  a demand
87unacceptable to Iran. On February 17, 1959, Khrushchev stressed
that the treaty would convert Iran into an American military base.
He declared that the Shah "fears his people. He is none too sure,
apparently, of his throne and for this reason he keeps his private
88capital in Britain, and not in Iran". Consequently, a war of nerves
and propaganda clouded the relations between the two sides. 'The
National Voice of Iran', broadcasting from the southern region of the
89USSR, began a vigorous campaign against the Shah's regime.
The Soviet criticisms coincided with the disapproval of the Shah's 
policies by the growing 'radical' Arab forces. The latter largely 
evolved around the personality of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser 
(President from 1954-1970), who advocated 'revolutionary' Arab nationalism 
and pan-Arabism against 'colonial', 'imperialist' and Zionist forces as 
well as the Arab 'conservative' forces, led by Saudi Arabia, with 
which the Shah's regime had a great deal in common both domestically and 
regionally. To Cairo, the conservative and absolute dynastical regime 
of the Shah was essentially anachronistic, anti-revolutionary and anti­
progressive; it was being upheld by Washington to promote and care for 
its 'imperialist interests' in the region. The de facto recognition of 
Israel by Tehran and the quiet entente which was developing between the
two countries (involving, among other things, Israeli- help for SAVAK
90and Iranian oil supplies to Israel), were significant in shaping
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Cairo's perception of the Shah's regime. These, against the background
of historical, ethnic, cultural, territorial and even religious
differences between Arabs and Persians, prompted Cairo to brand the
Shah's regime as the enemy of Arabs and their nationalist revolutionary
struggle against Western 'colonialism and imperialism' as well as
'zionism'. It officially denounced Iran's accession to the Baghdad
Pact and its successor, CENTO, and its military treaty with the United
States, advocated the overthrow of the Shah's regime and severed its
91diplomatic relations with Tehran in July 1960. As a result, each
side engaged in an intense war of propaganda against the other.
Although this will be discussed further in the following chapters, it
suffices here to stress that the 'radical' Arab opposition concurrent
with that of the Soviet Union caused continuous anxiety for the Shah's
regime, which claimed to be surrounded by hostile forces, threatening
its stability and security. The regime, most importantly, was in
constant fear that such hostile forces could prove detrimental should
92they establish effective links with the domestic opposition.
It is, however, important to note that the regime’s perception of 
Soviet and Arab threats was largely relative to its feelings of 
domestic insecurity. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet 
and 'radical' Arab opposition at any stage constituted r e a l threats in 
the sense of invading Iran, for this was unlikely under the prevailing 
regional and international circumstances. On the contrary, Moscow was 
willing from the start of the Shah's rule to improve its relations with 
Tehran largely for reasons of re a lp o titi. 'k j although it found it necessary 
to react sharply against some of the Shah's pro-Western measures which 
it perceived as threatening Soviet security and interests. There were 
three major reasons for its reluctance. First, Moscow did not wish
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to exert unnecessary pressure on the Shah's regime which could drive it 
deeper into the Western camp and thus prompt the United States to 
increase its presence and activities in a zone vital to the interests 
and security of the Soviet Union. Second, at the height of the Cold 
War and bi-polarisation of world politics, Moscow was in search of 
regional friends and allies; its interests were unlikely to have been 
well served by taking direct military action against the Shah's regime, 
as this could have made even the 'radical' Arab forces distrustful of 
Soviet friendship and support for them. Third, while the international 
situation was tense under the impulse of the Cold War and the Soviet 
Union was labouring hard to establish some sort of nuclear parity with 
the United States, Moscow was careful not to be trapped in a conflict 
with America in a zone south of its borders.
Consequently, as early as August 1953, the new Soviet leadership,
after the death of Stalin, tried to play down past Irano-Soviet
differences and indicate its desire for some sort of accommodation
with the Shah's regime. Malenkov said: "The experience of the thirty-
five years has shown that the Soviet Union and Persia are interested
93in mutual friendship and collaboration". In the meantime, the
Soviets initiated talks with Iran on the settlement of a number of
94frontier problems and mutual financial claims. Moreover, Moscow
adopted a rather calm attitude towards Tehran's persecution, arrest 
and execution of numerous Tudeh members and supporters. Although
it condemned and campaigned against actions by Tehran such as joining 
the Baghdad Pact/CENTO and concluding a military treaty with the US, 
Moscow seemed to be consistently in favour of improving its relations 
with Iran whenever the Shah's regime assured the Kremlin of its good 
neighbourly intentions. For example, after denouncing Iran's membership
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of the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet leadership invited the Shah to Moscow
and welcomed him warmly in the summer of 1956. As the Shah pledged
that his regime "... would never allow either the Pact or [the Iranian]
territory to be used in furtherance of aggressive designs upon the 
95Soviet Union , Moscow relaxed its anti-Tehran propaganda and there
seemed to be a degree of understanding in the Irano—Soviet relationship 
for the next three years, until the signing of Iranian-American military 
treaty. Even then, amid a war of propaganda, the Kremlin again welcomed 
the Shah to Moscow in mid—1962, and when the Shah gave his personal 
undertaking that he would not allow the Americans to establish missile 
bases in Iran under their military treaty with his regime, Irano-Soviet 
relations began steadily to improve. This, however, will be pursued 
further in the next chapter.
As for the perceived 'radical' Arab threat, it lacked the necessary 
potential either to seriously undermine or to oust the Shah's regime. 
Undoubtedly, the 'radical' Arab forces were expanding under Cairo's 
leadership in some parts of the Arab world. But this did not mean that 
the forces were politically united or militarily strong enough to 
endanger the position of the Shah's regime in a country as distant as 
Iran. While Cairo was deeply pre-occupied in its conflict with 
Israel and campaigned against what it called Western 'domination', 
particularly in the wake of the 'Suez crisis', the 'radical' forces 
were divided and engaged primarily in domestic struggles and rivalries. 
They had failed either to follow Cairo consistently or gain a strong 
foothold against their 'conservative' rivals, who were backed by the 
British 'protectorate' forces, in the Persian Gulf states except Iraq. 96 
Even in the case of Iraq, Qassem's 'revolutionary' republican regime,
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which the Shah perceived as a serious threat, soon proved to be more a
rival than an ally of Egypt in its bid for the leadership of the Arab 
97world. Besides this, Qassem's regime was short-lived: it was
replaced by the less 'radical' regime of General Abd al-Salam 'Arif in
1963. 'Arif did not follow Cairo's rhetorical line of a pan-Arabist
revolution against regional conservative forces, but rather sought
98better relations with Iran. The Irano-Iraqi disputes, which flared
up during Qassem's Government, were not solely ideological, in the sense 
of 'radicalism' versus 'conservatism' and therefore a by-product of the 
change of regime in Iraq in 1958. They were also territorial, 
concerning the two sides' traditional differences over their borders 
and Shatt-el-Arab, a waterway off the Persian Gulf which lay between the 
two countries. This issue, however, will be discussed further in the 
coming chapters.
Thus, the separate but concurrent opposition to the Shah from the 
USSR and the 'radical' Arabs was mostly rhetorical and scarcely 
amounted to a direct physical threat against his regime. This 
rhetorical opposition was largely a reaction to the regime's growing 
dependence on the United States and alliance with the West rather than 
their underlying cause. The most realistic source of threat against 
the regime was the domestic opposition. The regime feared in particular 
that this opposition might receive assistance from the Soviets and 
'radical' Arabs. It was largely a sense of domestic insecurity that 
made the regime continuously search for ways and means whereby it could 
strengthen its links with the West as an alternative source of security.
The more, however, the regime forged ties with the West and the 
pro-Western regional states (Pakistan and Turkey in CENTO), the more it
95.
fuelled Soviet and Arab opposition and increased suspicion on the part 
of its two non-aligned eastern neighbours, Afghanistan and India. The 
last two had serious border disputes with Pakistan. They therefore 
disliked any Western and Iranian support for Pakistan which could 
strengthen its position, and sought better ties with Moscow in order to 
counter-balance such support. Nonetheless, the Shah's regime
found it convenient to paint the Soviet and Arab largely rhetorical 
opposition as a serious threat against the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Iran, so that it could sustain and strengthen Washington's 
commitment for its survival primarily against the strong opposition which 
it was facing domestically. Thus, the regime played on the perception 
of a regional threat in order to justify its increasing dependence on 
the United States and alliance with West, and to obtain continuous 
American support for enforcing its manipulative and repressive domestic
policies.
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Chapter IV
'The White Revolution'
Despite its claim to great achievements, by the end of the 1950s, 
it was clear that the way the Shah's regime had consolidated its 
position was very costly for Iran and for the future of the regime 
itself. Based internally upon political centralisation and repression, 
the regime had nevertheless failed to bring about a marked improvement 
in the socio-economic conditions of an overwhelming majority of Iranians. 
Iran was still essentially a feudal society. In spite of the country's 
oil riches, a majority of its people had one of the lowest standards of 
living in the world and lacked basic civil liberties, a situation which 
virtually amounted to a "reign of terror".'*' The masses were generally 
dissatisfied with the regime and the Shah's domestic power-base remained 
dangerously narrow. Neither the Shah nor Washington could have much 
confidence in the future of his monarchic rule. Consequently, 
Washington found it necessary to press the Shah for urgent socio­
economic reforms. Eventually, in 1963, the Shah unfolded a reform 
programme, which had already been initiated by his American backed 
Prime Minister 'Ali Amini (1961-62), within the framework of what the 
Shah called 'The White Revolution' ('Inqilab-i-Safeid'). The programme 
entailed both domestic and foreign policy changes with important 
implications for the Shah's domestic and regional position and for 
Iranian-American relationship.
After providing a brief outline of the developments prompting the 
Shah to launch his reform programme, this chapter will mainly explore 
and analyse four major issues: (1) the nature and philosophy of the
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of the White Revolution; (2) the political consequences of the 
Revolution for the Shah's leadership and Iran; (3) the link between 
the Shah's domestic gains from the Revolution and his use of them in the 
conduct of foreign policy; and (4) the consequent changes in Iran's 
foreign policy position, particularly in the light of the normalisation 
of the Iranian-Soviet relationship, during the 1960s.
The Shah's method of consolidating his rule during the 1950s by 
pursuing a vigorous policy of political centralisation, based on 
extensive political repression and manipulation, had major drawbacks.
He failed to broaden his domestic power base to the point where he could
secure sufficient popular support to ensure the effective continuity of
<
his rule. His power base continued to remain very narrow. It was mainly
composed of the armed forces and security apparatus, and the conservative
groups of landlords, enterpreneurs and bureaucrats, who formed the most
substantial part of Iran's small upper class and slowly growing middle 
2class. The Shah's other source of strength, as he claimed at the
time, was his spiritual vision that he was being instructed by God to
3lead his predominently Shia Muslim people. This claim to divine right
was bolstered by his belief that there were indissoluble ties between 
the institution of the Shah and its mass followers, defined and
4legitimised by long-established cultural, social and religious traditions. 
But his spiritual vision was of little empirical value and his belief 
in traditional ties with the masses was to a considerable extent 
illusory in itself. Iran was basically a feudal society at the time.
A majority of the country's rural masses, who made up to about seventy 
percent of Iran's estimated 20 million population in 1960, lived in about
67,000 isolated small and large villages at the mercy of their landlords. 5
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With a low socio-political consciousness and living-standard, they had 
participated very little in politics. Their traditional sense of 
loyalty and submission to positions of power and authority, of which the 
Shah held the highest, was extensively affected by their conditions of 
daily hardship and their relationship with their landlords. The 
landlords, some of whom were also tribal chieftains, traditionally formed 
the most powerful base of support for the Iranian monarchy and exercised 
great influence on Iranian politics. They were able to prevent the 
central government and its policy initiatives from reaching and affecting 
the bulk of the rural masses directly if in any way their interests 
were threatened. As a result, the monarchy in practice maintained little 
direct contact with the rural masses and enjoyed no political support 
on a mass scale in the rural areas.^
The Shah could not hope for significant mass support from urban
centers either. It was in cities where Iran's experiences with
democracy during the constitutional period (1907-1921) and immediate
post-Reza Shah period (1941-1953) as well as Iran's growing intellectual
and human contacts with the outside world, had entrenched their influence
most. On the whole, the socio-political consciousness of the country's
urban population (about 30 percent of the total population) was
relatively higher than the rural people. It was they who provided the
politically 'active' groups and most of the opposition to the Shah's
regime. A majority of them were disenchanted with the regime and its
dictatorial and autocratic pattern of rule; they reflected their intense
quest for freedom of choice and political participation as well as for
better living conditions in a sequence of uprisings which engulfed Iran
8from 1960 to 1963.
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Despite the extensive American aid and increasing oil revenue, by 
the beginning of the 1960s, the Iranian economy was not in a sound 
position. There is no doubt that under the Second Economic Development 
Plan impetus was given to private investment, industrialisation and the 
establishment of necessary financial and commercial organisations to 
finance and coordinate economic activities and achieve a higher rate of 
economic growth. But, for the reasons explained in the previous 
chapter, the Plan was not implemented successfully and as a result there 
was only marginal stimulus for economic improvement. The Government 
policies primarily aimed at economic growth rather than economic 
development, as the Shah's regime was not in a position to cope with 
the latter's socio-political consequences. Consequently, the inequality 
of incomes and distribution of wealth was increasing and the urban 
population's standard of living, not to mention that of the rural 
people, was making very slow progress. In the absence of any reliable 
data concerning ratio of income and distribution of wealth, it suffices 
to note that during 1959/1960 while the top 20 percent of the urban 
population accounted for 51.79 percent of the total consumption
9expenditure, the bottom 40 percent accounted for only 13.90 percent. 
Meanwhile, the Iranian economy was sinking rapidly into a recession 
with a very high rate of inflation, worsening balance of trade and a 
dramatic drop in the general level of productivity and economic activity. 
Thus Iran continued to remain one of the world's most slowly developing 
countries. A majority of its people were suffering from acute socio­
economic inequalities, economic recession, curable diseases, a very high
illiteracy rate (over 85 percent) and consequently one of the lowest
11standards of living in the world.
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In the meantime, the Shah presided over and nurtured an
'anachronistic' power structure and corrupt administration which were
very much responsible for the worsening socio-economic situation.
During the consolidation of his regime, as was explained earlier, the
Shah concentrated on subordinating the parliament, political parties and
groups, social guilds and economic organisations, and the sociological
make-up of the Iranian society, to the needs of entrenching his rule as
forcefully as possible. As a result, although the Shah maintained the
Majlis and inspired two political parties under his control as token
forces of legitimacy for his rule, he essentially promoted and acted
within a traditional pattern of rule, which underlined the 'personalisation'
rather than 'institutionalisation' of politics. In other words the
significance of political institutions as bases for political stability
and continuity was submerged to the authorities, delegated to favourite
individuals by the Shah within a system of personal relationships; and
institutionalised political participation was played down in favour of
controlled individual participation, which was allowed at the Shah's
discretion. In the system of relationships the Shah assumed the central
position of authority and power by both traditional and divine right
and assigned his loyal and trused men to key positions to carry out his
dictates and policies. The Shah operated a system whereby these men
either checked on one another or were directed by their subordinates.
The latter had been given independent authority by the Shah, to whom they
12reported directly about their superiors.
The key non-royal participants in the system were those who had 
proved their loyalty to the Shah and often possessed political, economic, 
military, religious and tribal influence or a combination of these as a 
result of which they commanded a large body of followers. In fact, the
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Shah and these key participants formed the autocratic ruling elite of
Iran. But this elite was closely directed and overseen by an 'inner
elite' which was mainly composed of the Shah and his brother, two
sisters, prime minister, chief of secret police, joint chief of staff
and court minister. The role of the last was important in so far as
he headed a ministry which formed almost a secret government parallel
to the official one in guiding and checking the latter under the Shah's 
13direct command. In the system, J. Bill writes:
n... the Shah promote ... passive servitude in all relationships 
that others maintain toward him and balanced rivalry in all other 
personal, group, and class interaction. The former pattern is 
often buttressed by the latter since force that are constantly 
checked by others seldom have time to challenge the strongest 
force in the system.
The successful functioning of the system rested in the main upon three 
factors: the Shah's personal ability and shrewdness in commanding a
determining position in the pattern of relationships with the chosen 
key participants, the satisfaction of the key participants with their 
subordinate roles within the power structure, and their willingness 
to give their continuous loyalty to the Shah.
This style of political operation may have enabled the Shah to 
promote an autocratic and monolithic political system, which he was 
able to control more easily in the short term. But it had serious 
loopholes and shortcomings which threatened the existence and continuity 
of the Shah's regime in the long run. It promoted a carefully controlled 
individual participation in politics but failed to mobilise mass 
participation. It was the power of individuals, defined by the 
positions they held and the relationships they maintained with the Shah 
and within his power structure, which counted most in the formulation
102.
and execution of national affairs. Since not all the key participants 
held equal power positions or benefited from similar privileges and 
socio-economic status, there was often intense rivalary among them.
This at times resulted in concentration of too much power in the hands 
of certain individuals, who in pursuing their rivalry even challenged 
the Shah's position. For example, among the Shah's men who rose to a 
very strong position of power in the 1950s and then challenged the Shah 
himself in the early 1960s was his chief of the secret police, SAVAK, 
General Timour Bakhtyar, though the Shah succeeded in overpowering him and 
sending him into exile.
Moreover, the politics of personal relationships promoted the growth
of a top-heavy, centralised and corrupt government administration. The
participants in the power structure, by virtue of their powerful positions,
manipulated the administration for their own ends and purposes and
constantly waived and altered governmental decisions and procedures to
suit their own individual interests. The roles of public servants were
reduced to executing the dictates of the top few and they had little
or no part in policy decision making; they even hesitated to make the
daily routine decisions. This had a negative impact on the spectrum of
activities of the Shah's regime. As a result, the entire governmental
machinery was inefficient, being riddled with corruption, favouritism
and nepotism. It was out of touch with the public in general and
offered no effective avenues of communication with the opposition groups
in particular. The public even in their necessary daily dealings with
the bureaucracy (for instance, when paying electricity bills and lodging
applications for identity cards) had to resort to bribery and personal
contacts in order to make government officials attend urgently to their 
16affairs.
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For these reasons, the Shah's regime could not claim domestic
popularity and security sufficient for its long term success. Its
power base remained thin and it lacked the necessary popular support,
which majoritarian rule, if it had succeeded in adopting it, might have 
17offered. Moreover, the Shah was intensely disliked by many socio-
politically conscious Iranians for his close relationship with the
United States and for what they perceived as Washington's role in
aiding the Shah to pursue his 'oppressive' policies. This strengthened
the hands of both his domestic opposition and his opponents in the
region, who labelled him a dictator and stooge of the United States
18acting against the interests of the Iranian people. By this stage
also, Western, and particularly American, critics of the Shah's regime 
were increasing in number.
Some Americans were alarmed that, despite extensive American aid and
increasing oil revenue, Iran appeared to be on the brink of economic
19bankruptcy and social chaos. A US Congressional report, as early
as January 1957, had expressed its concern over the way US aid was being
administered and used mainly for other purposes than economic 
20development. Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration became
anxious about the Iranian situation. On December 15, 1959,
President Eisenhower in a speech before the Iranian Parliament hinted 
that it was not military strength alone, with which the Shah seemed to be 
obsessed, that provided for stability and just peace. He added:
The spiritual and economic health of the free world must be 
likewise strengthened ... While we must, at whatever cost, make 
freedom secure from any aggression, we could still lose freedom 
should we fail to cooperate in the progress toward achieving 
the basic aspirations of humanity. 1
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Nonetheless it was too late for the Eisenhower administation to note the 
gravity of the Iranian situation, which led the Shah to dissolve 
parliament in May 1961.
The Kennedy administration, however, resolved in 1960 to press the
Shah for speedy socio-economic reforms and relaxation of political
repression. It immediately set up a "task force" for this purpose.
The American ambassador to Tehran, Armin Meyer, recently revealed:
"That task force did nothing but work on Iran. The idea was that
Iran's demise was about to take place ... that it was about to go down
22the drain, and we just had to take some dramatic and drastic steps".
Using the leverage of the Shah's dependence on the United States,
Washington applied pressure on the Shah for such reforms in several ways.
First, it put the matter directly to the Shah and gave a cold reception
to his request for further military arsenals against the Soviet and
Arab threats which he perceived. Second, it courted General Bakhtyar's
political favours twice during 1960-1961, at a time when he had fallen
23out of favour with the Shah and held no official position in Tehran.
This underlined Washington's attempt to make clear to the Shah that
there were still alternatives to him should he fail to speed up a
process of reform so necessary for his own rule and the continuation of
Iran's alliance with the West. Third, while the Shah's regime was
facing severe financial difficulties, it promised the regime $35 million
with "special strings" attached, including that a "particular individual"
be appointed as prime minister of Iran. This "particular individual"
was to be 'Ali Amini, whom Washington had in mind to carry out the
necessary process of reform. Amini, an independent-minded economist,
had previously served as Iran's ambassador to Washington and "... had
24special ties with the Kennedys".
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In view of his poor domestic position and narrow foreign policy
options, the Shah had no choice but to name Amini as Iran's prime
minister in May 1961, though he never favoured him. This symbolised
"the height of American influence in Iranian politics" and the Shah's
submission to American pressure clearly indicated that Iranian-US
relationship had indeed been built on very asymmetrical bases in favour 
25of Washington. Amini, however, began his term of office by declaring
that his country faced "economic poverty". He pledged to free Iran of 
corruption and injustice and to carry out reforms for deep social
26and economic changes. For this, he pleaded for further American aid. 
Meanwhile, Phillips Talbot, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, noted Amini's premiership as a turning 
point in the American attempt to save Iran from going "down the drain".
He declared:
In Prime Minister Amini it seems to us there is now a prospect 
that we can foresee to see Iran move toward a government with a 
somewhat broader base than it has had and to move toward 
strengthening its public life ... It would appear very much in 
the American national interest to support these (Amini's) 
objectives and support the present government of Iran to the 
extent that it can carry out these objectives.2 7^
The first reform that Amini's Government undertook was a
comprehensive land-reform programme, which had been attempted twice by
his predecessors since 1960, but had been aborted by the Majlis which
was dominated by the landlords. Now with the closure of the Majlis
it was easier for Amini to start the land-reform under a royal decree.
As the implementation of the reform got under way, Amini soon acquired
personal prestige for his independence at home and abroad and his able
agriculture minister, Hassan Arsanjani, captured popularity and was to
2 8emerge as the champion of the land-reform. When the Shah visited
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Washington in April 1962 he, too, had enough grounds to assure Kennedy
and Congress of his government's strides in initiating fundamental
reforms and promoting "equity and social justice" in Iran. He stressed
that the reforms required time, though "we have no time to waste".
He asked for continuous Western "moral and material support" to help
his country reach its goals. He once again drew on Soviet activities
to explain the disturbing domestic situation. He accused the USSR of
doing its utmost every day "to beguile and delude and divert us from
the path we have adopted". It does this "... in order to seize this
gateway (Iran) to the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and Africa,
by means of falsehoods, threats and subversion". He pleaded that this
and his efforts for reform deserved better undertstanding from the US in
continuing and increasing both its military and economic aid to his 
29regime. Thus the Shah survived a major crisis in his relationship
with Washington. In August 1962, Vice-President Johnson, during a
state visit to Tehran, praised the Shah's leadership and Amini's reform
efforts. He promised the continuation of American aid and disclosed that
he had been assured by the Shah that he would cut down his military
30 .expenditures in favour of socio-economic reforms. Meanwhile, in
order to increase the strength of the Shah's real domestic power base
and one of the internal mechanisms of Iran's dependence on the US,
Washington agreed to the Shah's request for $200 million of modern
31military equipment.
Amini's government, however, ran soon into serious difficulties.
His land-reform was firmly opposed by landlords and certain religious 
groups, which held large 'auqaf' (religious) estates. This, in the 
face of the disturbing economic situation and the weaknesses inherent
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in the Shah's pattern of rule and the political structure over which he
presided, increased public agitation, culminating in the mass uprisings
of 1963. After fourteen months in office Amini's government resigned.
Amini publicly blamed the United States for the failure of his government,
32claiming that Washington did not live up to its promise of further aid.
Washington firmly rejected this, announcing that, during Amini's term,
the US had provided $67.3 million in economic grants and loans and
committed itself to provide an additional $20 million for a development
loan. "This level of assistance compares with an average of $59.4
million in United States economic aid to Iran during each of the
33preceeding four years".
There was, however, more to Amini's resignation than was
immediately apparent. The Shah had gained sufficient experience from
his own rise to power. He had, so far, tried to consolidate his rule
at all costs. Meanwhile, he had learned that for the effective continuity
of his rule he could not rely on a policy of repression, a narrow domestic
power-base and American support for ever. He had remarked as early as
1959 that "[a] country cannot be ruled by the force of the bayonet
and secret police ... for all times ... [and] [o]nly a majority can rule 
34a society". He had also thought in 1960 that the US support could
35not be regarded as something permanent. Moreover, the events of
the last few years had cleared in his mind a number of inter-related 
factors concerning his relationship with the United States and the 
weaknesses of his domestic rule and the restraining impact of this on 
his position in the conduct of Iran's foreign relations. The American 
pressure and his consequent appointment of Amini as prime minister had 
alerted the Shah to two important facts: one, the degree to which he
was dependent on the United States for the continuation of his rule;
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and two, which largely resulted from the first, that he was very
vulnerable to American pressures and, consequently to regional
criticisms; therefore his choice of policy options and actions was
very limited. When Washington backed Amini to initiate the long
overdue process of reform and when Amini and his minister, Arsanjani,
were emerging as its major architects, it must have become clear to the
Shah that two possible things could happen to him: first, he could lose
his leading position in dealing with Washington; and second, he could
lose the initiatives over the reform programme, which was considered
vital for the future of his leadership and rule. Either of these
possibilities could have easily undermined his supreme position in
Iranian politics and could have reversed his position to what it was
3 6during the first twelve years of his reign (1941-1953). He had
therefore firmly realised that the root cause of all these problems and 
anxieties was largely his weak domestic position, which lacked mass 
support. If it had not been for this, he might have not been as 
dependent and vulnerable as he had become so far. The key, however, to 
the betterment of his domestic position lay to a large extent with the 
reform process, which Amini had begun.
The Shah, consequently, found it necessary to take over the reform 
initiatives himself. He wanted to launch the reform process 
officially in accordance with the dictates of his own vision of political, 
social, and economic progress, under his direct leadership, without 
causing any major political change which could undermine his own and 
the monarchy's supreme position in Iranian politics and his alliance with 
the West. He was now in a position to accomplish this for several 
reasons. By mid-1962, despite all the socio-economic disturbances
which had besieged his regime, the Shah had consolidated his regime and
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centralised sufficient power under his control in order to 
initiate innovative policies. He had averted a possible crisis in 
his relationship with Washington and had the latter's full support for 
reforms. Moreover, Amini's initiation of the land-reform had tested 
the strength of the public reaction to a reform programme for the Shah 
and he must have been convinced that he could cope with such reaction 
quite efficiently. Yet when Amini's government became embattled with 
the ensuing opposition to its reforms and the socio-economic cirsis, which 
it largely inherited, and when Amini blamed Washington for the failure of 
his government, the Shah was in a strong and safe position to welcome 
Amini's resignation and draw on his failure to boost his own credibility 
in both his relationship with Washington and domestic standing. He 
promptly appointed his close and loyal colleague, Assadullah 'Alam, in 
place of Amini.
The Nature of the White Revolution
Within seven months of this, in January 26, 1963, the conservative 
Shah unveiled a 'revolutionary' front, though still at considerable risk 
to his personal position, and put successfully to the Iranian people 
in a referendum his own reform programme within the framework of what 
he called "the White Revolution". It was a 'revolution' designed to 
appeal to and benefit a majority of the Iranian people of different 
political leanings, ranging from conservatives ('White') to radicals 
('Revolution'), under the leadership, ironically enough, of the 
traditional institution of monarchy. The Shah later declared that it 
was "... Iran's internal situation and ... international position ..." 
which made him feel "an empirical need for a revolution based on the
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most advanced principles of justice and human rights that would change
the framework of ... [the Iranian] society and make it comparable to
37that of most developed countries in the world".
There are many ways that one could look at and examine the White 
Revolution in terms of both its substance and the consequences it held 
for the Iranian society in general and the Shah's rule in particular.
For example, J. Bill and M. Zonis have looked at it as "the politics of
38 39system preservation" and "the politics of manoeuvring"
respectively; R. Ramazani has regarded it as "the politics of 
40independence"; and C. Prigmore has analysed it in terms of politics
41of social modernisation. It could equally be analysed in terms of
what Professor Almond identifies as four major 'revolutions' which leaders
of the changing societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America confront in
their attempt to change their societies to meet the challenges of time;
the four are: "national revolution", "authority revolution",
42"participation revolution" and "welfare revolution". For the purpose
of this thesis, however, I am most interested in evaluating the White 
Revolution primarily as a means whereby the Shah originally attempted 
to achieve two major objectives: first, to solidify and widen the
popular bases of his leadership and rule; and second, to reduce, 
consequently, his dependence on the United States so that he could both 
minimise outside pressures on his regime and maximise his foreign policy 
options on the basis of normalising Iran's relations with the Soviet 
Union. The underlying thrust of this, in the sphere of foreign policy, 
was to strengthen what the Shah later on called Iran's "national 
independent foreign policy". In this context, the White Revolution 
represented an attempt on the part of the Shah to carry out a systematic
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process of centrally controlled general mass mobilisation and selected 
socio-economic reforms, largely in line with Westernisation, in support 
of his leadership and rule in order to achieve a higher degree of 
independence on the basis of his regime's original dependence on the 
US. Hence, he could maximise his foreign policy options and alter 
Iran's dependence relationship with the US to a more symmetrical plane.
In order to substantiate this, it is necessary first of all to outline 
the ideological nature and philosophy of the White Revolution and then 
the Shah's major gains from it to strengthen his position in the conduct 
of Iran's domestic and foreign policies.
In expounding the philosophy and working programme of the White 
Revolution, though not very coherent and consistent, the Shah drew on 
several sources, ranging from Iranian cultural heritage and Islamic 
principles to 'democracy' and 'Westernisation'. And yet he and the 
Iranian official sources exalted its originality. One government 
publication claimed that the "... idea and the philosophy as well as 
the measures themselves are purely Iranian in concept, planning and 
execution . It is a 'White' revolution because its accomplishment is 
through no disorder and no bloodshed; not even class hatred"
In this context, the Revolution was to encompass a wide-range of innovative 
changes affecting the whole spectrum of socio-economic life in Iran.
The Shah visualised the forthcoming changes in the Iranian way of life, 
beliefs, values, organisations and institutions through the White 
Revolution in terms of what he called political, economic and social 
democracy1 and 'Westernisation' for social justice, self-sufficiency 
and 'true' or 'complete' political and economic independence. His use, 
however, of terms such as 'democracy' and 'Westernisation' must be
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understood within what he called an Iranian context. He declared that
by "political democracy" he meant the blend of "the Western principle
of parliamentary [system] with the Persian monarchical tradition".
This was to involve the institutionalisation of politics, expansion of
political participation, and dispersion of power through the formation
of 'political parties' which, under the sovereignty of monarchy, would
form the 'actual' and 'alternative' governments. He made it clear that
he preferred a "two party system" over a "one party system" which he
44condemned as "communistic" and absolute "dictatorship".
By 'economic democracy' he meant the equal distribution of
resources, goods, and services according to the ability and needs of
the individual and the establishment of a mixed economic system to
be composed of private and public sectors. In this, free enterprise
and government control over the essential services and natural resources
of the country were to play important roles in the speedy development
45of both agriculture and industry. By 'social democracy' he meant
enabling every Iranian citizen to develop himself fully and act freely
in every direction within the bounds of the social welfare, national
interest and security of Iranians, as a single and united society 
46permitted. With regard to the realisation of such 'democracy' he
concluded:
As a nation we must demand steady progress, but we must also 
realise that the achievement of political, economic and social 
democracy perforce takes time. It requires education and 
psychological development, the reconciliation of individual 
wishes with social responsibility, the rethinking of moral values 
and individual and social loyalties, and learning to work in 
cooperation more than ever before. ^
With regard to the relationship between such understanding of 'democracy'
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and 'Westernisation', he emphasised that he talked of 'Westernisation' 
only in "selective and judicious" terms whereby Iran would liberalise its 
political system and Westernise its way of life only as far as this was 
compatible with and served to strengthen those Iranian traditions which 
are important for the preservation of Iran's identity as an old and 
sovereign nation with a glorious past and rich cultural heritage. The 
monarchy to the Shah was a pivotal tradition of Iranian society; and he 
sought sanctuary in the important traditions in order to legitimise the 
need for innovational changes to blend the traditional institution of 
monarchy with the requirement of modern time. He wrote:
Especially in a country with such venerable traditions as ours, 
rapid change naturally brings its strains and stress. These are 
the price we must pay for Westernisation and modernisation. But 
I do not propose that we abandon our great heritage. On the 
contrary, I have every confidence that we can enrich it. Religion 
and philosophy, art and literature, science and craftsmanship —  
all will prosper more as we develop our economy so that the common 
people of this ancient land can enjoy all the essentials of life. 
Instead of the few flourishing at the expense of the many, they 
will do so with the many. Selective and judicious Westernisation 
can help us towards the goal of democracy and shared prosperity; 
that is why I refer to it as our welcome ordeal.^®
These were the Shah's convictions by the turn of the 1960s. It was
against the background of these convictions that he launched the White
Revolution officially in January 1963. The Revolution's philosophy
and reform programme were declared to be instrumental in transforming
Iran from an economically poor, socially feudal and divided, and
politically bankrupt country into a prosperous, just, industrialised,
49self-sufficient and truly independent sovereign nation. This goal,
however, was to be achieved largely within the existing framework of 
Iran's close friendship and alliance with the West. The Revolution's 
policy guidance stressed the need for strengthening the Government
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guided free enterprise capitalist economic system and for conducting
Iran's foreign policy interests largely in convergence with those of the
"Free World", as underlined by the Shah's vow that "Westernisation is
50our welcome ordeal".
Originally, the Shah started off his Revolution by introducing six 
major reforms: a comprehensive land reform, which Amini and Arsanjani
had initiated; the 'nationalisation of forests and pastures'; 'public 
sale of state owned factories as security for land reform'; 'workers' 
profit-sharing in industry'; 'amending the Electoral Law —  franchise for 
women'; and the formation of 'Literacy Corps'. By the end of the 
1960s, he coupled these with the creation of 'Health Corps', 'Development 
and Extension Corps', and 'Houses of Equity'; the 'nationalisation of 
water'; 'national reconstruction'; and 'administrative and educational 
revolution'. During the first seven years of the 1970s, he added five 
other reforms: 'expansion of ownership of industrial and manufacturing
units'; 'price stabilisation and campaign against profiteering'; 'free 
education'; 'provision of free nutrition and care for all children 
from birth up to the age of 2 years old'; and 'provision of health 
insurance to the general public'.
In order to implement the initial reforms of the White Revolution 
successfully, the Shah had already promulgated an enlarged Third Five-Year 
Development Plan in September 1962. The Plan represented the first 
serious attempt at comprehensive and consistent national planning in 
Iran. It defined the Government's underlying development strategy and 
objectives, and made projections of the available financial and other 
resources for the Plan period much more clearly than at any time before.
115.
The Plan called for speedy development of agriculture, industry and
social sector. While stressing the importance of both public and
private investments, it initially proposed a total outlay of Rls. 190
billion, but this was soon raised to Rls. 230 billion ($3262 million at 
51current prices). Over 66 percent of this expenditure was to be met
from oil revenues, which amounted to about $3,000 million during the
Plan period, and the rest from domestic financing and foreign loans.
Thus, for the first time, a substantial portion of oil income was to be
channelled into national development. Of the total outlay, 25.6, 21.5,
15.8, 12.3, 7.9, 6.0, and 3.3 percent were allocated for transportation
and communication, agriculture, power and fuel, industry and mines,
52education, health and regional development respectively. Transportation
and communication were given top priority as a vital condition for rapid
improvement in all other sectors, as planned. The defence sector,
however, was not spelled out in the Plan, though it continued to consume
53about 10 percent of Iran's annual GNP during the Plan period.
The Political Consequences of the White Revolution
While the Third Plan provided the basic working framework for the 
White Revolution, the Shah indeed made some important short-term 
political gains from implementing a number of the Revolution's reforms 
during the 1960s. His gains were largely in terms of mobilising some 
of the previously politically 'non-active' and 'active' masses in 
support of his leadership and rule. He began the process first of all 
by putting his reform programme to the Iranian people in a referendum.
This in itself was unprecedented in the history of the Iranian monarchy.
No Iranian monarch in the past had ever sought a formal mandate of the
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kind from his subjects, though the idea of a referendum itself was not
new to the Iranian people because Mossadeq had held one in his quest
for emergency powers in early 1953. There is ample controversy over
the Government's administration of the referendum and its reports of
the referendum's representativeness. This, however, did not invalidate
the Government's claim that from 5,5^3,826 voters (of a population of
about 21 million) 5,589,710 (or 99 percent) voted for the Shah's 
54programme. The referendum results provided the Shah with an
effective instrument of 'popular democracy' to claim that his subjects
not only overwhelmingly endorsed his reformative revolution but also
55confirmed their support for his regime.
Drawing on this source of 'popular legitimacy', the Shah moved
speedily and forcefully to implement his reforms. He started with the
land reform, which had been initiated and executed to some extent by
Amini under the Land Reform Law of January 1962. After approving
some supplementary articles to the Land Reform Law in January 1963, the
Shah followed Amini's programme in order to implement the land reform
in three stages. In brief, under the first stage, the Government
purchased a total of 16,000 villages (about 19.5 percent of the arable
land) from landowners and transferred them to some 743,406 farm families.
It limited the landlords' individual holdings to one village.
Moreover, it launched a campaign urging the newly land-rich peasants to
57join the Government-guided cooperatives. The second stage of the
reform began in 1965. Under this stage landowners were offered a choice 
of five methods of settlement: (i) tenancy; (ii) sale to peasants;
(iii) division of land on the same proportion as the crop-sharing 
agreement; (iv) formation of agricultural cooperatives; and (v)
sale of peasants' rights to landowners. In addition, the land reform
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was extended to cover the religious endowment lands and an individual
landholding was reduced further to 370 acres. There were, however,
many local differences in the execution of the second stage. The
peasants were generally given tenure and "(t)hey did not all receive
ownership of the land ..., and the conditions under which the land was
transferred to them were less favourable than those under the first 
58stage". Nonetheless, during 1965-1969, among other achievements,
a total number of: 9,505 publicly-endowed lands were leased to farmers;
211,822 small landowners leased their lands to farmers; 54,480
villages were affected by the land reform; and 5,629 more rural
cooperatives were established, making the total number of cooperatives
598,102 with a total membership of over 1,399,000. The third stage of
the reform was launched in 1966. This stage, as was put officially, 
aimed at the expansion of agricultural production in line with the need 
of Iran's industrial development; a rise in the per capita output and 
standards of living of peasantry; and the improvement of marketing and 
production techniques and consequently the stabilisation of food prices.^
Meanwhile, the Government nationalised forests and pasturelands.
As was officially stated, this was to put these resources in the service 
of all citizens; to prevent their misuse and waste in the hands of 
private owners; to expand and develop them efficiently according to the 
needs of the country; and, above all, to support the land reform and 
strengthen the position of fanners. For the pasturelands, the 
Government legislated for "public ownership" to be available to sheep 
and cattlemen and cancelled all the charges which were collected in 
the past by private owners.^ In addition, it subsequently
nationalised water resources and established the 'Development and
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Extension Corps' (trained cadres to help farmers and rural cooperatives).
The nationalisation of water, which came into effect in July 1968, was
in support of both agricultural and industrial development. According
to the Government, it was to make water utilisation more efficient and
to increase water by whatever means possible so that there should be
enough water available for the expanding agriculture, industry and 
6 2electric power'. As for the Corps, their role in rural development
will be elaborated later on.
The land reform, irrespective of its socio-economic results for the
Iranian people —  an issue which will be looked at later on —  proved
to be politically rewarding for the Shah in several ways. First, he
succeeded in almost liquidating the large landholdings of all major
landlords, undermining their traditional power base and consequently
weakening their ability to keep apart the central government (or the
Shah himself) and a majority of peasants.^ Second, he was able to
maximise his direct access to the seventy percent of the population
in the countryside, who had previously been largely isolated from the
effects of his policy actions, and thus endear his leadership to the
newly land-rich peasants. Third, he met one of the popular demands of
his ideological-political opponents who had been advocating land reform
as a popular and democratic measure against the Shah's regime. Thus,
by the end of the 1960s, the Shah could claim not only to have abolished
the traditionally land-based feudalism in Iran but also to have
64'revolutionised' the life of peasantry. In their turn, a large
number of land-rich peasants, whose behaviour was mainly conditioned by 
their traditional way of living and politically illiterate thinking, 
submitted themselves to the power of the Shah in the hope of a better life
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and exalted him for his 'benevolence'. The land reform, consequently, 
provided a peasant-based start to the White Revolution and opened up a 
potential source of rural support for the Shah's leadership and rule.
The Shah, however, wanted neither to alienate the landlords
altogether nor to have a prolonged confrontation with them —  something
which he could not afford at the time. This was cared for, to a
considerable extent, by the next important reform of the White Revolution:
65'the public sale of state-owned factories' to private shares. This
reform was intended to achieve two inter-related objectives: (1) to
enrich the Government with an additional source of revenue so that it 
could finance the land reform effectively; and (2) to provide the 
former landlords with the necessary stimuli to reinvest the money with 
which they had been compensated for their lands under the land reform, 
in industries. In the second objective, the Government sought to buy 
off the former landlords and yet increase the share of private 
investment under its own guidance in developing the industrial sector. 
This, however, had a serious drawback: many former landlords soon
managed to become 'industrial lords' and in thus shifting their power- 
base from land to industrial urban centers still found the Shah's pro­
capitalist regime very beneficial.^
Concurrently with land reform, the White Revolution's programme 
stressed the speedy industrialisation of Iran and improvement in the 
working and living conditions of the country's industrial labour force. 
Consequently, while a certain amount of infrastructure had been built 
during the Second Development Plan, the Government allocated a 
relatively larger share of its funds for industrial development under 
the Third Plan. It sought direct investment in establishing heavy
120.
industries such as steel and petrochemicals; in promoting, together
with private investment, light industries such as making of refrigerators,
heaters and assembly factories for motor vehicles, radios and the like;
and in protecting and strengthening the traditional industries like
6 Vtextiles, carpet and food processing. The increasing Government
investment, coupled with the growing private investment which was
enhanced by the inflow of funds from former landlords, caused increased
economic activities and industrial growth, and furthered job opportunities
in urban centers. During the Third Plan period, therefore, the
industrial sector registered an average annual growth rate of 12.7
6 8percent —  2.7 percent more than had been planned. This represented
one of the highest growth rates in relation to other sectors. Moreover,
by the end of the Plan, the number of industrial plants grew from about
698,520 in 1961 to over 112,500, including some 4,000 large ones, and
70of industrial workers increased from about 121,800 to over 540,000,
although during the same period Iran's population rose from about 21 million
to over 26 million (about 35 percent urban). The traditional textile
71and food industries, however, absorbed most of the labour force.
In the meantime, the Government legislated for a minimum wage and 
workers' social insurance policy as well as a profit-sharing scheme for 
workers in industries. According to the latter scheme in each factory 
a share of up to 20 percent of the net profit was to be distributed among 
its workers or alternatively workers were to be entitled to extra 
compensations based on production norms, through higher productivity 
or less waste. The Profit-Sharing Law came into force in June 1963.
At first the Law covered a limited number of factories, but later it was 
amended to cover all workshops with more than ten workers. It was
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hoped that the Law together with the Labour and Social Security Laws
would ensure workers reasonable wages, increased employment, and welfare 
72incentives. By the end of 1968, as was reported officially, a
total of 1,412 large industrial plants had implemented the profit-sharing
73scheme, affecting over 125,692 workers. Undoubtedly, all this
marked some improvement in the working and living conditions of a good 
number of urban industrial workers and raised the hope of a majority of 
them for a better future; it also provided some impetus for the speedy 
growth of an urban working class largely under the Shah's leadership.
Yet another source of support, this time mainly urban, began to mature 
for the Shah's rule. It must be stressed that previously it was the 
urban centers which had produced most of the oppositon to the Shah's 
regime.
The agrarian and industrial measures were accompanied by the Shah's
efforts to mobilise women and youth behind his regime. Women had been
denied the voting right under the Electoral Law which had been passed by
Iran's first elected parliament under the Consitution of 1906. In 1963,
however, the Shah amended the Electoral Law and consequently gave women
the franchise so that they could "... contribute their share to the
administration of the country" and participate actively in the process
74of socio-economic change and political mobilisation. Of course, a
substantial majority of the Iranian women could not make effective use of
the franchise, given their low level of literacy and socio-political
75consciousness at the time. Nevertheless, the small educated group
of women could symbolise their growing support for the Shah's leadership 
through participating in Government administration, public and private 
enterprises and social schemes designed to propagate and execute the
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White Revolution's reforms and exalt the Shah for his 'enlightenment'.
The Government also legislated the Family Protection Law and Family
76Courts in support of "equal right" for women in all fields.
As for the educated youth, the Shah instituted what he termed 
'Literacy Corps', 'Health Corps', 'Development and Extension Corps' 
and 'Houses of Equity'. Under the first three schemes the Government 
drafted thousands of unemployed university and high-school graduates as 
trained cadres to work in rural areas in lieu of a part of their 
compulsory three years military service. While the Literacy and Health 
Corps were to help improve rural literacy, and health and sanitation 
standards, the Development and Extension Corps were to guide and assist 
farmers and rural cooperatives in new production and operational 
techniques. In addition, the Corps were collectively entrusted with 
the task of propagating and disseminating the White Revolution through­
out Iran. During 1963-1971, according to an official estimate, a total
of 98,599 men and women served in 21 terms of the Literacy Corps and
77educated about 1,625,000 pupils. By 1972, the Corps were active in
over 20,000 villages, some of which had been previously out of reach of
the Central Government. Moreover, Iran's literacy rate rose from about
15 percent at the end of the 1950s to about 25 percent at the beginning
of the 1970s, though the number of students enrolled in rural areas still
7 8lagged by 50 percent behind that in the cities.
The Health Corps was established in 1964. By 1972, as was
reported officially, there were 400 medical groups, each of which covered
79about 20 to 40 villages with a total population of 8,000 to 20,000.
The Development and Extension Corps were founded in 1965. By 1972, the
80number of Corps members serving in the scheme amounted to 4,692.
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Added to these schemes were the 'Houses of Equity' or 'village courts of 
justice'. They were originally founded in 1963 to deal with "misdemeanors 
and petty offenses" and, thus, lighten the burden of official courts 
above the village and prevent minor rural disputes from developing into 
major ones at the cost of peasants' time and work. By 1973, there
were reported to be 300 Houses of Equity with 2,400 corps members-judges
. 82 on service m  Iran.
The schemes, apart from fulfilling something similar to the Maoist 
idea of linking the mental and manual labour of youth, helped the Shah's 
regime in several ways. First, through them, the Government recruited 
the personnel it needed to propagate and execute the White Revolution and 
expand contacts between the rural and urban population under its own 
control. Second, since the corps members were fulfilling part of their 
military service in civilian form, they provided the Government with a 
source of legitimacy to emphasise the importance of the civilian role 
of the armed forces and, thus, boost the image and justify the expansion 
of the Shah's military power base. Third, they created employment and 
opened Government controlled avenues of political participation for 
graduates, a majority of whom had been previously bitterly critical of 
the Shah's regime for lack of jobs and participation and had consequently 
taken part in public agitation. Fourth, as a result, the schemes 
mobilised a good number of the educated Iranian youth, (who possessed more 
potential for revolt than any other section of the population against the 
Shah's regime) behind the Shah's leadership.
In addition, the Shah declared 'National Reconstruction' to be 
yet a necessary follow-up of the above reforms, involving the
reconstruction of both urban centres and rural areas. By the late 1960s,
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consequently, the Government legislated the Urban Renewal and Urban
Reconstruction Acts. The 'National Reconstruction' reform, according
to an official source, was to narrow the gap in the standards of
living between the cities and villages; to eliminate discrimination
among various areas through greater attention to less developed areas;
to accelerate rural development and reconstruction and to continue with
urban renewal; and to introduce all "modern amenities for transforming
83Iran into a prosperous and powerful country in its region. The
Shah, however, realised that the above reforms could not be fulfilled
efficiently without adopting fundamental measures, at the same time, to
reform Iran's administrative and educational system according to the
changing needs of the country. He, therefore, called for an
'Administrative and Educational Revolution' —  the last of his reforms
for the 1960s. The administrative aspect of this reform was to improve
the efficiency and working standard of Iran's fast growing public service.
It stressed the need for public servants, in whatever capacity, to
"... work honestly, consciously, and by accepting the responsibilities
of their duty. The spirit of procrastination and red-tape must disappear
84from ... offices". It promised the "decentralisation" of the
administrative system and the protection of the "public interest" as well 
as improvement in the social welfare and security of public servants.
The reform therefore envisaged new public service regulations, including 
the Public Auditing Law which came into force in 1972. The educational 
aspect of the reform was stressed as essential for the success of the 
Administrative and all other introduced reforms within a continuing 
process. It emphasised the need of Iran for trained educational, 
agricultural, technical and administrative personnel on the basis of merit 
and expertise. This was to be achieved at whatever expense by training
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students inside and outside Iran, but particularly in Western countries.
The Shah, however, failed to couple these socio-economic reforms
with any major political reform towards realising his promise of
"political democracy". He left the political structure and machinery,
over which he presided, almost intact and continued to centralise
politics under his absolute control so that his throne could strengthen
his traditionally central position in Iranian politics. In general, the
Iranian people were still denied the basic political freedoms and civil
liberties necessary to fulfil the Shah's promise to 'democratise'
and 'decentralise' the Iranian system for the sake of political stability
and capitalist oriented socio-economic development. The people were not
allowed either to criticise Government policies or to seek redress for
85their grievances individually and collectively. The Shah continued
to maintain the Parliament, which was reopened in 1963 after a lapse of
three years, and the two-party-system, which he had instigated in 1957, and
formally allowing the people to elect the Majlis every four years. As
in the past, however, party membership and elections were strictly
controlled by the Government and the opposition was suppressed to
prevent them from expressing themselves publicly, although some
representatives of peasants, workers and women found their way into
Parliament in 1963 and 1967 elections at the cost of landlords,
86signifying the new bases of support for the Shah. In fact, by 1964,
even the principle of the two-party-system dwindled. The Shah instigated 
a new ruling party called 'Irani Novin' (The New Iran) which was at 
first led by his loyal colleague, Ali Mansur, Iran's prime minister 
from 1964 to 1965. After Mansur's assassination in early 1965, he was 
succeeded by his finance minister and a former intellectual critic of the
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Shah's regime, Amir Abass Hoveyda, who soon made Iran Novin virtually
the sole political party contesting elections; the formal opposition
87party, Mardoom, continued to be nothing more than a name. Those
opponents who could not be coopted into the Shah's system through either
the formal process of parliament and the two parties or the informal
process of the White Revolution's programme, were to be suppressed, as
88in the past, effectively by SAVAK.
Thus, despite his frequent promises, the Shah largely failed to
'democratise' or increasingly 'institutionalise' the Iranian political
system. He consequently failed to expand institutionalised political
participation by his political opponents and gradually disperse political
power to the extent required by his capitalist oriented programme of
89socio-economic reforms. (It is true that he initially needed a
degree of political centralisation in order to put his reforms into 
practice.) His failure to do so can be attributed to two major factors: 
(1) the nature of his throne which required continued centralisation 
of politics for its own survival as the central feature of Iranian 
politics; and (2) the Shah's personal unwillingness to take the 
necessary risk involving limitation of his own power. In the long run, 
this together with the Shah's inability to plan and execute his 
reforms according to the needs of Iran, failed to serve the cause of 
stability and effective development. This, however, will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter IX .
Nevertheless, by the end of the 1960s, the Shah had come a long way 
from his unpopular and insecure domestic position before 1963, which 
had caused him and Washington grave concern about the effective 
continuity of his regime. By initiating his reforms, no matter how
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'undemocratic', 'autocratic' and 'unfruitful' they were in the eyes of 
his opponents and in terns of their results for the Iranian people, the 
Shah had achieved several short-term objectives in improving his domestic 
credibility and security. First, he generated a process of controlled 
mass mobilisation and opened up new bases of support, probably more 
psychological than anything else, for his leadership among peasants, 
industrial workers, women and youth and those intellectuals, professionals, 
technocrats and bureaucrats, who had been previously unhappy with his 
regime for other than ideological reasons. Second, he stimulated a higher 
degree of economic activity which, together with his mass mobilisation, 
improved the prospects for immediate socio-economic stability and raised 
the people's hopes for a better future. This accelerated growth of 
Iran's middle class —  a factor necessary for the Shah's regime in 
pursuing a guided capitalist mode of socio-economic development. Third, 
as a result, he stimulated some social and economic bases whereby he could 
transform 'autocratic' model of economic development, which he pursued 
in many ways in the 1950s, into a combination of this model with
90'bourgeois' and 'populist' models of socio-economic development.
Fourth, he had gained a reputation for his 'revolutionary' strides, based 
on a national ideology, to reform his society and improve the living 
conditions of his subjects. It was for the lack of such strides which 
he had been criticised by his opponents and critics both inside and 
outside Iran in the past. Moreover, he had adopted a 'revolutionary' 
rhetoric which had previously been solely a feature of his ideological 
opponents. The generally improving domestic image of the Shah was, 
indeed, effective in strengthening his capacity to initiate and pursue 
certain concurrent changes in his regime's regional policy behaviour 
in order to attain what he declared to be the White Revolution's foreign
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policy goal of "Iran's national independent foreign policy". The 
consequent regional achievements were to be, in turn, necessary and 
beneficial to the Shah's regime in terms not only of strengthening the 
regime's regional security but also of helping it to gain regional, 
particularly Soviet, economic and technical support for implementing 
its reforms. This, however, was not to undermine in any way Tehran's 
special relationship and alliance with Washington in particular and 
the West in general.
'National Independent Foreign Policy1
By the beginning of the 1960s, it was clear to the Shah that his 
past policy of exclusive alliance with the West and only those "friendly" 
regional countries which shared with his regime the common foreign policy 
convictions of firm opposition to "communism" and regional "subversion", 
had done his regime more damage than it had strengthened its position 
regionally. It had caused: (1) the displeasure of the Soviets and
radical Arabs with his regime; (2) the suspicion of Afghanistan and 
India; and (3) his own increasing vulnerability to Western, mainly
American, dictates. While Washington was pressing him for reforms 
for the sake of his own rule and Iran's long-term alliance with the US, 
and Cold War tensions were losing their intensity of the 1950s, the 
Shah found it imperative to couple his domestic reforms with changes in 
regional policy. He began to emphasise, along with Iran's 
alliance with the West, the importance of the country's bilateral 
relationship with other countries, particularly the neighbouring ones, on 
the basis of peaceful co-existence, cooperation and interdependence.
He considered this to be essential for Iran to conduct its foreign
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relations with more flexibility and independence within the bounds of 
his regime's alliance with the West and opposition to communism. He 
therefore stressed the foreign policy goal of the White Revolution 
to be one of "national independence". He subsequently declared:
Our policy is based on the maintenance and preservation of 
peace. We in Iran have adopted a policy which we call a policy 
of independent nationalism. Its essential principles are non­
interference in the internal affairs of other countries and 
peaceful co-existence. We must go beyond this stage and convert 
peaceful co-existence into international cooperation and 
understanding especially to countries with different political 
and social systems from ours, for without them the basic 
difficulties facing the world today, such as illiteracy, sickness 
and hunger, cannot be solved. We believe that the way to 
safeguard the real interests of our country is by co-existence and 
sincere cooperation with all countries ... on the basis of mutual 
respect for national sovereignty ... At the same time ... the 
establishment of ... understanding and peace cannot be achieved 
without sincere respect for the principle of co-existence between 
different ideologies and systems of government, or without respect 
for the principle of non-interference of countries in the internal 
affairs of others.^
In pursuit of such a foreign policy goal, the Shah first of all 
found it both politically and economically expedient to normalise Iran's 
relations with the Soviet Union strictly at government-to-government 
levels without abandoning his strong opposition to communism. While 
giving his personal undertaking to the Soviet leadership in 1962 that 
he would not allow any foreign power to establish bases in Iran against 
the Soviet Union, he set out to rectify one of the underlying causes of 
the Soviet dislike of his regime: Iran's membership of CENTO as a
military bloc. CENTO was originally set up as both a military and 
economic organisation. But hitherto its military aspect had been 
stressed more than its economic aspect as a defence against the spread 
of the "Soviet communism" and "regional communist subversion". Meanwhile, 
as was noted in the previous chapter, it had become clear to Iran and
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other regional members that CENTO as a military alliance was not of
any great value at regional level unless the Soviet Union invaded one
of them a contingency which none of them regarded as very likely any
more in view of the changing world politics. The Shah, consequently,
began stressing the fact that CENTO was important not merely because of
its military functions; it was also capable of making a significant
contribution in fostering cooperation and understanding in non-military
fields between the member states in particular and regional countries 
92m  general. While sharing a common concern in this respect,
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey eventually announced the formation of the
Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) as an offspring of CENTO in
July 1964. The objectives of RCD were declared to be not opposed to
the CENTO alliance but an improvement on and adjunct to it. It was to
expand "the field of mutual cooperation into those areas where the CENTO
93alliance had not been effective". In other words, it was to
further cooperation in economic, technical and cultural fields outside
94the existing framework of bilateral and multilateral collaboration.
At the time of its formation, the original member countries hoped that
the scheme would be soon joined by Afghanistan and other states of the
region, excluding the USSR. Although the RCD hitherto has been confined
to its original members, and although Iran during the 1960s gained much
less from it economically and technologically than Turkey and Pakistan,
which commanded stronger manpower and economic-industrial resources
95capabilities than Iran, the formation of the scheme was in line with 
the Shah’s need to implement his reforms and improve his regime's 
relationship with the Soviet Union. The Shah thus sought to de- 
emphasise the military aspect of CENTO and reassure Moscow of his 
readiness for better ties, involving expansion of economic and technical
131.
cooperation between the two sides.
Meanwhile, the Johnson administration classified Iran as a
'developed' country in 1965 and sought to end American grant-in-aid
to it by November 1967. This was because of the Shah's growing confidence
in his regime, the increasing socio-economic stability in Iran, the
modest but steady increases in Iran's oil income, the changes in
international politics, and the growing American preoccupation with the
war in Indo-China. This, however, was not to affect the US commitment
to maintain and strengthen its alliance with Iran and meet most of the
Shah's economic and military requests upon cash payment or long-term 
96repayments. Washington was, of course, confident that Iran's
commitment to the West and its dependence on the US had grown deep and
strong enough to ensure the continuation of its special relationship 
97with the West. The American decision, nevertheless, strengthened
the Shah's position in his efforts to normalise the Iranian-Soviet 
relationship, reduce his vulnerability to American pressures and counter 
his opponents' criticism that he was a Western 'stooge'. He consequently 
received the American decision with less reluctance.
The Changing Foreign Policy Position
98These developments must have been pleasing to the Soviets.
Some of the major consequences of the Shah's previous domestic weakness, 
which had contributed to straining the Iranian-Soviet relationship, 
were now dwindling. Since it had become obvious that only a domestically 
strong and secure Shah could normalise his relations with the USSR and 
reduce his dependence on the US, it was in Moscow's interest to help 
him in this respect as much and as soon as possible. In this, Moscow
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could seek to achieve several objectives: (1) to secure some access
to Iranian resources, particularly oil, which had hitherto been
monopolised by the West; (2) to manifest its desire for improved
ties with the conservative Arab states and attract their confidence,
since they had been resentful of the rapid development of close ties
between Moscow and radical Arab states; and (3) to promote its
general policy of "good neighbourly relations", "peaceful co-existence"
and "friendship" with as many developing Afro-Asian countries as possible.
Although, at the time, the Soviet Union was not in need of Middle Eastern
oil, it was economical for it (quite apart from its need to strengthen
its international bargaining position) to meet the fuel needs of its
southern areas from the fields lying in the immediate proximity of its 
99southern borders. For this purpose, it had already concluded a
natural gas agreement with Afghanistan in October 1963 —  the first
10(Soviet venture outside the Communist world in search of energy supplies.
It had tried to conclude similar ventures with Iran, but had failed 
hitherto largely because the Shah could not trust the Soviets while he 
was still domestically weak, given the Soviet active support for the 
outlawed Tudeh and other left-wing groups against his regime. With 
the changing position of the Shah and international politics, however, 
both sides were now ready to improve their relationship. While 
Moscow made fresh offers of economic and technical aid to Tehran, the 
Shah was pleased to make use of such offers in support of his domestic 
reforms and changing foreign policy objectives.
During the Shah's state visit to Moscow from June 21 to July 3, 1965, 
the groundwork was laid for Irano-Soviet economic and technical 
cooperation. Subsequently, this resulted in the conclusion of two
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major economic and military agreements between the two sides. The
first agreement was concluded in January 1966, under which Iran was to
supply the Soviet Union with more than $600 million worth of natural
gas, beginning in 1970; in return the USSR undertook to build Iran's
first large steel mill complex in Isfahan, construct a pipeline from
northern Iran to the Caucasus and establish a machine tools plant in
Shiraz.  ^ The second agreement was initiated in February 1967.
Under this one, the Soviets agreed to supply Tehran with some $110 million
worth of armored troop carriers, trucks and anti-aircraft guns in return
102for natural gas from Iran. Although the agreements were not to
affect Iran's alliance with the West, they marked a major breakthrough 
in Irano-Soviet relations and, consequently, provided the Shah with a 
bargaining leverage in conducting his relations with Washington. There 
were important economic and political gains for both sides from rapid 
improvement in their relations. Moscow secured a firm step towards 
realising its broader goal of expanding its share in the Persian 
Gulf's oil resources and exerting greater political influence in the 
region. This, however, resulted in a dilemma for Moscow in dealing with 
the mutually hostile revolutionary Arabs who were its allies, and the 
pro-Western conservative Shah. This dilemma will be discussed 
at the end of this thesis.
As for the Shah, he not only found a market outside the capitalist 
world for Iran's gas but also another source of economic and technological 
aid in accelerating the White Revolution's programme of heavy industrial­
isation. The Soviets' construction of the Isfahan steel complex was 
to provide Iran with sufficient steel to meet its domestic needs and 
export a considerable amount by the 1970s. The arms deal was not very 
significant in military terms. But, it was important, in political
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terms, in so far as it marked the first Iranian arms deal with a non-
Western and, above all, a Communist country. Politically, the Shah
gained several things from improved Iranian-Soviet relations.
First, he gained Soviet support for his rule and 'revolution' at the
small price of letting the Soviets have limited access to Iran's
petroleum wealth. Moscow, consequently, stopped both its propaganda
and its support for certain Iranian groups against the Shah's regime.
Second, the Soviet support strengthened the Shah's regional and international
position. It enabled him to improve his position against Cairo and the
Nasserite forces in the region as well as Iraq. Moreover, the Iranian-
Soviet rapprochement undercut the chances of any serious cooperation
between the domestic opposition and perceived hostile regional forces.
Third, the improved Iranian-Soviet relationship strengthened the position
of the Shah's regime in its relationship with the West, particularly 
103Washington. From now on a domestically confident Shah could use
his country's friendly ties with the USSR as a leverage against
Washington should the latter decide to exert pressure on him as it had
in the early sixties. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the Shah was in a
sufficiently strong position to conduct Iran's affairs with considerable
104flexibility and less vulnerability to outside dictates. He indeed
drew heavily on this to challenge the Western monopoly of the Iranian 
oil industry, realise Iran's potential as an oil power and call for an 
"inter-dependent1 relationship with the West in the 1970s.
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Chapter V
The Emergence of Iran as an 'Oil Power1
The Oil Policy of 'Positive Equilibrium1: 1953-1960
In its concern that Iran should own and control its oil industry in 
the interest of its national socio-economic development and stability, 
the Shah's regime shared a common purpose with the Mossadeq government. 
But they differed widely in their methods of achieving this. While the 
Mossadeq government believed in a 'revolutionary' method, the Shah's 
regime favoured an 'evolutionary' method which essentially stipulated 
that the exertion of Iran's sovereignty over its oil industry should be 
achieved gradually through accommodation rather than confrontation with 
the West. In this, the Shah's regime was largely influenced by four 
major factors: firstly, the initial weakness of the regime and its
pre-occupation with its own domestic consolidation; secondly, as a 
result, the regime's growing dependence on the United States and alliance 
with the West; thirdly, the prevailing regional and international 
circumstances which had proved unfavourable to Mossadeq's revolutionary 
methods;and, fourthly, the conservative nature of the regime itself.
From the start of his reign in 1941, the Shah had personally 
experienced the hazards of British monopoly of the Iranian oil 
industry which had minimised Iran's benefits from its own resources and 
made the country vulnerable to outside interference at the same time. 
Moreover, he had seen that these effects had limited and frustrated 
many Iranian governments in their attempts to implement successful 
internal socio-economic reforms and stabilise the domestic situation, 
on the one hand, and exercise greater independence in the conduct of
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Iran's foreign affairs, on the other. Therefore, by the time Mossadeq
declared the Iranian oil industry nationalised in May 1951, the Shah was
aware that as slong as Iran's oil was dominated by outsiders, Iranians
could not assert their "national sovereignty" effectively.1 For this
reason, he and his close royal supporters, who later helped him to
wrest the reins of political power from Mossadeq, at no stage opposed a
re-negotiation of the 1933 Oil Agreement between Iran and the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). On the contrary, they agreed with the
opposition that Iran's controlling share in the running of its oil
2industry should be increased. When confronted with popular demand,
the Shah even fully supported Mossadeq's nationalisation as an exercise 
of Iran's national legitimate right, although his political differences 
with Mossadeq were mounting.
When, howevep Mossadeq failed to achieve immediate nationalisation 
and to cope with the consequent crisis, which led to the overthrow of 
his government, the Shah faced his most urgent task: to establish his 
own rule against strong domestic opposition and the perceived Soviet 
threat. As detailed in Chapter III this resulted not only in the rapid 
growth in Iran's dependence on the United States and in a weakening of 
its regional position, but also in the perception of the necessity to 
end the nationalisation crisis in whatever way appropriate for the 
regime as quickly as possible. Given its weak and dependent position, 
the regime would not persist with Mossadeq's nationalisation, in its 
original prescription for simultaneous Iranian ownership and control of 
its oil industry. The Shah and his close supporters, therefore, 
retracted their initial support for Mossadeq's original nationalisation 
programme and discredited Mossadeq's method of achieving his objectives 
through his doctrine of "negative equilibrium". Instead, the Shah
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adopted a policy of what he called "positive equilibrium". He 
equated this with his doctrine of "positive nationalism", which was 
designed primarily to meet the requirements for the rapid establishment 
of his rule.^
Under this policy, the Shah's regime largely abandoned the 'control' 
aspect and opted mainly for the 'ownership' aspect of nationalisation.
It also welcomed US mediation in settling the oil dispute between Iran 
and Britain as well as putting the Iranian oil industry into operation 
as rapidly as possible in order to supplement American aid in financing 
its campaign against opposition and generating a higher level of economic 
activity. This is precisely what was manifested in its 1954 agreement 
with the Consortium of International Oil Companies, concluded under 
US auspices.
In terms of fulfilling the Shah's short-term objectives, the 
agreement was, however, significant. It meant the end of the 
nationalisation dispute with Britain and the reactivation of the 
Iranian oil industry. By the end of 1954, Iran and Britain had re­
established diplomatic relations and Iran had agreed to a 40 per cent 
share for BP in the newly formed consortium. As for the reactivation 
of the oil industry: within three years of the agreement's conclusion,
the Iranian oil industry under the consortium had achieved its pre­
nationalisation level. In 1957 Iran's crude output at 263 million barrels 
surpassed the production record of 242 million barrels established in
1950. In the same year, its oil exports reached 232 million barrels,
4and its oil revenue amounted to 212 million dollars. The consortium
companies accounted for virtually all of the production and exports.
They fixed the posted prices for the Iranian crude between $1.67 and
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$1.86 per barrel (the Iranian government tax and royalty were
calculated on the basis of posted prices), although this fell short of
the pre-nationalisation posted prices. The companies' 'off-take' per
5barrel amounted to 87.6 cents. The Consortium achieved all this at
a total capital expenditure of $34 million, which covered its fixed and 
movable assets as well as exploration and drilling costs.6
The reactivation of the oil industry at this level effectively 
supplemented the extensive US support for the regime. Together, the 
two factors helped the regime to achieve its immediate prime objective 
of domestic consolidation in the 1950s. The regime, consequently, 
traded the nationalisation aspect of Iran's control over its oil 
industry in favour of what it needed to establish swiftly its rule.
In reality, the regime's oil policy in the 1950s was one of modus 
vivendi with the West and its oil companies, which now collectively 
controlled the Iranian oil industry. The 1954 oil agreement simply 
embodied the code of legitimacy for such an oil policy. The agreement 
governed the regime's relationship with the Consortium companies for 
almost the next nineteen years. The Shah finally succeeded in abrogating 
it in 1973. It was only by abrogating the agreement, and enforcing 
Iran's control over its oil industry from production to pricing, that 
the Shah finally went a considerable way towards realising Mossadeq's 
nationalisation goal, and realising Iran's potential as an oil power.
This raises two main points. Was the goal of complete nationalisation 
one of the Shah's long-term objectives? If it was, how did he go about 
achieving it and what factors helped him to do so?
When the Shah's regime concluded the 1954 agreement for short­
term objectives, it did not mean that the regime gave up for ever the 
goal of complete nationalisation. The Shah was fully aware of the
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shortcomings of the agreement and later voiced his displeasure over it
on several occasions. Given, however, the prevailing circumstances, he
remarked in 1960, "it would have been difficult at that time to have
7concluded a better agreement". His prime minister, General Zahedi,
galso stressed that the agreement "left much to be desired". The
Shah believed that only "... through steadiZy increasing control over the
production and distribution of our oil, shall [we] be re-asserting our
9national sovereignty". Consequently, as became evident later on, the
Shah incorporated the goal of complete nationalisation into his regime1s 
long-term objectives. This was to be achieved through what can be seen 
as an 'evolutionary' method, which would develop gradually and peacefully 
in accommodation with the West and in the context of the Shah's 
strengthening domestic positon and the changes in the regional and 
international situations in favour of Iran. Meanwhile, without challenging 
the Consortium companies in any way, it appears that the Shah's regime 
concentrated on strengthening the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) as 
a government organisation, and enabling it to make effective use of the 
area outside the Consortium concession area according to the 1954 agreement.
To this effect, it passed the Oil Law in 1957, which made the NIOC 
responsible for the development of oil resources in all parts of Iran 
outside the Consortium or 'Agreement area', including the continental 
shelf, and made provisions for it to enter into direct partnership
10with other companies or organisations than the Consortium companies.
As a result, during 1957 and 1958 the NIOC signed two agreements, with 
an Italian and an American company, with 50 per cent NIOC participation 
in each one of them. They set up two companies called Societe Iranio- 
Italienne des Petroles (SIRIP) and the Iran-Pan American Company (IPAC).
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In each case, with NIOC's 50 percent participation share and 50 per cent
Government tax on the profits made by the foreign partners, Iran's
total share amounted to 75 percent This resulted in what became
known as the "75-25" percent agreement in favour of Iran.^ Undoubtedly,
the agreement, the first of its kind in the world, was an important
achievement in itself. It provided a basis for the Shah's rhetorical
comment that it marked the beginning of the end for the 50-50 formula,
which characterised Iran's agreement with the Consortium. He considered
the agreement a result "... of more than 17 years of agony and adversities"
12of his regime. Moreover, he stressed that although he did not want
to challenge or "kill any goose [foreign oil company] which lays golden
eggs that benefit my country ... we intend to regulate each goose's
13behaviour in the public interest". In this way the Shah's regime
attempted to imply that it was not happy with the 1954 agreement 
and was working towards achieving complete nationalisation, while at 
the same time it was trying to gain some domestic and regional support 
for the regime and its current oil policy stance.
In practical terms, however, the agreement neither resulted in 
substantial economic benefit for Iran nor did it affect Iran's relationship 
with the Consortium companies as defined by the 1954 agreement. While 
the NIOC controlled only about 10 per cent of the resource area outside 
that of the Consortium, the SIRIP and IPAC were very small ventures 
operating in a very limited area. Furthermore, the two ventures did 
not start production until 1961-64, and even their full production levels 
were negligible in comparison with that of the Consortium companies.
The agreements, consequently, had more symbolic than practical value.
They underlined the desire of the Shah's regime to strengthen the NIOC
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and its hold on the area under its control/ as well as to achieve better 
deals for resources outside Consortium control so that it could boost/ to 
some extent, its own position in possible future bargaining with the 
Consortium companies. It was, however, clear that the future of Iran's 
attempts to maximise the benefits it was to derive from its oil potential 
greatly depended on the country's success in controlling the policy and 
production areas of all its oil industry —  and not just 10 per cent of 
it. It was in this respect that the regime failed to make any notable 
progress in the 1950s. It was a period during which the regime was 
weak and the international oil companies were formidable 
in their unity against Iran and the other regionally 
disunited producers. Moreover the global political and economic 
circumstances were not favourable. These restraining factors began 
to alter by the beginning of the 1960's, and, with this, so did the 
attitude of the Shah's regime towards the Consortium companies. The 
major development was the foundation of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. This marked the beginning of a new 
phase in oil politics and in the evolution of Iran's oil policy to a 
position where it was to challenge directly within a little more than a 
decade the Consortium companies, and finally abrogate the 1954 Agreement.
The Oil Policy of 'more production more revenue':- 1960-1970
Until the end of the 1950s, the international oil companies held 
virtually a complete monopoly, not only of the Iranian oil industry, 
but also of the Persian Gulf resources as a whole. While the post-War 
boom in the West was increasing the demand for oil, the companies kept
142.
increasing their Persian Gulf production and explored more fields in both
old and new areas, including Libya and Algeria. The main reason for
their concentration on increasing their Gulf production was the cheapness
of oil there: a barrel of oil was produced at a cost as low as 10 cents.
Having been caught between cheap oil and growing available markets, which
brought them enormous profit, the companies failed to assess the world
oil boom-demand situation accurately. As a result, when there was a
minor downturn in the world oil market in 1959, the companies found
15themselves with a considerable surplus supply. There were several
reasons for the down-turn. The major ones included, first of all,
excessive production by the companies themselves, a downward fluctuation
in the post-War reconstruction and industrialisation boom in the West,
the US decision to adopt protectionist policies in order to help its
domestic oil industry against the inflow of cheap oil from outside,^
and the sudden rise of the Soviet Union as a major oil exporting country,
which offered its oil to many of the less developed consuming countries
at prices between 10 and 25 per cent less than the Persian Gulf oil
prices fixed by the international companies, and often in return accepted
17payment in local currencies or with non-oil commodities.
Although the downturn was minor, the companies panicked at the
prospect of a world glut in the oil market. In order to protect their
own interests, they immediately used their controlling power over pricing
and cut the posted prices twice, without consulting the producing governments,
during the first six months of 1959. Consequently, the posted price for
Venezuelan crude was reduced by $0.05-0.25 and that of Persian Gulf crude
18by $0.22-0.32 per barrel. In the case of Iran, the posted prices of
its crude dropped from $1.80-1.99 in 1958 to $1.62-1.81 in 1959. 19
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Since the companies paid royalties and taxes to producing governments on
the basis of posted prices, there was a substantial drop in the latter's
revenues. The first Arab Petroleum Conference (April 16-22, 1960)
20rejected the companies' unilateral price reductions as illegal. To
their annoyance, Venezuela, a hard-liner in oil politics, and Saudi
Arabia, a fundamentally pro-Western state which was being pressured by
growing Arab nationalism, called on the producing states, on May 13, to
formulate a "common petroleum policy" in order to defend themselves and
21prevent the companies from further unilateral price cuts.
By now the Shah's regime was in a better position than it had been 
a few years previously. It felt secure enough to make use of the 
opportunity and to take a substantial step towards achieving its long­
term oil objectives, by putting aside its main differences with the two 
other Gulf producers, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and joining them in promoting 
their common cause against the companies. Besides this, such a move 
on the part of Iran would have neither put the Shah in direct confrontation 
with the companies nor would it have singled out Iran as a rebel against 
the West. In fact, it was Saudi Arabia, another close Western ally, 
not Iran, which initiated the call for a common petroleum policy. In 
return for its cooperation with other producers, the Shah's regime was 
unlikely to lose anything, but to gain a source of collective strength 
and protection from other producers. This had not been available to 
Mossadeq, and the Shah could promote it now to strengthen his bargaining 
position not only against the Consortium companies but also against his 
domestic and regional critics, who denounced him for allying with the 
West and Western companies at the cost of Iran's interests, and made 
political capital out of this in stimulating opposition to him.
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The Shah's government therefore joined the governments of four 
other major oil exporting states, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Iraq, in a series of consultations in Baghdad in order to coordinate their 
oil policies. While the major capitalist consuming countries and oil 
companies expected little from them, the participants finally founded the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on September 14,
1960. It was the first of its kind and was set up as a permanent 
inter-governmental organisation. Its membership remained open to any 
less developed country with a sizable petroleum capacity. Given the 
political aims and leanings of its founding members, the principal aim 
of the Organisation from the start was in effect a compromise between 
the two 'radical' governments of Venezuela and Iraq, and the two pro- 
Western 'conservative' governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran, which wanted 
not confrontation but negotiation with the companies, in order to iron 
out their differences with them.
As a result, the Organisation's principal aim had two major aspects.
First, it stressed the determination of OPEC to coordinate and unify "the
petroleum policies of member-countries" in an attempt to safeguard "their
interests, individually and collectively" and ensure "the stabilisation
of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful
and unnecessary fluctuations". Second, it emphasised that it should give
due regard to the necessity of securing "an efficient, economic, and
regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on
22their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.".
This policy objective of OPEC was basically modest, and made no 
attempt to produce any substantial change in the governments-companies 
relationship. It was, therefore, in line with the Shah's long-term oil
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policy, which underlined the gradual expansion of Iranian control over
the country's oil industry through accommodation, not the confrontation
with the West, which had cost Mossadeq his government. As could have
been expected, the immediate achievements of OPEC were very limited.
The member-countries' general weakness, lack of sufficient determination
and unity, as well as the unfavourable international situation of the
Cold War period, did not permit them to pressure the powerful and united
companies to the point where they would first acknowledge OPEC's
existence, and then seriously respond to its demands. One way to exert
pressure on the companies was to restrict production. But the leading
OPEC producer, Saudi Arabia, was not interested in this, and Iran never
condoned it either. Another way which Iran and Iraq proposed was
"programming" production according to population —  both having large
populations. But other member-countries wanted programming according 
23to need. ~ Finally in mid-1962, the fourth OPEC conference, in which
Iran played an active role, resolved to establish a uniform rate for
royalties in each country; moreover, it recommended that prices be
brought up to their pre-August 1960 levels and royalty payments should
24not be deductible from income tax paid to producing governments.
By 1966, however, all that OPEC could claim to have achieved was, as
Rustow and Mungo rightly argue, "to have prevented further cuts beyond
the decline in real prices implicit in a steady nominal price. On the
other hand, the companies by 1965 agreed with each of the several countries
25not to claim the royalty as a credit against the 50 per cent income tax".
The immediate spin-off from this, for Iran, was that the posted 
prices of its crude stabilised between $1.58 and $1.73 until 1970 and the 
government's per barrel revenue increased from 75.7 cents in 1961 to
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83.3 cents in 1966, though this was short of the 1958 price of 89.7 cents 
2 Gper barrel. This gain was substantial neither in itself nor in terms
of what the Shah's regime could gain from it in the face of its domestic 
needs. By the beginning of the 1960s, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Shah set out to secure more solid bases for the effective 
continuity of his rule through achieving more stability at home and 
flexibility in the conduct of Iran's foreign relations. For this, he 
launched his White Revolution's programme of selective socio-economic 
reforms. Therefore, he had been urgently in need of increasing oil 
revenue to finance the reforms. So far, Iran's revenue from oil had 
recorded a steady but low rate of increase largely according to the 
interests of the companies which controlled the posted prices, and which 
resisted any major rise in production. Iranian production rose from 
390 million barrels in 1960 to 780 million barrels in 1966, of which 
356.2 and 700 million barrels respectively were exported. This 
increased the government's oil revenue from $285 million to $608.1 million 
during the same period. The Consortium companies were responsible for
27about 90 per cent of the production, exports and revenues paid to Iran.
The NIOC and its joint ventures, to which six more were added in 1966,
made up the remaining 10 per cent. This meant that the NIOC's progress
since the 1954 agreement was proportional to that of the companies and
nothing more. This, however, did not negate NIOC's 'expansionist' moves,
such as investing in India's Madras Refinery, and extending its exploration
activities to the continental shelf on the Persian Gulf, as well as
enlarging and modernising productive facilities in the area under its 
28control.
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Nevertheless, at first, the relative increase in the government oil
revenue helped the Shah to allocate an average of about 70 per cent
of the oil income to the Plan Organisation for economic development after
291962 as against an average of 50 per cent in the 1950s. This aided
him in speeding up his reform programme. But the increase in the oil
revenue could not keep up with the growing demands created by the reforms,
and consequently, people's rising expectations, in the light of the
Shah's unwillingness to cut down on his high security and administrative
expenditures and his inability to curb corruption in the bureaucracy.
The problem became more acute in view of Iran's limited achievement
through OPEC, and of Washington's decision to end its grant-in-aid to
Iran by 1967. Meanwhile, however, the Shah's domestic and regional
position had dramatically improved over what it was in the 1950s.
The White Revolution, in terms of mobilising new bases of domestic
support for the Shah's rule, was paying off favourably and Iran's
relations with the Soviet Union had taken a turn to steady normalisation
and increasing friendship. Moreover, despite the oil companies' panic
in the late 1950s, the world demand for Persian Gulf oil was growing 
30rapidly. From this improved position, although maintaining its
close links with OPEC, the Shah's regime intensified its efforts to 
pursue an old tactic of "more production more revenue" individually.
Since the regime could not force the companies to increase posted prices 
and, therefore, government revenue, it took advantage of its partial 
control over supply and pressed the companies for more substantial 
increases in Iranian production and exports. In 1965, for the first time 
since his protest against the companies over their unilateral price 
cuts in 1959, the Shah complained bitterly to the oil companies and 
threatened them, by declaring that:
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Western oil companies' dealings with us have not been fair.
We have often warned them that our production, in view of the 
country's socio-economic requirements, must be much higher than 
it is now. But on every occasion, they have found a way to avoid 
meeting their commitments. If the present trend persists we will 
have no option but to meet our requirements by dealing with other 
markets.
The Shah's complaint was genuine, but he had little chance to carry 
out his threat of "dealing with other markets" without bringing about a 
major crisis in his relationship with the West. The Consortium companies 
still firmly controlled the Iranian oil industry on the basis of the 1954 
agreement, which was still fully enforced. Above all, Iran on its own 
had neither marketing capability, nor any direct access to major non­
communist oil markets, as they were dominated by the companies. The 
only possible alternative markets that the Shah could have turned to were 
the Soviet Union and East European countries. In fact, the NIOC 
concluded two separate bi-lateral agreements with the Soviet Union and
Romania during 1965-66. They consisted of the Iranian sale of natural
32gas and oil to the two countries respectively. One could look at
these agreements as tactical moves by the Shah to strengthen his 
position against the companies. But this was as far as he could go.
For a start, the Soviet and East European markets were not big enough to 
provide Iran with effective alternatives. Even if they were, the NIOC 
did not have the strength and sanctions to divert the Consortium's share 
of oil to markets which it wanted. It could have done so only after 
abrogating the 1954 agreement; but the regime, on its own, was by no 
means ready for this yet. The companies were fully aware of these 
weaknesses on the part of Iran. Therefore, despite the Shah's 
increasing persistence, there was no major upsurge in Iranian production
and exports until 1967.
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During 1967 there was, however, a sharp rise in Iranian crude
production and export, as well as in government revenue, under the same
Consortium operation. This was more the case with Iran than any other
OPEC members. The major factors were the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967,
the consequent closure of the Suez Canal and an Arab oil embargo against
certain Western Countries supporting Israel, which the Shah exploited
very successfully in promoting his own oil and political interests.
What happened was not very complicated. In order to weaken the Israeli
position, the Arab oil ministers met during the war (June 3-9) at
Baghdad and decreed an oil boycott particularly against Britain and France
which were alleged to be aiding Israel against the warring Arab states,
expecially Egypt. The boycott was the first of its kind and, perhaps,
the most 'radical' action since Mossadeq's nationalisation. Although
the boycott was short-lived and proved ineffectual, it (together with
33closure of the Suez Canal) caused a temporary oil shortage. . Since
the companies were not prepared for it, they began to be concerned, not 
so much about the shortage itself —  as it was so small —  but how to 
prevent its repetition. Moreover, the boycott demonstrated that 
despite the companies' control over their oil industries, the producing 
states could use their hold on the top-stream and, hence, influence supply 
if they had the political will to do so. Given the existing circumstances 
especially with regard to the growing world demand for oil, any degree of 
control over supply could work out in the interest of producers.
While this was the case, Tehran's relationship with Cairo was at 
its lowest ebb. Consequently, while voicing his support for the Arabs' 
"just cause" and endorsing the Security Council's Resolution 242, the 
Shah disassociated Iran as a non-Arab state, though a Muslim country, from
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the Arab boycott and expressed his concern over the use of oil as a 
34political weapon. When the companies sought to overcome the oil
shortage, the Shah agreed to increases in their production in Iran.
As a result, Iranian production went up sharply by about 20 per cent in
1967 alone. By 1969, Iranian production increased to 1234 million barrels;
its export to 1158.5 million barrels; and its total oil revenue to
$1,136 million. And by the end of 1970, with the record annual production
of 1403.8 million barrels, Iran surpassed Saudi Arabia as OPEC's
35leading producer and exporter. Moreover, during 1967 Iran reached a
complementary agreement with the Consortium, whereby the latter returned
25 per cent of the area under its contract to NIOC, and agreed to the
delivery to NIOC of supplemental crude production for export to
36East European countries.
The rapid increases in production, and consequently in the government 
revenue, fulfilled to a considerable extent the Shah's pressure to 
'increase production increase revenue'. The return of 25 per cent of the 
Agreement area to NIOC was a 'bonus' on top of this. The whole development 
strengthened the position of the Shah's government not only domestically, 
but also within OPEC and regional politics. The increase in its oil 
revenue helped it to meet its domestic needs, and enhance the White 
Revolution reforms; and the increase in Iran's production made the 
country OPEC's leading producer, capable of exerting increased 
influence in the operational politics of the Organisation. In 
conjunction with the political consequences of the Middle East war for 
the Persian Gulf region, these gains improved Iran's regional position 
dramatically. The defeat of Egypt in the war bore two major implications 
for the Gulf region. First, Cairo became deeply pre-occupied with
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recovering its military, economic and territorial losses in the war; it,
therefore, could no longer pursue its aim of region-wide 'Arab revolution'
as vigorously as before. Second, Cairo became financially dependent on
the conservative oil rich Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, which despite
their differences with Nasser offered Egypt substantial monetary aid to
make up for the closure of the Suez Canal and help him re-equip his
army. Consequently, Nasser greatly reduced his revolutionary
aspirations against the conservative Persian Gulf regimes, and withdrew
Egyptian forces from South Yemen (the present People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen), where they had been engaged in support of pro-
Nasserite republican forces against the Saudi-backed monarchists in the
north. Thus, while the Nasserite forces were weakened, the conservative
37Arab forces emerged strong and triumphant in the Persian Gulf.
The major outcome of this for the Shah's regime was that it became 
free from its long pre-occupation with the threat of Nasserian. This, 
together with Iran's emergence as OPEC's leading producer, strengthened 
the regime's position in regional politics in two major, different but 
inter-related, ways. On the one hand, it no longer needed to base its 
relations and dealings with the conservative Arab producers on anti- 
Nasserism, but rather on its own emerging position as a strong force 
in the region. . On the other, it could cultivate and promote relations 
with all the regional states from a position of strength, as its own 
interests dictated. The Shah's refusal to join the Arab boycott, the 
petroleum and political implications of this for Iran, and the consequent 
dramatic strengthening of Iran's regional position led the Shah's regime 
to a central position in oil politics.
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At a time when the capitalist consuming countries and companies 
were deeply concerned about a repeat of the Arab boycott, the Shah 
assured them that Iran would continue to honour its commitments and meet 
their oil needs, in the event of a shortage created by an Arab boycott. 
Meanwhile, Iran's increasing production, and its emergence as OPEC's 
leading exporter, proved the effectiveness of the country's position as 
a potential 'boycott breaker'.
Thus, Iran became very important to the West and its companies, 
on the one hand, and the Arab producers, on’the other. Neither side 
could ignore it; the former needed it to moderate the Arab producers and 
compensate for an Arab boycott, and the latter needed its close co-operation, 
if they wanted their use of oil for political purposes to be effective.
In this case Tehran assumed a crucially influential position, not only in 
the network of relationships between the West, the companies and the 
Arab producers, as well as them and Iran, but also in OPEC politics itself. 
At the same time, the Shah wanted to strengthen OPEC. It was clearly in 
his interest to see OPEC emerging as a more effective cartel, so that he 
could use its strength in collective bargaining to take further steps to 
actualise Iran's nationalisation of 1951 and realise its oil potential 
for its own benefit. However, with certain changes in the world 
political and economic situation as well as in oil politics, which helped 
OPEC to become a very effective cartel by the turn of the seventies, the 
Shah was in a strong position to exert his influence, in cooperation with 
OPEC, to promote what appeared to be a policy of 'price rise, price and 
production control and more revenue'. This leads us to the third
phase' in the Shah's changing oil policy.
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The Oil Policy of 'Price Rise/ Price and Production Control': 1970-75
There seems to be a general belief that the emergence of OPEC as a
more effective cartel by the turn of the 1970s largely reflected the
political awakening of the oil producing states, including Iran, which,
at last, decided to exert their will collectively in order to maximise
their benefits from their oil resources. This is not altogether
correct. Many producers, long before the start of the seventies, were
aware of their oil potential, and knew that oil was a non-renewable natural
commodity which was traded internationally and which would neither be
exhausted, nor replaced by an alternative in the near future. If
anything, Mossadeq's nationalisation in 1951 and the formation of OPEC
itself in 1960 were a manifestation of such an awareness. But what the
producers had lacked all along were the 'appropriate' national, regional
and international political-economic environments which would allow them
to manage their national resources either individually or collectively,
but more independently of outside powers' hegemonic interference. The
failure of Mossadeq's nationalisation and the initial lack of effectiveness
3 8of OPEC may, in large measure, be attributed to this. By the end of 
the 1960s, however, this was no longer the case. The evolving changes 
in the spheres of national, regional and global politics had been working 
in favour of the producers. The national governments had become 
stronger, with increased control over their respective political 
situations. A strong trend had emerged for cooperation, at least at 
OPEC level, between the Persian Gulf producers themselves, as well as them 
and other OPEC producers, for a common purpose, since the foundation of 
OPEC. What enhanced these tendencies suddenly, as it appeared in the 
late 1960s, was the realisation by a number of producers that the changes 
in the world political-economic situation were finally swinging in their 
39favour.
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The change in the direction of the world oil situation was effective
primarily in two ways. First, the weakening of the Cold War politics
of bi-polarity in favour of a politics of 'detente', or cooperation on
the bases of mutual strength and respect for each other's interests in
East-West relations, provided for more lucidity in the conduct of
international relations. This meant an opportunity for small states,,
particularly those with a potential such as oil, to conduct their
foreign relations more flexibly and manage their dealings with the
outside world more forcefully, without risking strong unfavourable
repercussions for the forces whose interests, as a result, might appear
to be threatened. Second, there had been a steady upward trend in the
world oil market which gave the edge to demand over supply and consequently
strengthened the position of the producers which controlled the main-stream
of supply to some extent. Despite the international companies' claim in
1959 that the world oil market was facing a glut, during the 1960s the
world demand for oil almost tripled, world oil import increasing from
9.03 million barrels per day in 1960 to 25.60 million barrels in 1970.
Western Europe and the United States between them accounted for about 50
40and 70 per cent of these figures respectively. Most of the rising
demand was met from the resources of OPEC members, where oil was produced
at a cost more than 50 per cent cheaper than the production cost in the
United States. As a result, OPEC's total production rose from 7.89
million barrels per day in 1960 to 22.13 million barrels per day in 1970
and similarly its exports increased from 7.50 to 21.05 million barrels 
41per day. The Persian Gulf members of OPEC accounted for over
80 per cent of the Organisation's production and exports. In the face 
of such growing demand for OPEC oil, and increasing Western dependence 
on it, the position of producers, as the owners of the sources of supply,
155.
had been strengthening against the companies and the consumers. The
short-lived Arab boycott in 1967 had demonstrated clearly to the
producers that they could, if they wanted, influence the world market
by exercising their power over the sources of supply collectively.
Meanwhile, the position of the companies had been further weakened by
the fact that from the mid-1960s onward, when royalty payments were
added to, rather than deducted from, income tax payments to OPEC countries,
the companies began to accumulate vast excess tax credits. "These
details of tax-accounting procedure meant that the division of production
profits, which in 1948 had been approximately 63:37 in the companies'
favour, passed the 50:50 mark in 1955-56 and became approximately 70:30
42in the governments' favour by 1970".
It was these relevant changes in the world political and economic 
situation and the firm grasp of them by a number of OPEC countries, each 
of which had strong national leaders, that led the member-countries to 
coordinate their policies and activities to a greater degree than ever 
before; and, consequently to provide the initial impetus to OPEC 
becoming a more effective bargaining cartel and making the so-called 
"OPEC revolution" a reality by the beginning of the seventies. OPEC's 
"Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries", 
adopted by the Organisation's sixteenth meeting in June 1968, embodied 
what amounts to 'the charter' of this revolution because it was to set 
the pattern for the course of the revolution's development in the early 
1970s. The Statement clearly stressed the fact that it was the time 
for the producing governments to exert themselves in order to increase 
their oil revenues in relation to their oil value in the international 
market, increase their control over their oil industries by expanding 
their participation, determining posted prices, and adjusting them against
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declining monetary values, and keeping the companies under close
surveillance against misleading the producing governments about their
profits and general accounts. It emphasised that the governments
should have the right to set reasonable standards of account and
information, to formulate "the conservation rules to be followed", to
exercise full jurisdiction in their "competent national courts" in any
dispute with the companies, and to invoke against the companies the rule
of "the best of current practices" for such matters as incorporation,
43labour relations, royalties, taxes, and property rights.
From the very outset of the OPEC revolution, Iran, as we saw in 
the previous section of this chapter, held a strong and crucially 
important central position in both oil diplomacy and OPEC politics.
Drawing on this, it played a major role in the formulation of the 
Declaratory Statement, from a Position which empowered it to hold the 
balance between the two major factions that had developed within OPEC: 
one, the 'moderates', led by Saudi Arabia, which, perhaps, in many ways 
like Iran, wanted OPEC's objectives to be achieved through steady 
negotiation rather than any measure which could lead to confrontation 
with the companies; and the other, 'the radicals', led by Iraq, which 
pressed for certain swift collective actions against the companies.
Thus, Iran's continuous presence in OPEC was not only essential for the 
unity and collective bargaining strength of the Organisation, but also 
proved a balancing force in the subsequent dealings between OPEC and 
the companies. In maintaining this position, the Shah, in the 
implementation of the Declaratory Statement, at first was content to 
call for speedy negotiation with the companies. But when the companies 
failed to acknowledge the existence of OPEC, let alone agree to negotiate
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its demands, he did not, amid uncertainty as to what alternative means
were available, undertake immediately any direct radical action.
Instead, as it appears, he supported certain radical Arab producers,
particularly Libya under the newly emerged leadership of Muammar al-Qaddafi,
in their radical actions against the companies. For example, between
September 4 and October 9, 1970, Qaddafi exploited the conjunction of
increases in demand and expected decreases in supply. He ordered
production cuts and the threat of shutdown effectively against individual
companies. Consequently, he raised Libyan oil posted prices by
$0.30 per barrel and increased the tax rate from 50 to 58 per cent,
44retroactive to September 1. The Shah's government not only
refrained from undermining Qaddafi's efforts but also hailed his actions
45as "Libya's national right" This was not done out of any
admiration for Qaddafi's regime. In fact, the Shah and Qaddafi were
46ideological enemies then, as they remained in the following years.
But his support was largely for reasons of political expediency.
Qaddafi's actions and achievements helped the Shah in three important 
ways. First, they saved the Shah from having himself to initiate 
pressure against the companies. Therefore, while the companies were 
sufficiently pressured by Qaddafi, the Shah maintained Iran's strong and 
central position in oil politics without directly engaging with the 
companies and, as a result, avoided antagonising the companies and the 
major consumers against Iran. Second, Libya's actions tested for the 
Shah the intensity of the companies' and Western reaction and of the 
potential of OPEC's radicalism for achieving Iran's goals. Third, they 
paved the way for the Shah to implement similar measures, justifying 
them by the precedent of what Libya or any other radical Arab member of 
OPEC had already achieved.
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The Shah noted that (a) Qaddafi's radical measures succeeded and
the companies could not do anything but give in; (b) Western criticism
did not go beyond mere verbal condemnation of Qaddafi's behaviour; and
(c) the Arabs, not Iranians, once again gained the reputation in the
West of being unreasonable and xenophobic. Thus, in November, he had
sufficient justification to act more forcefully in raising Iranian
47posted prices and the tax rate by as much as Qaddafi had done.
This allowed Iran to participate in OPEC's 21st conference at
Caracas, between December 9 to 12, from a position of greater strength
and accomplishment —  if not more, at least, equal with Libya. OPEC's
Caracas Conference explicitly recalled its 1968 Declaratory Statement
and reiterated the member-countries' determination to implement its
provisions. Moreover, it adopted the 120th resolution of five principles,
which called for: first, fixing 55 per cent as the minimum net income
tax rate that the companies would pay to the OPEC members; second,
elimination of differences between the posted prices in effect and taking
into consideration the geographical situation and the type of oil of the
exporting country; third, adoption of a new policy for adjusting
differences between the posted prices and the prices used as the basis
for tax calculation; fourth, fixing a uniform total increase in the
posted prices and the prices used as the basis for tax calculation; and,
fifth, complete abolition, effective as from 1 January 1971, of the
discounts granted to oil companies. The Conference also instructed the
Persian Gulf members of OPEC to start negotiating the implementation
of its 120th resolution with the companies. 48
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The Shah's government played a prominent role in composing the
resolution, and fully supported a speedy implementation of the principles.
Although Iran had already increased its crude posted prices and tax rate,
the Consortium companies had failed to accept them. Any longer delay
in the implementation of this and other provisions of the 120th
resolution might have had serious repercussions for the Shah's regime,
which needed extra revenue urgently for several reasons. By now the
White Revolution reform had generated new social groups, with rising
political and economic expectations. Since the Shah failed to execute
substantial political reforms along with his socio-economic reforms in
the sixties, the country's political system could not cope with the
growing demands made by the new groups. Alternatively, the most
convenient way out of this was to increase the level of economic
activities and business transactions so that the people, in general, and
new groups, in particular, should be placated by pecuniary gains from
accelerating economic growth and thus their attention be diverted from
their aspirations for the expansion of political participation and
political reforms, the continued lack of which was likely to increase
48agitation against the regime. Moreover, in the last few years,
the rapidly weakening position of sterling, which was followed by
the American dollar in the early 1970s, and growing recessionary trends
in the Western economy, had had an inflationary impact on the oil
revenues of the'producing states. The Shah complained that "during the
past 10 or 12 years the value of money paid to us for oil extracted
49in Iran had been reduced by about 28 per cent".
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Consequently, following the Caracas Conference, the Shah found it 
timely to pursue, from then on, a more direct and harder line against 
the companies. When he found the companies as intransigent as before, 
he tried to strengthen his and OPEC's position further by rallying the 
support of the less developed countries in general. For this, he 
identified the OPEC cause as common to that of the less developed 
countries as producers of other raw materials, and widened the scope of 
this criticism of the companies by attacking the West, as a whole, for 
promoting its interests and welfare at the cost of the 'third' world 
countries. In a press conference, he complained that while the Western 
countries insisted on cheap oil and other raw materials from the less 
developed countries, they sold their own goods at increasingly high 
prices to these countries. He stressed:
"perhaps it is time to have the prices of raw materials corresponding 
with the increased prices of industrial goods in the world. Is 
there a simpler quest? You [the West] buy from us at cheaper 
prices and sell us your goods at dearer prices; we become leaner 
every day, and you become fatter every day". And he warned,
"Well, one day you are going to explode. There is no doubt about 
that".50
Furthermore, he expressed his awareness that such "clear policies by
51Iran will make certain enemies" —  perhaps, the type of enemies which 
were invoked by Mossadeq's nationalisation exactly twenty years 
previously. But, unlike Mossadeq, the Shah was now ready and better 
equipped to cope with such an eventuality.
While turning the issue into one not just between OPEC and the 
companies but rather between the Western industrialised nations and the 
less developed countries, the Shah soon painted an image of himself as 
a forceful spokesman not only for OPEC, but for the third world developing 
countries at large. This image became more identifiable during and after
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OPEC s celebrated Tehran Conference in February 1971. m  order to 
implement the 120th resolution, Tehran seized upon an instruction of the 
Caracas Conference and hosted a meeting between a three member committee 
of oil ministers from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, representing six 
Persian Gulf members of OPEC and the Iranian oil Consortium Companies, 
which were later joined by another twelve smaller companies, on January 12, 
1971. The prime objective of the meeting was to provide the venue for 
direct negotiations between the governments and companies. This was the 
first time that the companies had agreed to get together and open dialogue 
with OPEC as a collective organisation. Previously, they preferred talks 
with individual members so as to avoid recognising OPEC. However, the 
meeting broke down the same day, largely because representatives of the 
companies disclaimed any authority to negotiate; they stressed that 
they were there simply to find out more about the 120th resolution.
If nothing else, as the Iranian daily, Ettela’at, claimed ”... for the 
first time, the oil companies ... accepted the existence of OPEC".52
Gulf committee called the refusal of the companies to negotiate 
... illogical and unjustified ... [and] an attempt [on the part of the 
companies] to avoid facing justice and legitimate rights of the producing 
states . Moreover, it threatened the companies and called for an 
extraordinary conference by the ten member OPEC to be held in Tehran in 
order "to take appropriate decisions".53
The Shah personally blamed the companies for the break-down of 
talks and called their refusal to negotiate "unreasonable and provocative". 
When the talks resumed and broke down again, the companies informally 
consulted the US State Department. Although they were told to settle 
their differences with OPEC through negotiation,5^ President Nixon
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dispatched his Under-Secretary of State to Tehran and Riyadh to 
assess the situation and see if the United States could mediate in any 
way. The US had mediated in 1954 in settling the dispute between 
Iran and Britain. But it was that mediation which restored Western 
control of the Iranian oil industry and left the Shah's regime with a 
major problem of its rule in the subsequent years. When the companies 
now reportedly consulted the State Department, it must have had an 
alarming impact on the Shah. He immediately denounced the companies' 
approach, and warned the West against exerting any pressure in their 
support. He stressed that the companies' intransigent attitude and any 
Western support for it could not only cause a "crisis" but also an OPEC 
oil embargo against the West. He declared:
"- -• it could become a crisis if the oil companies think that they 
could bluff us or they could put up such a pressure on us [word 
indistinct] that we are going to surrender. It would be a still 
more dangerous crisis if the big industrial countries in the world 
tried to back up the companies and defend their interests. That 
would be then a confrontation between what we will call the economic 
imperialists or imperial powers, or the new aspects of the neo­
colonialism which would create then a terrible crisis between these 
countries and either the oil-producing countries and the countries 
who are not yet fully developed. Then [anything] could happen.
Not only the stoppage of the flow of oil but may be a much more 
dangerous crisis. It would be a [word indistinct] of the have- 
nots against the haves and if this [started] one day it would be 
beyond at least my control".^
Meanwhile, he made it absolutely clear that he would go beyond 
achieving the objectives of the Caracas Conference. He emphasised that 
Iran's ultimate objective was to achieve a status whereby it could
56"act as seller and the companies or other organisations as purchaser". 
Since the build-up of his regime's heavy dependence on the United States 
and alliance with the West, this was the first time that the Shah warned 
and challenged the West against doing anything which could harm what
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he called "the national interests" of Iran. Furthermore, he left the
major Western countries with no illusion that if necessary he would
join in an OPEC oil embargo, as an "economic weapon", against them.
This, particularly in view of his previous refusal to join an Arab
boycott, and his assurances to the West that Iran would continue to
meet its oil needs without interruption, indicated the extent to which
the Shah was prepared to confront the companies and the Western
consuming countries. Negotiations resumed once again on January 28
but broke down on February 2 despite all the efforts of the Iranian
Oil Minister, Jamshid Amuzegar. The major point of difference between
the two sides was the companies' demand that OPEC assure them of an
"uninterrupted flow of oil" and that it would not "restrict oil
57availability" to them in the face of threats. OPEC, especially its
Arab members, was of course reluctant to give such an assurance. The 
Shah did nothing, at least publicly, either to undermine OPEC's 
reluctance or help the companies. If anything, his attitude hardened 
against the companies during the special OPEC Conference, held in Tehran 
from February 3 to 4, following the breakdown of negotiations.
At the conference, the Shah urged the Gulf producing governments
to raise their tax rates and prices by concerted unilateral action,
along the lines of legislation enacted by Venezuela in 1970. He
proposed that the total receipts by the producer governments should be
increased from about $1 to $1.25 per barrel. This price was of actual
58receipts and quite separate from the national posted price. The
Shah's proposals substantially influenced the terms of OPEC's 
Resolution 131. The resolution, in its most important parts, 
declared the decision of the conference that "every member country in 
the Persian Gulf region take appropriate measures on February 15 to
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implement the provisions of Resolution 120 of the 21st OPEC Conference
and enact necessary legislation". Should any oil company concerned
fail to comply within seven days, the Resolution added, all the
member-countries concerned "... shall take appropriate measures including
total embargo on the shipment of crude oil and petroleum products by 
59such company".
The Resolution was endorsed unanimously by all member-countries, 
both 'radicals' and 'moderates'. In the light of the Shah's previous 
warnings, the embargo threat of the resolution was particularly 
significant in reflecting the US's closest ally's determination to win 
the fight against the companies. It took many Western political and 
business quarters by surprise. The companies, at last, bowed to OPEC 
demands. Following a meeting between the Iranian Oil Minister,
Arauzegar, and Lord Strathalmond, a managing director of British 
Petroleum, in Paris, and three days' discussion between the two in Tehran, 
the companies concluded an agreement with the six Gulf members of OPEC 
on February 14. The agreement provided for an immediate rise of 35 cents 
a barrel in posted prices at Gulf terminals to an average of $2.15; a 
standard 55 per cent income tax; a new system of payment for gravity 
differentials; fixed increases for the following five years; and an 
undertaking by the governments concerned not to seek further improvements 
in the five year period.  ^ The companies justified the agreement by
stressing that it established "security of supply and stability in 
financial agreements for the ... period, 1971-1975". It was, however, 
to yield the Gulf states concerned an estimated additional revenue of 
over $1,230,000,000 in 1971 rising to about $3,000,000,000 in 1975.
Of the figure for 1971, Iran's share amounted to about $800,200,000. 61
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Iran's total oil revenue, consequently, increased from $1,136 million 
in 1970 to $1,944 million in 1971 and kept up such pace of increase 
until 'November 1973 when it amounted to $4,100 million. In return 
the companies were to adjust their prices upward by 2k per cent from 
June 1, 1971 and hereafter every January 1 until 1975.
The Tehran agreement was, indeed, historic in its implications.
It marked a watershed not only in the relationship between OPEC
member-countries and the companies, but also in the oil diplomacy and
world politics as a whole. It set the stage for the oil producing
governments to increase their control over their respective oil
industries, from production to pricing, according to their own interests,
and their roles in regional and international politics in the next few
years. From now on, the world, particularly the industrialised
capitalist countries, had to concede the increasing power of the producing
governments over that of the Companies for their daily oil supplies and
price stability. Moreover, the agreement underlined the growing
effectiveness of OPEC as a bargaining cartel and its use of "collective
resource diplomacy", through which it could achieve what the producers
had failed to achieve individually in the past. This encouraged many
other less developed nations with non-oil raw material resources to
follow OPEC's example, in order to exert themselves against what they
saw as Western domination and exploitation of their resources, at the
cost of their own national development. They regarded the Tehran
agreement not only as an economic and political victory for OPEC, but
63also as a 'moral' victory for themselves. The Shah and his country
held an important position in this victory. The Iranian government
press hailed the agreement as a consequence of the Shah's relentless
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striving against the forces of domination in support of the less developed 
countries, which struggled to free themselves from such domination.64 
Even some Arab oil ministers, after leaving Tehran, acknowledged the 
instrumental role played by the Shah in leading OPEC to victory.65
The Tehran agreement, however, by no means fulfilled the Shah's 
ultimate objective: to put into practice the 1951 nationalisation.
It took him another two years to secure more solid bases for achieving 
this objective. During this period, the Shah's government indulged in 
no individual direct action against the companies. But it did a great 
deal, in conjunction with either OPEC or its other individual members, 
to adjust its oil revenue to world monetary changes, and increase 
Iran's production and weaken the position of the companies further.
This ranged from supporting Algeria's nationalisation of 51 per cent of 
French oil concessions on February 24, 1971, and endorsing the 
Venezuelan Hydrocarbons Revision Law, July 13, 1971, which required the 
companies "to cede ... their unexploited concession areas by 1974" and 
"all their residual assets" by 1983,66 to joining OPEC in protecting 
Iraq in its decision to nationalise the Iraq Petroleum Company's 
concession (Kirkuk area), June 1, 1972, after an eleven year dispute 
between the Iraqi government and the British operated Company, and 
supported OPEC's 28th Conference's resolution No. 146 to this 
effect in order, to prevent the companies' compensating for their losses 
in Iraq by increasing their production elsewhere. Moreover, in the
context of the worsening monetary situation in the West and the 
devaluation of the American dollar, Tehran advocated that because of the 
fluctuations in the world monetary situation OPEC should press the
companies to index to monetary changes their revenues paid to producing
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governments. To this effect, OPEC passed two important resolutions 
at its 24th and 25th conferences. It reached one agreement with the 
companies in Geneva, January 20, 1972, to increase posted prices by 
8.94 per cent to offset the decline in the value of the US dollar and 
another agreement, on April 1, 1972, for an increase of 7.5 per cent 
m  the posted prices. These were in effect two amendments to the
Tehran Agreement, under which the producing governments had agreed not 
to ask for further price rises until 1975.
Meanwhile, the companies had been pressed hard by the Gulf members
of OPEC to meet another demand of the Caracas Conference: the expansion
of the producing states1 participation in their oil industries. As a
result, a participation agreement between the companies and Gulf states,
excluding Iran, was finalised on November 6, 1972. This agreement provided
for 25 per cent government participation from January 1, 1973, rising to
51 per cent by January 1, 1982.69 The Shah fully supported other
Gulf states m  this, but conducted separate negotiations with the companies,
on the grounds that Iran had already nationalised its oil industry and
did not need such a participation agreement. in order to justify such
a move, the Shah drew on the 1954 agreement itself and announced, on
January 23, 1973, that one of the terms of the 1954 agreement with the
Consortium was that the operating companies would protect Iran's
interests in the best possible way; but "we have evidence that this has
not been the case". Therefore, although the agreement provided for
three extension periods, each of five years, "[w]e have ample grounds ...
for not renewing the agreement with the Consortium in 1979", when it was 
, , 70due to run out. He proposed two courses of action. One was, as he
said, to let the companies continue their operation up to 1979, provided 
that Iran's oil export capacity was increased to 8 million barrels and
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the country's earning per barrel was no less than those earned by
other regional producers. After 1979, the Consortium companies had to
join other customers in "a long queue to buy Iran's oil ... without any
privileges over the other companies". The other was to sign a new
contract with the Consortium companies, whereby they would return to
Iran all their policy and operational responsibilites which were at
the time not in Iran's hands. "The present operating companies could
then become our long-term customers and we would sell them oil over a
long term, in consideration for which we would give them good prices and
71the kind of discounts which are always given to a good customer".
In this the Shah made it plain that he wanted the second alternative to 
be implemented within the framework of his regime's close political, 
economic and military links and alliance with the West. The major 
problem, however, with implementing the second proposal, was the fact 
that Iran lacked sufficient technical know-how and trained manpower to 
operate the Iranian oil industry on its own after its handover to NIOC. 
For this, the Shah proposed that Iran would still seek help from the 
Consortium companies. When faced with the choice, there is no doubt 
that the second proposal was also attractive to the companies. While 
freeing them from the responsibilities and hazards of domesic operations, 
the proposal assured them not only of continued oil supply for the next 
20 to 25 years at favourable terms as Iran's "privileged customers", 
but also of an important stake in the operation of the Iranian oil 
industry through their technical help. Moreover, the companies could 
still market a major proportion of the Iranian oil at retail prices which
benefited them most.
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Senior oil company officials discussed the Shah's proposals with
him directly in St. Moritz, Switzerland, on February 26 and it was
disclosed that a "satisfactory understanding" had been reached between
the two sides. However, on March 16, the Shah announced that the oil
companies had "totally surrendered" and had agreed to handover
"full control" of oil operations. He declared: "They have handed
over to us total and real operation of the oil industry ... with ownership
72all installations". Furthermore, on March 20, the Shah announced
that the Iranian takeover would take effect on the same day and that
both the installations —  production and refining facilities —  and
the 17,827 employees of the Consortium would be controlled by the National
73Iranian Oil Company. Thus, a new agreement called the 'St. Moritz
Agreement', replacing the 1954 Agreement was concluded between Iran and 
the Consortium companies. In view of the Shah's pronouncements, at 
first it appeared that the terms of the new agreement would be much 
different from what the Shah had outlined in his second proposal. However, 
as subsequently became clear, the St. Moritz Agreement was formulated very 
much in line with that proposal except that it came into force six years 
before the expiration of the 1954 Agreement in 1979.
The St. Moritz Agreement was to be valid for 20 years. Under this
agreement, while the NIOC was entrusted with all the policy-making and
management responsibilities and the "control of all oil operations" and
installations, including the Abadan and Mahshahr Refineries and all
related establishments, the former Consortium companies were turned into
Iran's long-term and privileged customers, with an important expertise stake
74in running the country's oil industry. Upon submitting the agreement
to the Majlis on July 19, 1973, however, Prime Minister Hoveyda stressed
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that the NIOC would need the companies' expertise only for part of the
oil operation related "to exploration and exploitation". Their
services would be contracted according to the laws of Iran and would
"be utilised temporarily for a period of five years". Moreover, he
emphasised that under the agreement arbitration of any dispute with a
contractor company would be based on Iranian laws and the agreement's
provision "will be interpreted in accordance with the laws of Iran".
Also, Iranian oil would be sold to the companies at prices "no less than
those earned by the Persian Gulf states". He characterised Iran's
relationship with the companies, under the new agreement, as one between
"seller and buyer". He hailed the agreement as an "historic document"
manifesting the implementation of the Nationalisation Act of 1951
"in its fullest sense after a lapse of twenty-three years, thus realising
75our long-cherished national objective".
The agreement, however, did not offer much comfort to the Shah's
critics, who branded it as yet another manifestation of the Shah's
"collusion" with the West. A Tudeh Party commentary in exile stated
that although the companies were weakened in international politics and
they could no longer impose their will, the Shah's government, "as a
result of behind-the-scenes deals" made them "privileged, long-term"
purchasers of "our crude oil". This enabled them to hold on their
monopoly on the sale of a major part of Iran's oil "against the interests
of the Iranian people" and contrary to "the spirit of the oil nationalisation
law (1951)". It recommended that: "Iran should be free to sell its oil
in world markets in any way that would secure its interests to the 
76utmost". In spite of all its encouragement and support for Iran and
OPEC against the international companies, Moscow, too, criticised the new 
agreement. In a commentry, it pointed out that under the terms of the
171.
agreement Iran was not only committed to a long-term« oil sale to the 
Consortium companies, but also "Iran gets only four per cent of the oil 
production for its internal needs and for independent export. This 
share will only increase gradually, which means that the Consortium will, 
as before, retain the (increasing) role of middle-man between Iran and 
the oil buyers of the market of the capitalist world. As before, the 
member monopolies of the International Consortium will export large
77quantities of crude oil from Iran and sell these at a huge profit".
Although the critics were partially justified at the time, the 
new agreement was a great improvement over the one concluded in 1954.
The concessions which it made to the former Consortium companies were by 
no means as significant as the sanctions and consequent power which the 
companies had acquired under the 1954 Agreement to control the Iranian 
oil industry from production and refining to pricing and marketing.
The agreement clearly reflected the two major factors, which influenced 
its formulation: first, that Iran still did not have the necessary
capability to run its oil industry and market its oil on its own; and, 
second, that Tehran was still deeply committed to close links and alliance 
with the West and as a result its policy all along had been to achieve its 
oil objectives through accommodation rather than confrontation with the 
West. But one thing which the new agreement specifically failed to 
achieve was to entrust Tehran with the necessary power to fix the price 
of its oil unilaterally according to its own interests and curb the 
excessive profit made by the companies at the cost of Iran and consumers. 
This, however, formed the Shah's next major oil objective. He, therefore, 
set out to materialise what subsequently became known as OPEC "oil-price 
politics". This essentially aimed at empowering the producing governments 
to fix the posted prices on their own with reference to their own interests
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and their perception of the changing world economic and oil market 
situation, and, conversely, to influence the world market situation, 
should the producing governments' interests necessitate it.
After the conclusion of the St. Moritz Agreement, the Shah's
government increased its complaints about the lack of correlation between
oil prices and the world inflation, which had continuously devalued Iran's
real oil income since the Tehran Agreement. It also pointed to the
growing discrepancy between the prices of oil and other energy resources
in terms of the former's high quality and capacity to produce hundreds of
important by-products, particularly petro-chemicals, and the companies'
bias in influencing the oil prices on the basis not of the real value of
oil in the world market, but of their own profitability. Tehran
prompted OPEC to consider this matter urgently, launching a vigorous
78campaign and supporting any call or action by other OPEC members.
In a communique, on July 27, 1973, consequently, OPEC declared that member
countries should not only obtain an adequate price for their oil but
also negotiate with a view to attaining conditions which would effectively
foster permanent and diversified sources of income within their territories.
Furthermore, at its 35th Conference in Vienna, September 15-16, OPEC
agreed that its members should negotiate either collectively, that is, the
six Gulf states, including Iran, or individually in order to obtain
substantial price increases, in view of the fact that the existing posted
prices and annual increases were "no longer compatible with prevailing
80market conditions as well as galloping world inflation".
Meanwhile, taking advantage of its increased control over Iran's oil 
industry, the NIOC followed the example of a number of non-Persian Gulf 
OPEC members and offered some of its surplus oil to international bidding.
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Given the world panic about a prospective energy shortage, and the heavy 
dependence of Japan on the Persian Gulf in general in Iran in particular 
Japanese companies offered the highest bids for Iranian oil: one barrel
of it was sold as high as $17.8. This certainly determined the
independent value of Iranian oil in the world market, though it was 
artificially enhanced by the prevailing circumstances. It provided the 
Shah's government, along with other Persian Gulf producers with a solid 
base for bargaining against the companies in the forthcoming negotiations 
over the implementation of OPEC 35th Conference's resolution. Although 
the companies at first resisted any further price increase, and regarded 
it as violation of the Tehran Agreement, they finally opened negotiations 
with six Persian Gulf members of OPEC on October 8. The Gulf states' 
position was, as press reports put it at the time, that posted prices 
should be increased from the current average level for the Gulf states of 
about $3 per barrel to $4.20.81 However, while the companies were 
reluctant to accept such a price, in view of the outbreak of the fourth 
Arab-Israeli War on October 6 and the Iraqi nationalisation of US 
interests in the Basrah Petroleum Company, the talks between the two 
sides broke down on October 12. But this breakdown marked the beginning 
of a period in oil politics, during which the Shah skilfully took 
advantage of the Middle East War and its consequences to lead OPEC in 
imposing the sovereignty of producers over price fixing, and taking away 
any power which the companies exercised in this respect once and for all. 
How did this happen?
The use of oil as a political weapon" by Arab producers in a 
forthcoming Arab-Israeli war had been on the cards for some time. 
President Sadat of Egypt had hinted strongly at such a possibility
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8 2as early as April 1973. This had, subsequently, added to growing
speculation by press and certain political and economic quarters in the 
West, about a possible Arab embargo and the question of whether the
O O
West could cope with it effectively. The Iranian official reaction
to all this was, however, one of cautious silence. The Shah's
government issued no specific statement clarifying its position in the
wake of an Arab embargo. If seen in the light of the Shah's refusual
to participate in the Arab boycott in 1967, and his repeated disapproval
of the use of oil for political purposes, which the Arabs had been
seeking to advance, as well as his strong assurances to the West and Japan
of continued Iranian oil supplyfthe silence was not very important.
It could have been safely assumed that Iran would not take part in any
future Arab embargo measures. But, if the silence is considered in
view of the dramatic improvement of relations between Tehran and Cairo
since the two sides re-established diplomatic ties in 1970, Tehran's
apparent changing position in favour of voicing a stronger support for
the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict and its growing friendship
and cooperation, at least at OPEC level, with other Arab states, except 
84Iraq, it certainly benefited Tehran in two important ways. On the
one hand, it helped Tehran maintain its cooperative relations with the 
Arab states which were desirable and necessary for the Shah to realise 
Iran's potential as an oil power. On the other, it made concerned 
Western quarters uncertain as to what Iran's decision would be in the 
wake of an all-round Arab embargo. Thus, while preventing any undue 
complication with the Arab states, Tehran provided the companies and 
major Western consuming countries and Japan with no solid grounds to take 
it for granted that Iran would definitely not respond favourably to 
possible Arab embargo measures. This gave Tehran the benefit of the
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doubt, which strengthened its position further against the companies. 
Tehran maintained its silence right up to the outbreak of the fourth 
Arab-Israeli war.
The fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out on October 6, 1973. in
order to retaliate against Western, particularly US support for Israel,
Iraq and Libya nationalised certain US oil interests in their respective
oil industries. Moreover, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, a close ally of
the West, warned that Arabs might use their oil in concerted actions 
85against the West. Certain joint Arab embargo measures now seemed
inevitable. At this point, however, the Shah’s government promptly 
sought to clarify its position by resorting to what may be looked at as 
a dual policy approach. Tehran reiterated its past policy of non­
involvement in the Middle East conflict for two major reasons: one,
Iran was a non-Arab state, though a Muslim country; another, Iran did 
not believe in the use of oil as a "political weapon".86 But, unlike 
the past, this time Tehran was very careful not to condemn the use of 
oil as a political weapon, nor to question its effectiveness in the context 
of the Middle East conflict. On the other hand, Tehran assured the
Arabs that it would do nothing which could undermine their embargo 
87
measures. Subsequently, during the Arab embargo measures, Tehran
refrained from increasing its porduction by an amount sufficient to 
offset the effect of Arab measures.
This dual approach enabled Tehran, once again, to maintain, at least 
on the surface, a balanced and central position between the West and the 
Arabs. Taking advantage of this position and the growing world panic 
about an energy crisis', pending the Arab embargo measures, as well 
as the Western world's pre-occupation with the Middle East war itself,
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the Shah took the lead in urging other Persian Gulf members of OPEC to 
take unilateral actions to implement OPEC's 35th conference's resolution, 
talks over which between Gulf producers and companies, had broken down 
at the start of the war. The Iranian delegation put the Shah's proposal 
to OPEC at its conference in Vienna on October 12. Given that all other 
Gulf members were Arab and they had enough grievances against the West 
under the prevailing circumstances, the Shah's proposal received their 
unanimous approval.88
Consequently, on October 16, one day before the Organisation of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)89 announced its decision that
the Arab producers would cut their production by 5 per cent monthly until
Israeli forces withdrew from the Arab territories they occupied during 
90the 1967 war, the six Persian Gulf producers, led by Iran, unilaterally
announced a 70 per cent increase in the posted prices of their crude.
The increase m  the posted prices was approximately $2 per barrel (from 
about $3 to $5), with an effective increase in payments by the oil 
companies to the producing governments of about $1.25 per barrel (from 
approximately $1.75 to $3).91 m  effect, the producing governments' 
share of the posted prices increased from 40 per cent agreed in Tehran, 
in February 1971, to 60 per cent. in the case of Iran, the government 
raised its posted prices to $5.09 per barrel, from which its share was 
to be $3.05 per barrel. The Iranian Oil Minister, Amuzegar, however, 
argued that with the removal of the effect of the posted prices on the 
actual market price of oil in the Persian Gulf, the increase in the 
latter amounted to only about 17 per cent. Either way, in real terms 
government income increased by about 70 per cent per barrel. This 
almost abandoned the formula endorsed by the Tehran Agreement, which
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had been modified twice, in January and June 1972. Meanwhile,
Amuzegar warned the companies that if they, either individually or in
a group, refused to transport the Persian Gulf oil on the basis of new
prices, then the Gulf producers "would be unanimously prepared to offer
their oil", on the basis of the new prices, "to any customer who want to
buy". "Therefore", he declared, "all the consumer nations have been
assured that OPEC does not consider the matter of an oil embargo at all".
Amuzegar stressed that the Persian Gulf price increase, in which Iran
played the leading role, must not be associated with the embargo measures,
adopted by OAPEC on October 17 and thus Iran must not be implicated in
92the Arab embargo actions. However, one cannot overlook the importance
of Iran's actions in relation to the Arab embargo. There are several 
reasons to suggest that in many ways Iran helped and participated, 
at least indirectly, in the Arab embargo. It must be remembered that 
the Persian Gulf Arab producing states, which Iran led in the move 
for the price increase, were members of OPEC and OAPEC at the same time.
It was exactly one day after they had unanimously approved the Shah's 
proposal for a unilateral price increase that they endorsed a 70 per 
cent increase in OAPEC oil prices and committed themselves to OAPEC's 
embargo measures, which consisted of 5 per cent monthly production cuts 
and, subsequently, a total oil embargo against the US and Holland.
Moreover, the Iranian-led Persian Gulf price increase was decided on at 
an OPEC meeting held at the same time and place (Kuwait) as OAPEC's meeting 
to formulate its embargo. There is no doubt that the embargo measures 
were entirely decided by OAPEC, but the leadership for the price increase 
was initially provided by Iran, which had a fair knowledge of what OAPEC 
was about to decide next day. In view of this and the fact that the 
Shah stood by his assurance to Arab producers that Iran would do nothing
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to undermine their embargo measures, Iran cannot be totally divorced 
from the Arab actions and their consequences. In this respect, Iran's 
role, at the time, was overshadowed by Iran publicly disassociating 
itself from Arab embargo measures and reassuring the West and Japan of 
Iran's uninterrupted oil supply. It was also overshadowed by the world's 
pre-occupation with the Middle East and Arab producers' militancy. 
Therefore, Iran's role received less publicity and analysis in the West.
Once, however, OAPEC's embargo measures took effect, an oil
shortage in the world market became very acute, and the West and Japan
were forced to value Iran more than ever before as their only major OPEC
supplier, the prevailing circumstances shifted more to favour the Shah's
policy of price increase and price control. In the next meeting of
OPEC in Vienna on December 20, the Iranian delegation, speaking on
behalf of the producers, recommended "that oil be priced at $12 to $15 
93a barrel ...". Although this was sharply criticised by the companies
94and American government, nevertheless during an OPEC meeting held in
Tehran from December 22 to 23, the oil ministers of six Gulf member-
countries decided to set the "take" of the "host" or producing government
at $7 per barrel of Arabian light 34-degree API (the standard quality),
as against about $3 which was fixed in accordance with the October
price increase. This meant that for such oil the relevant posted
prices would be increased from January 1, 1974 to $11,651 per barrel
95from the level of about $5.11 in force since November 1, 1973.
Moreover, OPEC announced that it would hold an extraordinary conference 
on January 7, 1974, to discuss the bases for a long-term pricing system, 
replacing the posted prices mechanism, and to "review the possibility 
of establishing a dialogue between oil-producing and oil-consuming
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countries in order to avoid entering into a spiral increase in prices and 
to protect the real value of (its member-countries') oil". It also 
stressed that since "the government take of $7 per barrel is moderate", 
the consuming countries would refrain from further increases in their 
export prices.^
In a press conference, on December 24, the Shah hailed the price 
increase as a great success in establishing producer's sovereignty over 
oil pricing, and eliminating the companies' influence in this respect 
once and for all. He also spelt out, for the first time in a detailed 
and coherent fashion, his regime's objectives in pressing for such rapid 
price increases. The Shah revealed, indeed, some important points in 
this conference, which deserve to be assessed in the context of this thesis' 
argument at some length.
There were several major inter-related considerations which 
motivated the Shah to press for rapid price increases and for the producing 
states' control over fixing the prices of their oil according to their 
own interests in relation to the changing world economic and oil market 
situation. First, despite the price increases in 1971 and 1972, the 
Shah said that the producing states did not earn as much as their oil 
was valued at in the world market and the producers' price increases did 
not keep up with the galloping global inflation. Second, oil was under­
valued in relation to other available sources of energy, particularly 
coal. Third, oil was "too precious" to be just burned away. There 
was a definite need to use it more efficiently, from now on, because no 
other sources of energy like oil produced hundreds of important by-products, 
especially petro-chemicals, which one day could substitute for oil 
itself as a source for both capital formation and industrial development.
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Fourth, oil was a non-replenishable commodity, which in the case of Iran, 
would run out by the end of this century. Before it ran out, the Shah 
stressed there was a definite need for Iran to diversify its process of 
economic development from one dependent on oil to one with non-oil bases. 
But for this, Iran first of all needed to use its oil with great care so 
that the country should extract enough capital out of it over as long 
a period as possible in order to create non-oil bases for its economic 
development and other sources of energy, i.e. atomic stations.
Fifth, despite the expansion of the producing states' control over their 
respective oil industries in the last few years, the companies still
influenced the pricing of oil and, as a result, made excessive profits
at the cost of producing and consuming countries. However, one
important consideration which the Shah failed to list was the high cost 
of his military programme, which he saw as necessary for the emergence
of Iran as an oil and regional power. This will be discussed in Part II.
For these very reasons, the Shah also stressed that the $7 "take" 
per barrel by producing governments was not going to be final. He 
described the fixed price as "a commercial price", which would be subjected 
to periodic reviews. "It is almost a price that we (OPEC) have fixed 
out of kindness and generosity for you (the West)". He hoped that the 
"real price" of oil would be fixed in consultation with the OECD 
countries so that we could see what the real value of other sources
of energy are and what the prices of oil should be in view of its 
preferential advantage over other sources of energy. Then the price of 
oil would be tied to world inflation". The Shah was most pleased to note 
that the companies, in their relationships with Iran, had effectively 
become nothing "more than simple buyers". "The last thing in their hand
181.
was the price mechanism and that also we have wrested from them. It
98is now we who govern the oil prices". He wished that OPEC's
decision concerning $7 as "take" or "base" price would lead to
replacement of the posted prices mechanism, which he described as
"complicated unnatural, (and) ... fictitious", by a more defendable
and equitable pricing system. He said that from now on the producer
would take its share of $7 per barrel no matter how much profit the
companies made out of customers, because this was the responsibility
99of the consuming governments.
The Shah warned that the industrialised capitalist countries 
"... will have to realise that the era of their terrific progress and 
even more terrific income and wealth based on cheap oil is finished, 
they will have to find new sources of energy. Eventually they will have 
to tighten their belts''.1^0 However, upon his oil achievements, which
undoubtedly worked in favour of Iran's relations with the Arab world, 
the Soviet Union, East European countries, the People's Republic of 
China and many less developed countries, which were not as much dependent 
on the Iranian oil as the West and Japan were --, the Shah was very careful 
neither to undermine his policy of accommodation and alliance with the 
West nor alienate the support of many less developed nations. The 
Shah was fully conscious of the fact that his regime, over the previous 
twenty years, was deeply committed to the West within the framework of 
Iran's Western orientated socio-economic development and military build­
up, the progress of which had become tied in with the capitalist world 
and depended on its continuous prosperity and well-being. This, in fact, 
had set the limits to the extent that the Shah could use Iran's oil in 
order to realise Iran's own intersts against those of the West.
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Therefore, after achieving his oil objectives, the Shah sought to 
separate his hard-line oil diplomacy against the West from Iran's 
over-all special relationship with the West. He declared:
We do not want to hurt the [capitalist] industrial world at all, 
not only because we are going to be one of them ourselves ... 
soon, but what good will it bring anybody if the present known 
industrial world and its civilisation is crushed and terminated?
If the present world has deficiencies they could be remedied, 
gradually, wisely. But if it is destroyed what solution do we 
have? And what is the interest of making the poor countries 
even poorer and only a few countries getting all the money in 
the banks? If the world economy crumbles down the value of these 
paper monies^jll not be more than the sheet of paper on which they 
are printed.
Although the Shah stressed that Iran needed most of its oil
revenues, which increased from about $4 billion in 1973 to over $17 
102billion in 1974, for its own development, he undertook that Iran
would help the capitalist countries in any way possible to sustain their
economic progess (though perhaps not at the past rate1) and offset any
deficit caused by spiralling oil prices in their balance of payments.
He subsequently proposed that the capitalist industrial nations could
pay for oil partly in cash and partly in some sort of bonds, which in
effect would permit them to buy now and pay later. He also showed keen
interest in some kind of barter trade with the industrial countries
whereby these countries could exchange their capital goods, military
103arsenals and know-how for a secure Iranian oil supply. Furthermore
the Shah once again found it timely to break his non-committal attitude 
to the Arab embargo measures and call on Arab producers to end their 
measures against the West. He stressed that although the Arabs "played 
a good game with the oil card during the (Middle East) war", the 
continuation of this game "during peace-time", would be "very dangerous". 104
He therefore urged them to stop their 'game', which had immensely helped
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the Shah in fulfilling his oil objectives, but was no longer in the
interest of Iran. Consequently, during 1974, Tehran not only refrained
from pressing for further substantial increases in oil prices, but also
urged intensive cooperation between the oil-consuming and oil-producing
countries. To this end, Tehran supported President Nixon's call, in
January, 1974, for a dialogue between consuming and producing countries
at a subsequent date, promised financial help to the West for developing
alternative sources of energy, agreed with the US call for a world-wide
campaign against energy wastage, and above all concluded many bilateral
multi-million dollar oil and trade agreements with the United States,
Britain, France, Japan, West Germany and many other West European
countries, though not at the cost of Iran's growing commercial ties
105with the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Meanwhile,
Tehran made it clear that unlike the past it would not cave in to any
Western pressure against maximising Iran's benefit from its resources.
In this respect, for example, Tehran firmly rejected two similar suggestions
by US Treasury Secretary George Schultz and President Ford in January and
October, 1974, respectively, that Iran along with other OPEC members
should reduce its oil prices by about 50 per cent so that the world
economy could avoid a major dislocation.“*"^  Moreover, while President
Nixon was organising a consuming countries' conference to consider the
'energy crisis' and adopt a unified position in a forthcoming dialogue with
producing countries in early 1974, the Shah personally warned Washington
107against organising a "consumers cartel". The Shah also strongly
condemned Kissinger's hint, on January 13, 1975, at possible military
action against oil-producing countries in case they pressured the
capitalist world to the point of "actual strangulation". The Shah
warned that he would do everything in his power to resist such an action
108against whichever oil producer it would be.
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With regard to the less developed countries, which supported OPEC
at first, but, by 1974, had began to express their unhappiness over
OPEC's reluctance to give them oil at discount prices and support them 
109financially, the Shah made several proposals to help them. He
urged the oil-producing states, particularly those with large surpluses 
(Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, which had smaller populations than Iran) 
to aid the less developed countries either through bilateral agreements 
or regional and international organisations. One idea which attracted 
the Shah stipulated that the oil-producing states should' ... create some 
kind of international bank or fund ... and put this at the disposal of 
an international body which is going to finance all the wise projects 
that could be carried out in ... developing countries ."*’"*’*“* He also
recommended that the oil producers should invest directly in the 
developing countries to benefit these countries and to "keep inflation 
away" from their own countries —  inflation as a result of surplus 
revenues.'*'^ In order to fulfil the Shah's suggestions, Tehran
subsequently claimed that it had devoted 6 per cent of Iran's GNP to 
aiding the less developed countries in 1974r5. The major recipients 
were listed as Pakistan, India, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Afghanistan. 
The extent to which Tehran was influenced by political and strategic 
considerations in extending aid to these countries, and to what extent 
it fulfilled its initial undertakings, will be discussed in Part II.
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It took the Shah's regime more than twenty years to realise to any 
considerable extent Iran's potential as an oil power in terms of both 
Iranian ownership and control from exploitation and production to 
refining and pricing. The regime's progress in this respect fairly well 
corresponded with its emergence from a position of heavy dependence on
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the United States and international oil companies in the 1950s to a 
position whereby it became able to conduct its domestic and foreign 
affairs with more flexibility, but in convergence with the interests 
of the West, in the second half of the 1960s. Of course, the major 
factor in helping the regime to achieve this stature was the Shah's 
White Revolution reform programme, which primarily aimed at mobilising 
the masses and centralising political power in support of the Shah's 
rule. The White Revolution created a degree of economic and political 
stability in Iran, which was of paramount importance since a stronger 
domestic base strengthened the Shah's hands in the conduct of Iran's 
foreign relations. As a result, the Shah's regime was relatively 
successful in optimising its foreign policy options and increasing its 
regional credibility by developing friendly and cooperative relations 
with all its regional neighbours except Iraq. But in both this and its 
evolutionary drive to maximise Iran's benefits from its oil resources, 
the regime was immensely aided by the evolving changes in regional and 
international politico-economic situations, including the formation and 
activation of OPEC as an effective cartel, the two Middle East Wars of 
1967 and 1973 and their consequences, which the regime skilfully 
exploited in order to achieve its own oil policy objectives.
The realisation of Iran's oil potential in the interest of the 
country, brought the Shah's regime not only enormous and unprecedented 
wealth, but also diplomatic strength with increasing influence in regional 
and world politics. In using this, the regime attempted to substantiate 
what the Shah less than a decade earlier called "Iran's independent 
national foreign policy", implying that his regime would conduct its 
foreign affairs on the basis of Iran's interests and international
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stability, but independent of foreign powers' influence. The regime,
however, could not escape the fact that it had already committed itself 
deeply to the West, and it could act only within the limits set by this 
commitment. It was for this very reason that the regime had to adopt 
an evolutionary approach towards actualising its oil nationalisation act 
of 1951 through gradual accommodation with the West. The realisation 
of Iran's oil potential, nevertheless, revived a strong leverage for the 
regime in its relationship with the outside world, particularly the 
West, which suddenly found itself more dependent than ever before on 
Iranian oil and, for that matter, Iranian oil money largely under the 
control of the Shah's regime. For this the capitalist countries more 
than any others found it necessary to acknowledge the influential 
position of the Shah's regime and set out to win its favour in whatever 
way possible in order to "recycle" to the West the money which had been 
transferred to Iran as a result of the oil price increases. The Shah, 
in turn, demanded increasing help from them in achieving his broader 
goal of transforming Iran into a capitalist oriented self-generating 
economic and military power before the country's exportable oil ran out 
by the end of this century. This leads us to the Second Part of this
thesis.
The Emergence of Iran as a "regional power
Introduction
The Iranian oil achievements in the early 1970s greatly enhanced 
the country's emerging position as a 'regional power' with global 
influence. These achievements, namely the expansion of Iran's control 
over its oil industry and the unprecedented increases in the country's 
oil revenue, in a world with growing demand for oil, proved to be 
instrumental in strengthening the position of the Iranian leadership in 
the conduct of Iran's domestic and foreign affairs. They provided the 
Shah with a viable, oil-based source of capital and the diplomatic 
power needed to engage in intense 'resources diplomacy' - an effective 
bargaining method in dealings with the outside world. Hence, he could 
accelerate his drive to achieve his ultimate national goal: 'Tamaduni
Buzurg' (Great Civilisation). As expounded by the Shah, this goal 
involved not only the building of a "just", "democratic" and "prosperous" 
Iran, but also the development of the country into a mightly, self- 
sufficient and self-generating "economic and military power" capable of 
"guarding" its own region in particular against what the Shah perceived 
to be regional "subversion" and "instability" as well as outside powers' 
"hostile" and "hegomonial" interference.^ He considered this to be
a prelude to the emergence of Iran as a "global power" in its own right, 
before the end of this century. Although the Shah sought to strengthen 
the Iranian economy and military capability more systematically as part 
of his White Revolution from the early 1960s, it was not until the 
beginning of the 1970s when, with the start of new oil achievements,
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he greatly magnified the scope and intensity of his efforts for this 
purpose.
While fully engaged in the process of building Iran's regional 
paramountcy, the Shah seemed to have been pursuing a changing pattern 
of regional behaviour with two persistent and intertwined but conflicting 
aspects. One aspect stressed Tehran's desire for regional political 
and economic cooperation. Another underwrote the Shah's determination 
to prevent and uproot, by either direct or indirect, but qualified, 
military intervention, any force or development, whether it was 
inspired locally or externally, particularly by the Soviet Union and 
its regional clients, which he considered to be "subversive" and 
"disruptive" to the Iranian regional role, interests and security. It 
is within such a pattern of behaviour, which in turn was largely 
backed up by the Iranian oil potential and growing economic and military 
build-up, that the Shah seemed to have sought to achieve two major objectives: 
first; to secure a regional market, fields of investment, and sources of 
raw materials, which were vital for the development of Iran's economic 
power; and second, and concurrently, to modify, strengthen and preserve 
the existing regional situation in favour of Iran without causing any 
major regional upsurge against Iran while the country was undergoing 
intense economic industrialisation and militarisation. However, the 
whole process of the Shah's search for regional paramountcy was likely 
to cause serious destabilising effects in the very region which he sought 
to stabilise and influence according to what he thought to be Iran's 
interests and security needs. He was trying to achieve his vision of 
Iran as the leading power within a region which, because of its very 
peculiar sociological, political and economic make-up as well as 
strategic location and significance to the outside world, was one of the
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world s most rich but volatile and unpredictable regions.
This Part does not aim to provide a comprehensive description 
and analysis of all the issues concerning the emergence of Iran as a 
regional power and the consequences. Neither does it intend to enter 
the controversy surrounding the conceptual question: what is a 'regional
power' in its universal sense? Numerous international relations 
specialists have attempted to answer this question with reference to 
their respective case-studies of one or more states.3 Realistically, 
however, every state, whether big, medium or small, is characterised 
and influenced by its own peculiarities, namely the geopolitical and 
sociological situation, national goals, resources-capability, leadership, 
and finally regional and international perceptions of security and 
interests. The power and region of a state has to be understood in 
relation to these variables rather than on the bases of broad definitions 
and criteria reached by a number of scholars, who have attempted at 
abstract levels to establish what they claim to be the general grounds 
for the universality of such a concept as 'regional power'. Consequently, 
in reality every state which is recognised or claims to be recognised 
as a regional power provides its own case.3 in line with this, I shall
look at the Iranian case largely on its own, focussing mainly on those 
issues which seem to be most essential and relevant. The issues are: 
first, the Shah's vision towards which he was striving or what he 
perceived to be the Iranian status within the Iranian region, and 
the factors influencing him in visualising it; second, the Iranian 
resources-capability and the economic and military process undertaken 
by the Shah to realise this vision; third, the Iranian pattern of 
regional behaviour while the Shah was engaged in realising this vision; 
and, fourth, the repercussions of his policies in his bid for regional
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paramountcy. Of course, these issues cannot be adequately appraised 
without discussing them in relation to the changing international 
circumstances and Iran's relationship with the major powers, especially 
Iran's leading ally, the United States, which found it in its
interest to help the Shah in the realisation of his vision. References, 
therefore, will be made to these factors within the scope of this 
thesis whenever necessary.
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Chapter VI 
The Shah's Vision
The Shah's views concerning the status of Iran as 'qudrati mantaqawi• 
or regional power' were complex but not altogether original. He 
developed them mainly over the years of his rule. They were largely 
based on his own beliefs, experiences, desires, expectations, historical 
interpretation of the Iranian situation, and perception of the Iranian 
stability and security needs in relation to a changing and insecure 
world. He expressed his views mainly in small fragments which have 
little coherence or consistency. All this makes the task of outlining 
and analysing his views systematically,’quite difficult. However, to 
piece the major trends of his thought together, it becomes reasonably 
clear that by 'regional power' the Shah essentially meant the transformation 
of Iran into a strong, prosperous and stable monarchical state with the 
ability to fulfil two major functions: first, to "guard" and "influence"
its 'region' according to its own political and economic interests and 
security needs against what he referred to as - regional subversion" and 
outside powers' "antagonistic" and "hegemonial" infiltration and 
interference; and second, to regulate and conduct its relations, 
particularly with its neighbours, from a position of strength favourable 
to Iran and m  support of the first function. The Shah considered this, 
together with the' simultaneous development of what he called "political, 
economic, and social democracy"4 inside Iran, to be essential for his 
absolute dynastic monarchy to remain pivotal to the operation of Iranian 
politics and for Iran to preserve and develop itself effectively as
well as conduct an "independent national foreign policy" with maximum 
regional security and stability.5
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He claimed that by achieving this Iran would reach the frontiers
of what he named 'Tamaduni Buzurg' ("Great Civilisation"), his
ultimate goal. Although he was never very clear as to what
exactly 'Tamaduni Buzurg' would be in its achieved form and when it
would be realised, his continuous, but fragmented, remarks mainly since
the late 1960s provide some clues. As a result, it seemed that
'Tamaduni Buzurg', if accomplished, would have represented that stage
of progress whereby Iran would have become not only a prosperous
industrialised and welfare state, advanced as the Western developed
countries, but also a formidable self-sufficient and self-generating
world economic and military power in its own right - it would have had
more economic and conventional military strength than those of Britain
and France.^ In the late 1960s, the Shah set the early 1980s as
the probable date for achieving this goal, but a decade later, he spoke
7about the end of the century. However, the emergence of Iran as a
regional power was basic to the country's success in achieving a world 
power stature. It is for this very reason that this chapter mainly 
concentrates on examining Iran's status as a regional power rather than 
evaluating the country's chances of becoming a global power, though the 
latter will be undertaken briefly in the final chapter.
The Shah believed that the Iranian status as a regional power needed 
to be based mainly on its growing resources-capability, and he attached 
great significance to his own firm national leadership, the Iranian 
oil potential and economic-military power. He argued that no nation­
state had emerged as a regional and, subsequently, global power without 
achieving a high degree of success in developing these inter-related 
resources in support of each other and on the basis of each other's
Qstrength. To him, the simultaneous strengthening of the civilian
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and military sectors of national life, under the direction of a strong
and resolute leadership, complemented each other on grounds of
technology, know-how, expertise, and infrastructure, on the one hand,
and the military sector ensured the effective development of the
civilian sector and safeguarded the Iranian oil potential, the backbone
of Iran's national development, against disorder, subversion and aggression, 
9on the other. It was, in fact, largely due to the weakness of
Iran in these resources that the country during the first decade of 
the Shah's rule experienced a rather low regional standing and credibility; 
and was most vulnerable to regional pressures particularly from the 
Soviet Union and 'radical' Arab forces. Consequently, during the same 
period, as was discussed in Chapter Three, the Shah's regime found it 
most convenient to seek external sources of security by becoming heavily 
dependent on the United States, concluding a bilateral military agreement 
with Washington, and allying itself with the West through joining the 
Baghdad pact and its successor, CENTO, against both domestic and 
regional pressures. With reliance on these sources and the British 
protectorate rule of the Persian Gulf, the Shah successfully launched 
his White Revolution and progressively built his domestic resources in 
the context of a changing regional and international situation. By 
the late 1960s, as a result, Iran was both domestically and regionally 
in a reasonably strong position, though it had neither maximised its 
control over its oil nor had it become blatantly assertive in its 
'region'. Before discussing the Shah's endeavours to exploit the new 
Iranian oil gains, maximise Iranian resources-capability and enhance 
the country's regional position, there are two major relevant questions 
which need to be answered. First, what regional factors or considerations 
prompted the Shah to build the Iranian resources for regional paramountcy?
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Second, what did he consider to be the Iranian 'region'?
There were numerous regional factors. A detailed evaluation
of all of them falls beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the 
most important and relevant ones, which gave the Shah cause for concern 
and influenced his perception of Iran's regional interests and security 
needs and the role that Iran should play in its 'region', can be looked 
at in relation to three major areas: the Soviet Union, the Persian
Gulf, and Iran's eastern flank (the Indian subcontinent and the Indian 
Ocean and its peripheries).
(I) The Soviet Union." the Shah was always distrustful of 
Moscow's intentions towards his country. This was partly because of 
his anti-communist convictions and belief in his type of monarchy as 
the right form of regime for Iran, but largely for historical reasons.
He constently reminded the Iranians and the world that the Soviets 
not only forcefully occupied the Iranian northern provinces in the 
1920s and 1940s, but also actively aided the outlawed Iranian Communist 
Party (Tudeh) and other hostile groups against his regime whenever it 
had the opportunity. He claimed that although Iranian-Soviet
relations had improved considerably towards friendship and cooperation 
largely because of Iran's growing domestic strength and regional 
importance since the early 1960s, Moscow was still pursuing a 'back-door' 
policy with the aim of weakening his regime by helping regional 
dissention, furthering regional tensions, and supporting hostile 
governments and groups against it.11 The Shah mostly relied on the 
Soviets' active political and material support for the following 
governments and groups as some of the concrete evidence of Soviet 
attempts to weaken the Iranian regional position in order to advance
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its own political, economic, and strategic interests and influence in 
the Iranian zone of security and interests: (1) the 'radical' Arab 
Ba'th government of Hassan al-Bakr in Iraq, with which Iran had long­
standing political and border disputes; (2) the Arab nationalist 
revolutionary groups in the Persian Gulf, of which the Shah regarded the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Persian Gulf (from 1974 the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman) as most threatening to Iran;
(3) the Marxist Government of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
which preached and helped revolutionary actions contrary to the Iranian 
interests in the Gulf; (4) the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan; and (5) the Afghani and Indian 
governments in their territorial disputes with Iran's regional CENTO ally, 
Pakistan, whose possible further dismemberment (after the creation of
Bangladesh in 1971) the Shah saw as detrimental to the security of Iran
12and, therefore intolerable to Iran.
(II) The Persian Gulf: the Shah came progressively to regard
the Gulf as most vital and at the same time troublesome to Iran. This
was for several reasons. Iran, the largest and the only Persian
(as distinct from Arab) littoral state, maintains the longest coastline
in the south with the Gulf. The Gulf provides Iran with its only
vital and strategic outlet to international waters and therefore the
outside world; it is through this outlet that over 90 percent of the
Iranian oil export and about 60 percent of the country's non-oil trade
are handled. Moreover, the Gulf's bed possesses sizeable mineral
resources, of which Iran, perhaps like any other littoral states, is
eager to have a reasonable share. The Shah consequently, referred to
13the Gulf as the "Jugular Vein" of Iran. This significance of the
Gulf to Iran is coupled with the fact that while Iran holds the world's
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fourth biggest reserves (approx. 60 billion barrels) after Saudi Arabia 
USSR and Kuwait, the other Gulf states, all Arab nations, led by
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, hold about 50 percent of the world's 
proven oil reserves and produce about 30 percent of the world's oil 
consumption.14 Such economic viability of international significance 
is complemented by the strategic importance of the Gulf because of its 
central location between Mediterranean and Indian Ocean as well as 
central Western Asia and the Horn of Africa. As a result, it is also 
of great value to the outside world, particularly the major powers, 
which have been competing for political and economic influence in the 
region especially since World War II, though it was largely under the 
British protectorate until 1971. The Gulf's stability, however, has 
often been undermined by serious internal tensions and conflicts.
This has been partly because of outside infiltration and interference 
and largely due to a number of historical, sociological, political, 
ideological, territorial and economic differences within and between 
the political units of the Gulf region.
(1) The fact that the population of the region is divided 
into two main groups: the Persians, inhabiting the Gulf's most
populated state, Iran, and the Arabs, populating the rest of the Gulf 
states. rhe Persians and Arabs are distinct from each other on ethnic,
cultural, historical, and even religious bases. On these grounds, 
they have both claimed primacy over one another whenever they have felt 
threatened by each other's dominance.1^
(2) This has been further complicated by their long-standing 
political disputes as well as territorial claims and counter-claims. 
In the past, the most outstanding disputes between the two sides
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concerned (i) the island of Bahrainf an Arab emirate with a
Persian minority, and (ii) the strategically important Shatt-al-Arab
waterway between Iran and Iraq. Tehran claimed Bahrain as part of its
territory after Britain extended its protectorate over the island about
one and a half centuries ago.^ Tehran also rejected the traditional
Iraqi claim of sovereignty over Shatt-al-Arab, demanding that the waterway
17should be legally controlled jointly by Iran and Iraq on an equal bases.
The first dispute and other differences, as mentioned above, constrained 
Iran's relations with most of the Arabl world. The second dispute, 
in conjunction with other border and ideological disputes, between 
nationalist and 'revolutionary' Iraq since 1958 and pro-Western conservative 
Iran, continuously strained Iranian-Iraqi relations.
(3) In turn, the Arabs' claims and counter-claims included:
their support for the secession of the Iranian southern province of
Khusistan (as "Arabistan"), which was once ruled by an Arab family and
18had a sizable Arab population; the Iraqi policy of aiding and
sheltering many anti-Shah groups and movements, including Tudeh and the
19Popular Fronts for the Liberation of "Arabistan" and Baluchistan;
and the Arab states' constant reference to the Persian Gulf as the
"Arabian Gulf" in order to exert Arab dominance of the Gulf against 
20that of Iran. The Iranian-Iraqi differences took a sharp turn
after 1967 when the pro-Moscow 'revolutionary' Ba'th Party rose to 
power, under the leadership of Hassan al-Bakr, in Baghdad. The Shah 
perceived this as a major change in the regional status quo and as 
threatening to Iranian security and stability. The Ba'th 
government's attempt to exploit Iraqi differences with Iran mainly for 
domestic purposes reinforced the Shah's perception. As a result, 
Tehran stepped up its financial and military support for the Iraqi
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Kurdish secessionist movement, under the leadership of Mawlana 
21Barzani, in Iraq, and Baghdad increased its support for the anti-
22Shah groups and sought to rally Arab support for them. All these
meant deterioration of Iranian-Iraqi relations; this led to open
conflict and clashes between the two sides. Although a full-scale Iranian-
Iraqi war was avoided, the reasons for which will be explained later,
relations between the two continued tense in the early part of the 
231970s.
(4) The volatility of the political situation in the Gulf
has also been underlined by three more main features: the rapid
socio-economic changes within the Gulf states; the Gulf's dissenting
'revolutionary1 groups, and the intra-Arab tensions. The domestic
structures of all the Gulf states, similar to Iran's, but to a lesser
degree, have been undergoing intensive socio-economic transformation,
particularly since the early 1960s. This transformation has been one
mainly from being basically traditional, centralised, and absolute
feudalistic or semi-feudalistic to economically more diverse and
sophisticated, politically more bureaucratised and educated, and socially 
24more flexible. Among many factors, the growing wealth of the region
from its oil seems to have played the most important role. But all the 
states have been, and are, at different stages of socio-economic 
development; and, undoubtedly, their consequent problems have been 
different. However, they all share one common phenomenon: the rise of
new political and social groups, which are imbued with the ideas of 
domestic reform and structural change. While many of these groups 
have been content to press their demands within existing systems, a
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few have opted to bring about fundamental changes from outside the 
system through 'revolutionary' methods.
One of the most active and publicised groups of the latter type,
in the Gulf, has been "the Popular Front for the Liberation of the
Arabian Gulf" (PFLOAG), which, in 1974, changed its name to "the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman" (PFLO). After carrying out sporadic
actions against the pro-Western conservative governments in the Gulf,
the PFLO, by the start of the seventies, succeeded in turning the
southernmost province of Oman, Dhofar, into a centre of its
'revolutionary' activities. In this, it was backed by the 'radical'
governments of Iraq, Syria, and the Peoples Democratic Republic
of Yemen (PPRY) as well as the Soviet Union, China and the Popular
25Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Thus, the PFLO constituted
not only a serious threat to the Gulf's conservative Arab regimes 
but also to that of the Shah. The latter considered the PFLO and 
other similar groups very dangerous to Iran on three main counts.
First, they could extend their activities to the Strait of Hormuz, the 
strategic passage connecting the Gulf with the Indian Ocean, and to the 
Iranian coast-line. Hence, they could sabotage the Iranian oil sea- 
lanes and other vital lines of communication, leading through the 
Strait, with the outside world as well as the Iranian coastal oil 
installations. Second, they could weaken the Gulf's conservative 
Arab regimes contrary to the Shah's endeavours to expand and preserve 
the conservative status quo in the Gulf in the interest of his own 
regime and policies. Third, they could enhance the position of 
the Iranian dissident groups and stimulate them. Giving further
cause for concern in the region have been intra-Arab differences and 
tensions. These have been largely due to the division of the Gulf's
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Arab states into two major camps: the 'radicals', led by Iraq and
PDRY; and the 'conservatives', led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This
division has manifested itself in ideological, political and territorial
disputes. For the purpose of this thesis, however, there is no need
26to go into details of these disputes.
(5) Another factor, which increased the Shah's concern for the
situation in the Gulf, was the British announcement of its decision
in 1968 to withdraw its protectorate forces from the Gulf as part of
its over-all withdrawal from 'East of Suez' by 1971. The Pax
Britannica had for more than a century, been a constant irritant to
Iran, but it had also been a protective shield against encroachments
by other powers and serious "subversive" activities in the Gulf.
The Shah did not especially like the British presence, but it did
provide him with a source of security against possible troubles from
the Gulf; this was particularly important whenever the Shah was more
pre-occupied with the domestic situation. The British decision to end
the Pax formally confronted Tehran with the ultimate question: How could
it best secure for itself the greatest control over its own destany
27under the new historical circumstances?
The new circumstances faced Iran with several major developments. 
The British withdrawal decision (i) posed the problems of a 'power 
vacuum' and what to do with small emirates and sultanates, hitherto 
British protectorates, in the Gulf; and (ii) induced, not only the 
Gulf's 'radical' and 'conservative' forces to become active against 
each other in relation to these problems, but also the outside powers, 
particularly the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China to increase their activities in order to advance their
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own positions in the wake of the 'power vacuum'.28 in response to
these developments, Britain proposed the creation of an Arab federation
of the so-called Gulf's Trucial States and other possible sultanates
and emirates, on the one hand,29 and supported Iran, as the West's
biggest and most capable and trusted ally, to play a leading role in
filling the 'vacuum' in return for the Iranian support for the Federation 
, , 30on the other. Although this was what almost happened, by the end of 
1971, the development, in conjunction with numerous other differences 
and disputes, as mentioned above, caused further dissention between Iran 
and many of the Gulf Arab states, which rejected the Iranian bid for 
paramountcy in the Gulf. I shall pursue this further later on.
(Ill) The Tastern Flank: Another region, which caused anxiety
for the Shah from time to time, lies in an arc from South-east to 
South-west of Iran. The region comprises Afghanistan, the subcontinent 
and the Indian Ocean, particularly those parts which flank the approaches 
of the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa, and form the Iranian oil sea 
lanes or what the Shah called "the Iranian life lines".31 Over the
years, there have been a number of developments in the region which 
worried the Shah so much that he perceived them as threatening to Iran. 
These developments were related largely to domestic changes in the 
regional countries, and disputes between them as well as to Soviet 
activities. A brief look at the most important of these developments 
is necessary. Afghanistan not only shares a long border, with Iran, 
but also a common language, culture, history similar form of government, 
until Afghanistan was declared a Republic in July 1973.32 Apart from 
some differences over the distribution of water from the Helmand 
River, which has its origins in Central Afghanistan and flows through 
the Afghan land into south-east Iran,33 the two countries enjoyed steady
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and friendly relations from the inception of the Shah's rule.
Afghanistan, however, unlike Iran developed close ties with the Soviet
Union which were largely manifested in extensive Soviet economic,
34technical and military aid from 1956. Meanwhile, Afghanistan's
relations with Pakistan, Iran's regional ally, often suffered from a
serious border dispute between the two countries. While successive
Afghan governments were pressing for the self-determination of
Pushtuns in Pakistan, who form an Afghan minority, within a territory
which Kabul calls 'Pushtunistan', the Pakistani governments refused
to concede to Afghan pressures and regarded the matter as internal.
During Khrushchev's leadership, Moscow supported Afghanistan on the issue
explicitly and, since then implicitly, by stating its support for
35"self-determination of peoples" in general. The Shah viewed
Afghan-Soviet friendship and the Soviet support for Afghanistan in its 
dispute with Pakistan with suspicion and ill-feeling. He was worried 
about Soviet motives in trying to weaken Pakistan and find direct access 
to the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan.
The Shah, consequently, gave Iran's full support for Pakistan
and declared that Iran would not tolerate further dismemberment of 
3 6Pakistan after the signing of a 20 year Treaty of Friendship
between New Delhi and MoscoW^nd the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.
Of course, adding to Tehran's worries was subsequently the Afghan
coup in July 1973, which replaced the traditionally established
monarchy by a republican regime, headed by President Mohammed Daoud.
It was during Daoud's premiership (1953-1963) that Afghan-Soviet friendship
flourished and Afghan-Pakistani relations deteriorated over the
38'Pushtunistan' issue. At first, Tehran, like Peking, suspected
39Moscow of being behind the coup. But it soon found out that the
203.
coup was purely an Afghan internal matter, that Daoud would pursue the 
Afghan traditional policy of non-alignment and that he was eager to 
strengthen Iran-Afghan relations more than ever before.40 This 
still did not compensate for the fact that the Afghan coup constituted 
a severe blow to the cause of monarchy in the region and provided a 
source of inspiration for thousands of Iranian intellectuals and 
activists, who opposed monarchy as a dictatorial and repressive
. , 4iinstitution in Iran. In addition to these developments, there
was Pakistan's chronic domestic instability and dispute with India
over Kashmir, on the one hand, and the growing Indo-Soviet friendship,
at least, until the change of government in India in early 1977, on
the other. Pakistan has been suffering from acute tensions both
domestically and in its relations with Afghanistan and India since
its creation in 1947. Domestically, the country's tensions have
often manifested themselves in frequent changes of government, military
take-overs, communal riots, industrial unrest, mob violence and, above all,
42secessionist movements. Of the secessionist movements, the most
important ones have included: (i) the Bengali Movement for
Independence before East Pakistan became the independent state of
Bangladesh in December 1971; and (ii) the Baluchi and Pushtun
movements for independence/autonomy in Baluchistan and the North-West
43Frontier province. The first movement was actively supported and
aided by India and finally realised its aim only through Indian 
military operations. The second, which are still alive, have been 
supported and, at times, encouraged and helped by Afghanistan in support 
of the latter's stance on the issue of 'Pushtunistan'.44 This 
situation has become further complicated by the long-standing Indo- 
Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, which has led to two major wars between
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the countries, and the Indo-Soviet, Afghan-Soviet and Indo-Afghan friend­
ships as well as the close ties between these three countries and the 
Iianian western neighbour, Iraq. This, together with the failure
of successive Pakistani governments, including that of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto (1972-1977), to find an appropriate solution for Pakistan's 
pioblems and the fact that Iran shares a common border and coast-line 
with Pakistan and has its own Baluchi minority, were, at times, alarming 
for Tehran and influential in shaping the Shah's regional perceptions.
By the start of the 1970s, consequently, the Shah perceived a 
Moscow-Kabul-New Delhi-Baghdad axis as a distinct possibility; such an 
axis could not only weaken Pakistan further but also help Moscow to 
develop a chain of bases of influence from Delhi to Baghdad and Aden;
and increase its capability against Iran as far as the Persian Gulf 
and Indian Ocean.46 At a time when the United States was suffering
from isolationist tendencies, largely as a result of its involvement 
in Indo-China, and London had decided to withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 
this could ultimately, as far as Tehran was concerned, lead to the 
Soviet encirclement of Iran. All these regional developments and 
the Shah's perception of them prompted him to: (i) expand his
regime's regional goal and define the Iranian region of security and 
interests in relation to this goal; (ii) seek new ways and means 
in order to strengthen further Iran's resources-capability, in the 
light of Iran's increasing oil-based financial and diplomatic power, 
to achieve this goal; and (iii) pursue a more assertive but 'proper' 
pattern of regional behaviour for this purpose.47 in doing so, the
Shah brought to maturity his conception of Iran as a 'regional power'.
In expanding the Iranian national goal, as it appears from the 
sequence of developments, the Shah resolved to achieve the following
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major objectives. First, Iran must continue to pursue his traditional
anti-communist policy. Therefore, it must continue to strengthen
its own national resources, though in convergence with the Western
interests, against possible Soviet hostile action, whether it be direct
or indirect through other hostile regional governments and groups.
But this, meanwhile, should not harm the development of a normal,
peaceful, and symmetrical relationship with the Soviet Union at official
levels, which had already been making good progress since the early
1960s. Second, Iran should vigorously seek and prepare itself to
replace Britain in its traditional role as 'stabiliser' and 'protector'
in the Persian Gulf after the British withdrawal from the region;
hence, fill the possible 'power vacuum' resulting from the British
withdrawal; and thus, rebuff any attempt by outside powers, particularly
the Soviet Union, to take over some of the British responsibilities 
48in the Gulf. In this, the Shah sought (1) to safeguard Iran
against internal subversion sponsored by any hostile government or 
group from the Gulf region; (2) to ensure uninterrupted passage 
through the Strait of Hormuz, Shatt-al-Arab and the Gulf, as a whole;
(3) to protect the Iranian oil resources and facilities on and off­
shore in the Gulf against deliberate sabotage or disruption; and
(4) to boost the psychological stability of the Gulf's smaller states,
sultanates and emirates, which in the past had relied on British
49protection against regional threats.
Third, Iran must seek to acquire the capability and initiatives 
to influence events and developments and undermine the rise of any 
Soviet backed or 'left-wing' force in the region south and south-east 
of the Iranian borders whenever necessary. Iran should conduct 
balanced relations with all the three regional countries: Afghanistan,
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Pakistan, and India. In doing so, it should strive to (i) 
strengthen its alliance with Pakistan; (ii) support Pakistan to 
preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity against both domestic 
instability and regional pressures; (iii) mediate between Pakistan 
and its neighbours to settle their border disputes and political 
differences peacefully; and (iv) encourage and help Afghanistan 
and India to reduce their dependence on Soviet aid.50 Otherwise, 
the Shah considered that Pakistan's weakness and regional tensions 
could only assist Moscow to entrench its influence in the region.
In sum, Iran's regional objectives developed in such a way as 
to support the Shah's overriding goal of transforming Iran into such 
an actor that it could play a leading and "guardian" role in shaping 
and maintaining a regional status quo which would basically evolve 
around the paramountcy of Iran in the region. In pursuing this goal, by 
the early 1970s, the Shah defined the changing Iranian 'region' of 
security and interests well beyond the geographical perimeters of West 
and Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. He stated:
... I must confess that three or four years ago I only thought of 
the defence of the Persian Gulf because most of our wealth was 
obtained from Bandar Abbas and from the Hormuz Strait at that 
time, so we only wanted to preserve this wealth and to maintain 
free access to outside world. But events were such that we 
were soon compelled to think of the Oman Sea and Iran's shores 
on the Oman Sea as well. And again world events were such that 
we were compelled to accept the fact that the sea adjoining 
the Oman Sea I mean the Indian Ocean —  does not recognise 
borders. And now, as far as our thoughts are concerned, we are 
no longer thinking only about guarding Abadan or Khosrowabadan 
or Bushire or even Bandar Abbas or Hormuz. We are not even 
thinking only of guarding Jask and Chah Bahar. [As for] Iran's 
security limits -- I will not state how many kilometers we have 
in mind, but anyone who is acquainted with geography and the 
strategic situation, and especially with the potentials of air 
and sea forces, knows what distances from Chah Bahar this limit 
can reach.51
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In order, however, to achieve the above regional objectives and build 
and sustain Iran's position as a regional power within what he regarded 
as the Iranian region, the Shah resolved that Iran needed to have the 
necessary 'power'. This raises two major questions for answer in 
the next chapter. What sort of power? And how did the Shah proceed to 
build it?
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Chapter VII
Resources Capability
The ability of a state to act successfully, whether it be in 
the field of domestic or foreign policy, largely depends on the 
appropriate resources which it can muster as necessary means to back 
up its action. The term'tesourced' is used here to include political, 
social, human, economic and military potential.1 In the case of
Iran, as was discussed in Chapter Three the country was very weak in 
these resources during the 1950s. There was, however, considerable 
improvement in these resources during the 1960s, as was discussed in 
Chapter Four in the context of the Shah's White Revolution, his 
military modernisation and evolving changes in regional and 
international circumstances. Consequently, by the time Britain 
announced its decision to withdraw from the Gulf, Iran was clearly 
emerging, not only as the most trusted Western ally, but also, as the 
most stable and strong state with growing social cohesion, and economic- 
military strength in the Gulf region. It was for this very reason 
that London, from the start, favoured Iran as the logical choice to 
shoulder some of the major British responsibilities and look after 
Western interests in the Gulf during and after the British withdrawal. 
This will be pursued later on in this thesis.
This all occurred, of course, largely before the OPEC and 
Iranian oil achievements of the early 1970s. The oil developments, 
however, marked a turning point in augmenting Iranian resources- 
capability. They, for the first time, invoked Iran's most effective 
resource strength, enabling tiie Shah to pursue, with the utmost speed 
and vigour, his process of building up the resources of Iran as a
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regional power. As argued in Chapter Five, they resulted in the 
maximising of Iran's control over and benefit from its oil resources.
The Shah found himself suddenly in possession of enormous petro-dollar 
revenue and great resource bargaining power. Given the world's existing 
economic and energy stiuation, this put the Shah in a unique position to 
use the Iranian oil and petro-dollar wealth to support this building 
of Iranian regional paramountcy. He, consequently, engaged in 
intensive 'resources-diplomacy' as an effective method to: (1) trade
off the Iranian oil and surplus petro-dollar for the best, and even for 
scarce, capital goods, expertise, technology, skilled man-power, 
and arms; (2) sell Iranian products in suitable markets and on 
favourable terms; (3) give aid to and invest in the countries which 
were very important in terms of their usefulness in helping him to 
promote his national and regional goals,- (4), whenever necessary, 
buy off relevant and influential individuals, companies, institutions, 
organisations and governments around the world, as dictated by the 
desire to fulfil his goals; and (5) promote his own leadership 
both at national and international levels. In this context, the 
Shah accelerated his drive to maximise the Iranian economic and 
military potential as basic to the development of the Iranian regional 
paramountcy. He resolved that Iran must achieve a maximum degree of 
non-oil based economic industrialisation and military sophistication 
within the next two decades. Although a comprehensive analysis of the
Shah's economic and military build-up are outside the scope of this 
chapter, it is essential, at least, to outline his programmes • 
with regard to these resources. I shall do this only in so far as 
it is necessary in order to determine the scope of increasing Iranian 
resources-capability in support of the Shah's regional objectives.
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Economic Programme and Objectives
The Shah began a more systematic build-up of the Iranian economy 
essentially with his White Revolution. The measures, adopted in the 
context of the Revolution and featured prominently in Iran's Third 
and Fourth Economic Development Plans (1962-1973), proved effective in 
stabilising and stimulating the Iranian economy, and developing a 
modern industrial infrastructure.3 By 1971, before the huge oil 
price increases, Iran claimed to be enjoying one of the highest rates 
of economic growth in the world4 and to be moving fast towards 
becoming a highly industrialised state in comparison with all its 
neighbours except the Soviet Union and India. To establish this 
conclusively would require a comprehensive analysis of the 
Iranian economy at the time. For our purpose, however, it suffices 
to indicate that some of the major economic indicators support such a 
claim. During the Iranian year of 1349 (21 March 1970 - 20 March 1971) 
Iran achieved an economic growth rate of 10 percent at constant 
prices with its GNP estimated at $10.9 billion. In this, the oil and 
service sectors contributed 3.3 and 3.1 percent respectively; the 
shares of industries and mines, water and power, agriculture, and 
construction were respectively 1.8, 0.9, 0.6, and 0.2 percent. All 
the sectors registered a high rate of growth except agriculture. The 
rate of growth of the value added in oil was 12.5 percent, increasing 
the total oil revenue for the year to $1,136 million; in the service 
sector it was 9 percent, within which the public and private sectors 
services grew by 12 and 6 percent respectively; in industries and 
mines it was 13.2 percent; in water and power 39.9 percent with 
electricity alone counting for a growth rate of 41.5 percent; and in
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construction it was 5.4 percent. The labour force and productivity
recorded a growth rate of 2.8 and 7.3 percent respectively. These
rates of growth either met or exceeded the target set by the Fourth
5Economic Development Plan.
The agricultural sector, however, recorded a decline of 3 percent, 
which fell well short of the Fourth Development Plan's target of 4.4 
percent growth. The production of foodstuffs, tobacco and cotton was 
less than that in 1348. This was largely attributed to a growing decline 
in the labour force in agriculture mainly on account of the relatively 
higher money wage rates and productivity in other sectors as well as 
increasing immigration from rural to urban areas. As a result, 
agricultural exports and imports registered very unbalanced growth rates 
of 4.2 and 60.9 percent respectively over those in 1348. But this 
was generally in line with the government policy of giving priority to 
industrial development over agriculture. During the same year, while 
investing about Rls. 6 billion in agriculture (well below the target of 
about Rls. 13 billion envisaged by the Fourth Plan), the government's 
investment in the industrial and mining sector reached about Rls. 30 
billion. The proportion of the active population in agriculture 
declined by about 0.9 percent; but the number of people active in 
industries and mines increased by 8 percent; consequently, 19.5 percent 
of the active population was involved in this sector. Value added 
increased by 13 percent and,as a result, productivity rose by 5 percent. 
Apart from the traditional industries, such as textiles, carpet and 
packaging, the major new industries, which recorded a high growth 
rate, included steel, machinery and petrochemicals. The items 
contributing to the rise in the industrial productivity included
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vehicles, petrochemicals, electric appliances, and radio and television,
which together accounted for 57 percent of the rise. The growth rate
in mining production was largely caused by the exploitation of mines
especially of chromite, lead and zinc for which the world demand was 
6growing.
Meanwhile, the value of Iran's foreign trade, other than oil, was 
$1.95 billion in 1349 and had an increase of 9.3 percent growth rate 
as against 11.3 percent in 1348. The relative fall in the rate of 
growth in foreign trade was largely due to a slower growth in imports 
because a number of projects, requiring capital goods, had already been 
completed. Iranian economic growth, however, particularly with the 
stress on industrialisation and the decline in agricultural production, 
still remained heavily dependent on a growing level of imports.
As a result, while Iran's non-oil exports amounted to $277.9 million, 
the country's imports were valued at $1,676.6 million, though the former 
grew by 13.6 percent and the latter by 8.7 percent in 1349 as against 
12.8 and 11.0 percent respectively in 1348.7 This discrepancy was, 
however, rectified to a large extent by the Iranian oil exports.
Although the leading Iranian oil customers were Japan and the West, 
in particular the EEC countries, which were the major suppliers of 
Iran s imports, the country's major foreign customers of non-oil 
exports were the Socialist States, led by the Soviet Union ($100.3 
million with a 4.3 percent rate of increase). In this, the Socialist 
countries were followed by the EEC countries ($60.1 million with a 
16.7 percent rate of increase), the US ($24.2 million with a 4.7 
percent rate of decline), the ECAFE countries ($27.5 million with a 
59 percent positive rate), the UK ($9.8 million with a 1 percent 
positive rate) and finally Turkey and Pakistan, members of the Regional
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Cooperation for Development ($1.7 million with a 21.4 percent positive
Q
rate). The emerging trend was clearly in favour of Iran's
growing trade with the regional countries. The conclusion of
'clearing agreements' between Iran and the Socialist countries was
9an important factor in the growth of trade between the two sides.
The rate of growth in the social services sector, education,
health, and welfare, was also considerable but not as high as in many
other sectors. This was largely because of the lower priority
accorded by the Government to investment in the social services sector.
Although the Government claimed a literacy rate as high as 37 percent,^
there is serious doubt about the accuracy of such a claim. The term
'literacy' is very subjective and thus is difficult to quantify.
According to the government's own admission, most of Iran's estimated
67,000 villages suffered from an acute shortage of teaching staff and
poor educational facilities, and about 50 percent of school-age
children were still not receiving an education. Moreover, the
<
government claimed a great improvement in the field of health. But 
this improvement was limited by the number of physicians and dentists 
totalling 8,950, of whom physicians constituted 87 percent. The 
officially reported ratio of physicians to the population was 1 to 3,700 
persons, but this ratio, if anything, was mainly applicable to the 
Iranian major cities, particularly Tehran. For example, in the governate 
of Zanjan and province of West Azerbaijan the ratio was one physician 
to over every 15,000 and 9,000 persons respectively. There were also
about 35,000 hospital beds in the country with most of them in Tehran. 12
A government report itself admits that "... the major portion of health
facilities was confined to Tehran and the Central Province". 13
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The government's total expenditures on education and health amounted
to Rls. 3.2 and Rls. 2.5 billion respectively. These figures were
much lower than the government expenditures on defence or on administrative
14services in the same year. The defence sector, however, will
be discussed separately later on. The government's welfare measures 
were limited mainly to basic pension, superannuation, and some social 
insurance schemes and the relegislation of workers' sharing of the 
factory profits. But these all suffered extensively from administrative 
incompetency, corruption and lack of proper enforcement. The government's 
disbursements on social welfare services amounted to Rls. 898 million, 
though this represented a rise of about 60 percent over the corresponding 
figure in 1348. ^
It needs, however, to be stressed that the Shah's economic 
policy, embodied in the Third and Fourth Plans, aimed mainly at economic 
growth rather than economic development. The latter would have 
required comprehensive political and social changes and schemes
concerning redistribution of wealth on a nation-wide scale --  measures
which the Shah's regime, given its nature, did not want and could not 
cope with at this stage.^  In view of this and the above economic
indicators, nevertheless, the rate of Iran's economic growth and 
industrialisation had reached an impressive stage. This was reflected 
not only in increasing domestic economic activities and stability but 
also in the growing volume of Iran's foreign trade which was chaning 
its pattern and becoming more regionally oriented. The new oil 
achievements of the early 1970s, however, marked a turning point.
They enabled the Shah to multiply his government's expenditures or 
'inputs' and intensify his diplomatic activities with greater reliance 
on Iran's oil-bargaining power to pursue his goal of economic growth
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and industrialisation at a more ambitious and accelerated rate. Hence, 
he would be able to turn Iran into what he projected as a 'non-oil based 
self-generating and self-sufficient industrialised economic power' 
before the end of this century. During the period 1971-1974, the 
Iranian oil revenues increased from Rls. 152.1 billion to Rls. 1,297.4 
billion with annual growth rates of 74.4, 20.2, 161.1, and 171.7 percent 
espectively. At the same time, Iran's GNP grew from Rls. 1,036.3
in 1971 to Rls. 2,270.0 (1972 prices), representing annual growth rates 
of 10.1, 14.2, 34.2, and 43.0 percent respectively.18 Consequently, 
government expenditure, the Iranian economy and foreign trade 
experienced a phenomenal rate of growth. m  the light of changing 
circumstances, the Shah ordered a revision of Iran's Fifth Economic 
Development Plan (1973-1978), which did not take effect until late 
1974. He declared that this Plan would be "equal to all four previous 
plans combined. By the end of the Fifth ... Plan, we will be in quite 
a distinguished and unprecedented position. However, we are already 
thinking about the Sixth Plan and even byond, which we call the period 
of our grand civilisation [Tamaduni Buzurg]. We hope to find the
Iranian society on the threshold of this grand civilisation by the 
end of the Sixth Plan".19
The revised Fifth Plan indeed underlined the Shah's ambition and 
drive to maximise Iran's economic and industrial capability and to 
achieve a dominant economic position at both regional and global levels. 
It is outside the limit of this thesis to provide a thorough critical 
analysis of the Plan and its achievements in terms of its benefits 
or otherwise for the Iranian people. But it is essential to outline 
briefly the Plan's major objectives and areas of concentration so that 
one could assess what sort of economic-capability the Shah was seeking
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to achieve for Iran.
Explaining the over-all objective of the Plan, the Shah himself
declared that it was "... to achieve a stage at which the Iranian
society, enjoying utmost privileges of social and economic development,
could be transferred into a strong society enjoying culture and learning „ 20
”  * In order to realise this objective, the Plan was: (i) "... tc
provide maximum public welfare"; (ii) "... to maintain the country's 
economic growth rate and to adopt serious measures to control 
the effects of inflationary tendencies ..." due to the world economic 
situation and the government's high expenditure; (iii) to expand 
the agricultural and industrial sectors with "a rapid transformation 
toward the most advanced industries of modern times"; (iv) "... to 
establish access to the latest scientific and technical achievements 
in the industrialised countries and their application to advance 
Iran's technological standard as rapidly as possible, as well as bringing 
about the effective participation of research institutes and studies 
necessary for industrial and agricultural growth"; (v) to achieve 
a high growth rate in the services sector; and (vi) to promote 
"culture and mass media" according to the needs of Iran. Moreover, 
the Shah stressed that the plan placed emphasis "... on cooperation 
with other countries, participation in investment and activities, 
expansion of the economy on the basis of mutual interests and extension 
of aid to countries which are taking steps towards expansion".21
The Plan envisaged an annual GNP growth rate of 25.9 percent at 
constant prices —  more than double what it was during the Fourth 
Plan and the GNP was to increase from Rls. 1,165 billion in the
final year of the Fourth Plan to Rls. 3,686 billion during the
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corresponding year of the Fifth Plan. Considering the estimated rate 
of 2.9 percent annual growth of population, the per capita GNP was 
to rise from 37,523 in 1351 (1972-73) at constant prices to 106,650 
rials m  1356 (1977-78). The Plan projected a total capital investment 
of Rls. 4,698 billion, annual growth rates of 29.7, 19.3, and 27.2 
percent in gross domestic investment, consumption and public sector 
consumer expenditure at constant prices respectively. Of the total 
capital investment, Rls. 3118 billion was to be public (government) 
investment and 1,580.2 billion rials private investment, representing 
a rise by 38.1 and 17.7 percent respectively over the corresponding 
figures of 12.9 and 14.6 percent during the Fourth Plan. Excluding 
the oil sector, gross domestic production was to rise at the rate of
15.0 percent per annum; the value added of agriculture was to grow by
7.0 percent, of manufacturing and mining by 18.0 percent and services
22by 16.4 percent.
The total government receipts during the Fifth Plan period 
were projected to amount to 8,296.5 billion Rials, of which 79.8% would 
come from oil and gas and the rest from direct and indirect taxes, 
small foreign loans and other government revenues. The total revenues 
from oil and gas during the Plan period were estimated to be 6,628.5 
billion rials, representing a twelve-fold increase compared to the 
Fourth Plan period. Total government allocations were projected to 
amount to Rls. 6,241.4 billion, of which 13.3, 31.5, 21.0 and 34.2 
percent were allocated for public affairs, defence, social affairs, 
and economic affairs respectively. These percentages were, however, 
to comprise both current and development expenditures. An estimate 
of Rls. 745.1 billion for foreign investment was also included in the 
total government payments. During the Plan period the volume of
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Iran's foreign trade was expected to increase many-fold with stress on 
expanding transactions with regional states for reasons of both 
political and economic expendiency. Given the scope and direction 
of its social welfare programmes, the Plan, moreover, underlined certain
trends towards economic development as against just economic growth,
23which largely characterised the previous Plans.
It was the underlying contention of the Plan to diversify the 
mood of Iran's economic development and industrialisation from their 
heavy dependence on the Iranian oil resources to becoming more self- 
dependent, self-generating and independent of oil, which was expected to 
lose its export potential by the end of this century. But the Plan was 
indeed, very ambitious in both its scope and objectives. For its 
successful implementation, Iran had neither the necessary capital 
goods nor the trained man-power, expertise, technological and scientific
know-how and infrastructural facilities. As a result, its implementation
24was foreseen on the basis of heavy importation.
I shall discuss the implications of such a policy for Iran 
in Chapter Nine. However, the important point which
needs to be discussed here is that the Plan was designed to strengthen 
Iran's position to become not only an economic power but also a 
military power at the same time. This was in accordance with the 
Shah's belief that the Fifth Plan could not be successfully implemented 
and Iran's economic capability could not be magnified in support of the 
country's emerging position as a regional power without concurrently 
maximising Iranian military capability. He stated:
In view of the regional and international problems, the streng­
thening and consolidation of the country's defence power will 
enjoy special priority in the Plan, so that it should act as the
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m a m  factor m  safeguarding the country's stability and 
independence, maintaining the precious fruits of economic and 
social expansion and securing Iran, as before, as an area of 
peace and reliance in today's turbulent world.25
Military Capability
The term military capability is a subjective one. It can be 
approached, defined, and measured in various ways, depending on one's 
choice and interpretation of the variables which constitute the 
components and bases of a state's military capability. m  order to avoid 
confusion, the term will be used in the following discussion to underline 
the sum aggregate of Iran’s national "putative military power".
This type of power, in its general meaning, "... is a capacity for 
taking or defending objects forcibly as well as a means to exercise 
coercion". It is "... something which pertains to particular states; 
it is something they possess, which they may use or not use".26 The
putative military power of a state, for instance of Iran, may be 
evaluated in relation to a state's ready military forces and their 
functions, military potential (from which additional military 
capabilities can be derived), and military reputation, that is, the 
known and expected disposition of a society to resort to military 
strength if national interests are crossed by other societies,
and its government decides to act.27 Let us look at these issues 
more closely in the case of Iran.
As was mentioned in Chapter Three, traditionally, the military 
fulfilled a variety of significant and interrelated functions in Iran. 
These ranged from providing the Iranian rulers with an effective power- 
base and instrument of coercion and policy implementation to policing 
the domestic order and acting as a deterrent against external threats
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and infiltration. The military, therefore, played and probably will 
continue to play a central role in the shaping and conduct of the 
Iranian policy. Of course, it has not always been successful in 
performing these functions, particularly the ones concerning domestic 
order and external threats. But, while serving his own interests, 
the Shah, like his predecessors, was determined not only to control 
the military but also to expand, reorganise, and modernise it as much 
as possible so that it could perform the above functions more efficiently 
and successfully. The Shah's efforts in this respect during the 1950s 
and 1960s were outlined in Chapters Three and Four. As a result, 
he succeeded in transforming the Iranian military into expanded and well 
equipped modern armed forces, comprising army, navy, airforce, and 
para-military, special task and intelligence forces. During the
year 1970-71, when the British withdrawal from the Gulf was imminent, 
the Iranian population was about 28 million and the country's GNP was 
estimated at $10 billion, Iran's defence budget amounted to over $1 
billion of its GNP. The Shah commanded armed forces totalling
221,000 men. Their armaments included M-60 A1 tanks, escort destroyers, 
patrol vessels, coastal minesweepers, F-40 all-weather fighter-bombers, 
F-5 tactical fighter-bombers, F-86 all-weather interceptors, and an 
advanced radar system as well as ground-to-ground and ground-to-air 
missiles and a variety of armour. Most of these arms had been 
supplied by the United States.29 Certainly, the Iranian military
machine was not strengthened with any of the world's most advanced 
weapons; and it had not acquired a capacity either to challenge a 
possible direct Soviet operation or match India's military potential.
It had, however, attained a putative capability to (i) outclass the 
varying military strength of other regional forces, (though Iraq may have
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maintained a higher number of combat aircraft);30 (ii) be continuously 
an effective driving force behind the Shah's autocratic rule, on the 
one hand, and his domestic policy of socio-economic reform, on the 
other; and (iii) aid the Shah in promoting Iran as the most logical 
and capable successor to Britain in the Gulf and build for Iran an 
active and assertive guardian role in its region. It was largely on 
the basis of this capability that the Shah engaged in a number of what 
may be regarded as forward military actions. They included:
(a) Iranian military aid to and training of the Kurdish secessionists 
against Baghdad, particularly in the late 1960s;31 (b) Iranian
logistic support for Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965 and 
the transfer to Pakistan afterwards of 90 F-86 Sabre fighters, which 
reportedly took part in the air war with India in 1971;32 (c) Iranian
support for North Yemen and its readiness to aid the Sana'a Government 
against the PDRY after the latter became independent in 1967;33 and 
(d), above all, the Iranian military take-over of the strategic 
islands of Abu Mussa and the Great and Small Tumbs in the Persian Gulf 
(but on the mouth of the strategic Strait of Hormuz) just before Britain 
formally ended the presence of its forces at the end of 1971.3^
Moreover, the Shah was about to commit Iranian forces, comprising 
3,000-5,000 men with special counter-insurgency units and air-cover, in 
Oman m  support of the pro-Western conservative Muscat Government against 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, within the next two years, 
1971-1973. I shall pursue this further in the next chapter.
ihe Iranian pre—1972 military capability was achieved not 
necessarily because of increased Iranian economic strength, productivity, 
industrialisation, technological and scientific advancement, foreign
2 2 2 .
trade and capital holdings abroad or political-administrative efficiency 
which are generally considered as bases for a state's increased 
putative military power.35 In fact, as was noted earlier, Iran's 
progress m  these fields was very modest from a low base which could 
not provide impetus for the country's military build-up. The 
military capability was attained largely due to an increased Iranian 
GNP, which was mainly a result of a steady rise in the country's oil 
revenues, and foreign aid, notably from the United States. This was, 
however, done at the cost of investment expenditures in the economic 
and social welfare sectors, which were geared more in support of a 
policy of growth rather than development. As a result, Iran's 
military potential, (which must not be misunderstood as military 
capability), as well as its economic potential, was limited by supplies 
and expertise from outside, the quantity of capital inflowing from 
oil, and the extent of the country's economic-capability.
The oil achievements of the early 1970s, however, strengthened 
the Shah's position so that he could make spectacular increases in 
his government expenditures not only for economic and social welfare 
development but also for maximising the Iranian military capability 
at a more ambitious and accelerated rate. Also, he was able to bargain 
for the best and most advanced non-nuclear weapons for his armed forces. 
Hence, he could now concentrate more on a policy aimed to promote what 
may be seen as a socio-economic-military potential for Iran. This 
potential is determined by the composition of a state's military and 
non-military (such as economic, social and political) resources as well 
as by their over-all magnitude. . It stresses the importance of blends 
between these resources in so far as they support and complement each
as expertise, scientific and technological know-how,other in such areas
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trained manpower and infrastructure. Thus, the development of the 
economic-military potential of a state is often regarded as the most 
effective way to increase and safeguard the domestic/regional stability 
and security as well as the self-sufficiency and autonomous strength of 
the given state.36 Consequently, along with expanding investment 
expenditures for economic development and heavy industrialisation, the 
Shah embarked on a massive military build-up which was rare in 
the history of less developed countries.
During 1972 and 1973, when Iran's income from oil began to rise
steeply and amounted to $2,380 and 4,100 million respectively,37
the Shah wasted no time in increasing the Iranian defence budget by
29 percent in 1972 and 11 percent in the following year (or $1,375 and
1,525 million respectively).38 He immediately sought to strengthen,
above all, his army and airforce for short-range, particularly
"counter-insurgency", operations against possible hostile groups
mainly m  the Gulf area. He ordered many new advanced and sophisticated
arms for this purpose. They included 202 Bell AH-IJ assult and 287
Bell 214A "Isfahan" utility helicopters at a total cost of $430 million
as well as 141 Northrop F-5E Tiger 11 fighter aircrafts, costing
$377 million and a variety of missiles.39 But the year 1974, during
which the Iranian oil income quadrupled, reaching a record level of
over $17 billion, and the country's GNP consequently rose to over
$40 billion, marked a turning point in the Shah’s drive for military 
, • , , 40build-up. He declared:
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At present, Iran has a certain military potential ... to the 
extent that so far no one has managed to trifle with us (in 
spite of a number of regional hostilities against Iran).
I promise ... that within the next four or five years Iran's 
armed forces will be such that no one had better entertain any 
evil thoughts about Iran ... . Obviously, to have weapons and 
an army is not something which can be had free of charge, 
but thank God, today we can afford to purchase as many of the 
best weapons in the world as we can absorb, without any favours 
from anybody, for we pay cash. Of course, we are grateful that 
the producer provides us with the best weapons.41
In order to fulfil this promise, under the Shah's personal direction,
defence affairs" were given top priority almost as much as "economic
allalrs ln the revised Fifth Economic Development Plan. The
government undertook to spend a total of Rls. 1,968.7 billion (about
$28 billion at constant prices) on defence during the Plan period.
This was to count for 31.1 percent of its total allocations, only
2.7 percent less than what the government pledged to devote to economic
development. From the total defence allocation, Rls. 1,967.4 and
1.3 billion were to be for military and civil defence expenditures 
42respectively. Even so, the Shah found the Plan's defence allocations
smaller than what he could actually spend. He, consequently, did not 
abide by the Plan and his defence spending exceeded the Plan's target 
by the beginning of 1978, the Plan's final year. This is evident 
from the government's annual defence budgets and total defence 
expenditures between 1974 and 1977. During that period, the Government 
defence spending rose from $3,680 billion in 1974 to $9,400 billion in 
1977 -- an increase of 141 and 650 percent over that of 1973 
respectively. Meanwhile, the Government's total defence disbursement 
amounted to over $28 billion. The Iranian budget for the fiscal
year of 1978/1979 (the final year of the Plan period), which provided 
for a record $59.2 billion expenditures, allocated $9.9 billion for
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defence. With this, the government's total defence expenditures,
during the Plan period, was to be over $10 billion more than what was
44originally envisaged in the Plan. During the first four years
of the Plan, defence consumed an average of 27-29 percent of the
45government budget.
Consequently, Iran became not only a big military spender but
also a leading arms purchaser in the world after 1974. Iranian
officials guarded the Shah's military purchases and orders with
strict secrecy. But according to outside sources (particularly US
Congressional Hearings and Reports and SIPRI) the total cost of the
Shah's arms purchases and orders, between 1973-1977 alone, exceeded $15 
. . .  46billion. in 1977, Iran was the world's largest single purchaser
of US arms, buying about $5,700 million worth; this accounted for 
more than half of the entire US arms sales to foreign countries.^
The Iranian military procurement consisted of a variety of the most 
advanced and sophisticated weapons (both defensive and offensive) 
for all branches of the country's armed forces. They include: 
Chieftain MK5 "Shir Iran" tanks, Victor armoured recovery vehicles 
(both British), F14A Tomcat fighter/interceptor, F-4E and RF-4E 
Phantom aircraft, a Phoenix air-defence system, "Spruance"-class 
destroyers, renovated "Tang"-class submarines, fleet tankers,
Lockheed P-3C Maritime aricraft and a wide range of anti-Tank, 
anti-aircraft and guided missiles (all American).^  _ Moreover, as 
the Shall was impressed by the effective performance of SAM missiles, 
used by Egypt and Syria, in the Middle East War of October 1973,
Iran planned to buy an undisclosed number of such missiles from the 
Soviet Union. To this effect, the Iranian War Minister, General 
Toufanian, concluded a $414 million arms deal with the Soviet
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authorities during his visit to Moscow in November 1976. The deal
provided for the Soviet supply of SAM-7 and SAM-9 and a number of anti-
49tank and anti-aircraft guns to Iran, starting in 1977. This was
the second deal of its kind between Tehran and Moscow. The deal was
very significant not so much for what it may have offered to Iran 
militarily but rather for its political implications in terms of 
strengthening the Shah's position in his arms dealings with the West.
Of course, not all the above-mentioned arms were in the possession of 
Iran by 1978, but their deliveries were expected to be completed by the 
mid-1980s.
The Shah's military purchases and orders were mainly of two 
types: cash payment and oil-for-arms deal. The first was pre­
dominant until late 1975, by which time Iran's oil income was 
continuing to increase. However, with a post-boom downward fluctuation 
in the world oil market in early 1976 and the Saudi Arabian decision to
restrain OPEC from huge oil price increases, the Iranian oil revenue
50dropped by 2-4 percent against an expected rise of 5 percent.
As a result, the Shah urgently sought to trade Iranian oil for arms 
directly. Iran concluded the first deal of such a kind with Britain 
in November 1976, whereby the latter undertook to provide Iran with 
most advanced ground-to-air missiles (worth £400 million) for a long-term 
oil s u p p l y . I t  was also soon reported that Iran was trying to 
negotiate further similar deals with British and the United States, 
particularly, with regard to Victor armoured recovery vehicles and 
F16 fighers."*^
Meanwhile, given Iran's increasing dependence on outside sources 
for its military supply, training, expertise, and infrastructure, the
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S h e *  was s e e k i n g  e a g e r ly  t o  d e v e lo p  I r a n ' s  own arms i n d u s t r y .  By 
t h e  l a t e  19 7 0 s ,  I r a n  p ro d u c e d  o n ly  p i s t o l s  and m ach ineguns  and t h e  
Government had  u n d e r ta k e n  a  number o f  programmes t o  expand t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
o f  such  s m a l l  arm s. F u r th e r m o r e ,  a f t e r  1974, T eh ran  c o n c lu d e d  s e v e r a l  
a g re e m e n ts  w i th  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  and B r i t a i n  t o  a s se m b le  B e l l  214 
U t i l i t y  and B e l l  209 AH-U armed h e l i c o p t e r s ,  Hughes Tow a n t i - t a n k  
m i s s i l e s ,  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  and  BAC R a p ie r  SAM m i s s i l e s  as  w e l l  a s  t o  
p ro d u c e  p a r t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  o r d e r  o f  1600 C h i e f t a i n  t a n k s  u n d e r  l i c e n c e . 53 
On March 17, 1978, B r i t a i n  a g re e d  t o  expand th e  e x i s t i n g  r e p a i r  shops  
f o r  some 1 ,0 0 0  C h i e f t a i n  t a n k s  a l r e a d y  a t  th e  d i s p o s a l  o f  I r a n  and s e t  
up a m in i  a s sem b ly  l i n e  f o r  t h e  t a n k s  on o r d e r  i n  I r a n  in  1 9 7 9 .5^
The m a jo r  I r a n i a n  arms a sse m b la g e  and p r o d u c t i o n  p l a n t s  had a l r e a d y  
become o p e r a t i v e  i n  S h i r a z .  B ut t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  s u c c e s s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d ,  
a s  i n  many o t h e r  m i l i t a r y  and  econom ic f i e l d s ,  was l i m i t e d  by th e  l a c k  
o f  a s o l i d  n o n - o i l  e c o n o m i c - i n d u s t r i a l  b a s e ,  s u f f i c i e n t  t r a i n e d
manpower and s c i e n t i f i c - t e c h n o l o g i c a l  know-how and i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  
c a p a c i t y .
The S h a h 's  m ass iv e  m i l i t a r y  b u i l d - u p ,  how ever ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  
w h e th e r  i t  had s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g  p o t e n t i a l  and w h e th e r  i t  was i n  t h e  
i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  I r a n i a n  p e o p l e ,  had p r o v id e d  I r a n  w i th  such  a 
n u m e r i c a l / t h e o r e t i c a l  m i l i t a r y - c a p a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  c o u n tr y  had come t o  
be r e g a r d e d  n o t  o n ly  by i t s  own l e a d e r s h i p  b u t  a l s o  by co n c e rn e d  
f o r e i g n  q u a r t e r s  as " . . .  t h e  do m in an t  m i l i t a r y  power i n  t h e  P e r s i a n  G u l f " .  
AS a US C o n g r e s s io n a l  S t a f f  R e p o r t  p u t s  i t ,  " (u )p o n  d e l i v e r y  betw een now 
( J u l y  1976) and 1981 o f  eq u ip m e n t  o r d e r e d  t o  d a t e ,  I r a n ,  on p a p e r ,  can 
be r e g a r d e d  a s  a r e g i o n a l  s u p e r p o w e r " .55 T h is  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  
had become an e f f e c t i v e  d r i v i n g  f o r c e  b e h in d  w ha t  t h e  Shah w an ted  t o
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achieve not only at home but also in the Iranian region and rnternational 
arena. This was enforced further by the fact that the regional 
countries in particular and the world in general were aware of the 
Shah s military build-up but were largely uncertain of what it could 
produce if it were used. Consequently, as long as the sizable 
military inventory remained and continued to grow, the Shah and his 
regime had the putative instruments to guard and exert themselves 
Within the bounds of regional and international constraints against 
the regional countries (whether weak like Qatar or strong like the 
Soviet Union) which seemed to be watchful of the Shah's military 
build-up but uncertain of what this build-up could produce.
It must be stressed that the Shah's military programme was 
a non-nuclear one, though Iran had concluded agreements with the US, 
France, and West Germany to build over 20 nuclear reactors for "peaceful 
purposes" (energy generation) before the Iranian oil wells run out of 
their exporting potential by the end of this century.56 m  fact, the
Shah had demanded^that the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean be declared a 
"zone of peace". 57 Iran, a signatory to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, had moved several motions to this effect in the United Nations 
in the last few years.58 But this had not prevented the Shah from 
postulating that the maximisation of Iran's conventional military- 
capability enabled the country to fulfil several vital objectives:
(I) to deter Moscow, in the first place, from carrying out any possible 
direct or indirect action against Iran and, if this failed, to put up 
an effective resistance to any Soviet action until Iran's Western 
antes came to its aid; <ii) to guard the Iranran economic development 
and its regional security and interests against forces of "disruption"
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and "sabotage" in the region; (iii) to influence and possibly control
developments and events, which might run contrary to the Iranian
interests, in the politically volatile areas of the Persian Gulf and
Iran's eastern flank; and (iv) to enforce the traditional prestige
of the Shah as "the king of kings" and of Iran as a country which was
59once a mighty imperial power in its own right.
The whole process of the Shah's accelerated economic and military 
build-up, largely on the basis of Iranian oil resources, proved to be 
in many ways self-defeating, with serious repercussions for the Iranian 
society and the Shah's regional objectives. This will be, however, 
discussed in Chapter Nine. At present, it is central to the discussion 
of this Thesis to turn to another important aspect of the Shah's 
drive for the exaltation of Iran as a regional power; and this aspect 
largely concerns one major question; while the Shah's efforts to 
build Iran's resources capability had been ongoing, how did he behave 
regionally to support these efforts and help fulfil his regional
objectives?
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Chapter VIII
Pattern of Regional Behaviour
The purpose of this chapter is largely to outline a general 
pattern in the Shah's regional policy behaviour, particularly since 
the late 1960s when he resolved to achieve for Iran a regional 
power status. in this, reference will be made only to the Shah's 
most relevant diplomatic, economic and military actions in the conduct 
of the Iranian regional relations, but given the scope of this thesis, 
no attempt will be made to provide the details of his actions, which 
have been covered by other analysts of Iranian politics elsewhere.1
The Shah's goal of developing Iran into an effective guardian and 
deterrent regional power determinined his regional policy behaviour.
He pursued a policy which sought to create a regional atmosphere 
conducive to this goal in relation to a number of opposing regional 
variables, as was outlined in Chapter VI. As a result, his regional 
behaviour largely aimed at: (1) enhancing regional stability and
security, based on the status quo and backed by the increasing Iranian 
resources capability, in favour of Iran; (2) stimulating the 
regional political and economic resources in support of the Iranian 
economic and military build-up; and (3) gaining regional 
recognition for Iran's emerging status as a power in its region.
This policy behaviour did not have a totally coherent pattern. It 
was changing, complex and often inconsistent. It consistently main­
tained, however, two major aspects: one stressing the Shah's search
for what he called "regional cooperation"; the other seeking to
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enforce the Shah's opposition to what he considered 'communist/
subversive' forces and activities within Iran and its region.
While the former aspect apparently involved seeking regional
consensus and support for Iran's aspiring position as a regional
power, the latter amounted to a number of limited Iranian regional
military interventions. it is under these two aspects that most of
the Shah's regional policy actions since the late 1960s can be categorised
and explained. These actions ranged from settling some of Iran's
major disputes with its neighbours, offering sizable capital aid and
investment to certain regional countries and pressing for the formation
of a regional "common market" and "collective security", to deploying
Iranian combat forces in Oman and offering military aid to Somalia
against Ethiopia. Although the two aspects were intertwined in so
far as they supported and sanctioned each other, it will be helpful
methodologically to illustrate them in some detail under separate 
headings.
(I) "Regional Cooperation"
The Shah's search for "regional cooperation", as a means to 
enhance Iran's regional stability and security and enable the country 
to benefit from regional resources for its own socio-economic development, 
dates back to the early years of his rule. Although since then, he 
used the term in different ways for rhetorical and practical purposes, 
an outline of his changing understanding of the term can be drawn
the basis of his policy thinking and actions. During the 1950s, he 
believed that "... the system of alliances and mutual aid" between 
states with common interests was the most effective way to ensure not 
only the stability and security of the world but also that of Iran.2
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Consequently, given the nature of his regime as well as its weak 
domestic and regional position, (as was discussed in Chapter III) he 
readily pursued a foreign policy which opposed Soviet 'communism' and 
Arab 'revolutionary nationalism' but aimed at strengthening Iran's 
alliance with the West. At the regional level, this narrowed down 
his options to seeking alliance and cooperation only with those 
"friendly regional countries" which shared with him similar foreign 
policy convictions. These countries comprised Pakistan, Turkey and 
Iraq, with which Iran forged an alliance through the Western sponsored 
Baghdad Pact and its successor, CENTO, though Iraq opted out of the 
latter in 1959. Although the alliance provided for economic and technical 
cooperation between member states, its overall stress was on its 
military importance as a means to contain Soviet communism. As was 
noted in Chapter HI/ this policy of regional cooperation, based on 
Iran's exclusive alliance with the West, failed to help the Shah's 
regime in either building long-term solid bases for its own continuity 
or strengthening the Iranian regional position. On the contrary, it 
aggravated Iran's relations with the Soviet Union and the Arab world 
and caused anxiety for Afghanistan and India, which were engaged in 
serious border disputes with Pakistan.
Consequently, by the beginning of the 1960s, the Shah found it 
necessary to introduce certain changes in his regime's overall policy 
behaviour. On the domestic front, he adopted the White Revolution's 
programme of mass mobilisation and selected socio-economic reforms.
On the foreign policy front, he began de-emphasising the military 
significance of CENTO in favour of its potential to promote regional 
socio-political understanding and economic cooperation. As a
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corollary to this, he found it impreative to improve Iran's regional 
relationships, particularly with the Soviet Union, through a policy of 
bilateral diplomatic, economic, technical and cultural cooperation 
at a government-to-government level.3 As was analysed in
Chapter IV, it was in the context of these changes that, during the 
1960s, the Shah succeeded not only in broadening his domestic 
power-base and stabilising the internal situation under his rule, but 
also improving Iran's regional relationships. They included:
(1 ) the establishment, together with Pakistan and Turkey, of the 
Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in July 1964; (ii) the 
normalisation of Iran's relationship with the Soviet Union, involving 
the expansion of commercial ties between the two sides and extension of 
Soviet economic and technical assistance to Iran; (iii) the 
expansion of economic and cultural ties with Afghanistan and India;
(iv) the development of an effective working relationship with the 
conservative Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and even Iraq, 
at least, at OPEC level; and (v) the balancing of Iran's relation­
ship, to an extent, with the West, particularly the United States.
Despite this, however, the regional situation by the late 1960s 
was still beset by numerous regional differences, disputes and new 
developments. This, particularly in the wake of the British 
announcement of its intention to withdraw its forces from the 
Gulf, continued to heighten the shah's concern about Soviet penetration 
and 'communist subversion' in the vicinity of Iran. He, consequently, 
resolved that Iran should work against this situation by assuming 
the role of a leading guardian and deterrent power in its region; 
and should therefore press on with building its resources capability
234.
so that it could ensure regional security, based mainly on the regional
stability of the status quo, with reliance largely on its own resources 
4
strength. in order to realise this goal successfully, the Shah
now needed, more than ever before, not only a period of regional 
peace and stability but also increasing support from such regional 
resources as a market, raw materials, technology, and trained manpower, 
as well as considerable regional consensus and recognition for the regional 
status which he wanted for Iran. This made it all the more pressing 
for him to pursue his policy of regional cooperation with increased 
vigour and on a larger scale, particularly in view of Iran's growing 
oil-based resources capability. He consequently found it expedient, 
while the Iranian-Soviet relationship was at its strongest, to seek 
better ties with the Arabs, on the one hand, and to strengthen Iran's 
relations with its eastern neighbours, on the other. First of all, 
some of the Shah's major policy actions concerning Iran's relationship 
with the Arab world will be examined.
(A) Iran-Arab Relationship
There were several major problems which had traditionally 
strained Iran's relations with the Arab world in general and the 
radical Arab states in particular. They emenated largely from 
Iranian policy concerning the Middle East conflict, the country's 
claim over Bahrain, its dispute with Iraq over Shatt-el-Arab, and the 
Shah's general dislike for the Arab revolutionary regimes/forces 
and vice versa. Any improvement of the Iranian-Arab relationship 
into one of effective friendship and cooperation depended crucially 
on the two sides' success in overcoming these problems. The
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Shah initiated the necessary process as early as 1967. In the wake 
of the Third Arab-Israeli War the Shah reappraised his regime's 
Middle Eastern policy in favour of the Arab cause, and demanded 
Israeli withdrawal from Arab occupied territory, though he condemned the 
use of oil as a 'political weapon' by Arab producing states.
By 1968, however, when Britain announced its intended withdrawal 
from the Gulf and consequently the stability and security of the Gulf 
became a prime focus of Tehran's policy considerations, the Shah also 
felt it expedient to resolve the problem of Bahrain once and for all.
In a surprise statement in New Delhi on January 4, 1969, the Shah 
pledged, for the first time, that his government would "... never resort 
to the use of force to oblige ..." the people of Bahrain to join Iran.5
This statement was subsequently elaborated to mean that Iran 
was prepared to accept a referendum or plebiscite in Bahrain under 
United Nations auspices to decide the future status of the island.
Consequently, Britain and the UN acted swiftly on the change in the 
Iranian policy and on 11 May 1970, the UN Security Council adopted 
unanimously a resolution approving the finding of its Secretariat 
that: "The overwhelming majority of the people of Bahrain wish to
gain recognition of their identity in a fully independent and 
sovereign state
with little opposition on 14 May 1970.
The Iranian Majlis endorsed this resolution 
7
Thus, Iran abandoned its traditional claim over Bahrain and 
resolved the problem amicably through a successful but quiet diplomacy 
with the UN and Britain in the year following the Shah's original 
statement. Lord Caradon, the UK representative at the UN Security 
Council, praised the Shah's initial statement as "... an act of states­
manship ... which opened the door to settlement", and credited Iran
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with "magnanimity".8 Tehran rejoiced at the fact that the problem 
was solved "... in such a manner as to contribute to creating a climate 
of peace, friendship and stability in the Persian Gulf".9 The Arab
world’s reaction to the solution, in general, was one of satisfaction, 
though Baghdad claimed the settlement to be a victory for the Arabs 
against the Shah's design for territorial expansion.10 in broad 
terms, the settlement proved to be in the interest of Iran's regional 
position and the Shah’s search for regional cooperation. It put an end 
to a major dispute between Iran and its neighbouring Arabs, which had 
caused the conservative Arab states to have reservations about 
developing close ties with Iran, and the radical Arab forces to be 
antagonistic to the Shah's regime and to denounce it for its 
imperialist' ambitions.11 Moreover, it freed Iran of a major 
foreign policy preoccupation, which had been conducted very unsuccessfully 
in so far as Tehran could not hope for either a peaceful or forceful 
takeover of Bahrain. In the first case, an overwhelming majority 
of the people of Bahrain did not want to join Iran and, in the second 
case, Tehran could not undertake a military operation without risking 
a war with the Arabs. The Bahrain settlement, consequently,
(i) removed a major restraining factor in Iranian-Arab relations;
provided the Arab world with some evidence of Tehran's desire 
for regional peace and cooperation; and (iii) enabled Tehran to 
concentrate more on its other urgent objectives in the wake of British
withdrawal. of course, there was not only a definite cause and 
effect relationship between the British withdrawal announcement and the 
Shah's decision to forego the traditional Iranian claim over Bahrain 
but also possible behind-the-scene dealings between London and Tehran 
m  bringing about the Bahrain settlement. This, however, will be
discussed later.
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I n  t h e  m e a n t i m e ,  t h e  B a h r a i n  s e t t l e m e n t  was  c o m p lem en ted  b y
T e h r a n ' s  s u c c e s s  i n  s e t t l i n g  some o f  i t s  o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s
w i t h  t h e  A r a b s .  They w e r e  l a r g e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  ( i )  t h e  d i v i s i o n
o f  t h e  c o n t i n e n t a l  s h e l f  i n  t h e  P e r s i a n  G u l f  b e t w e e n  I r a n  an d  t h e
G u l f ' s  c o n s e r v a t i v e  Arab s t a t e s ;  and ( i i )  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  J n i t e d
Ara b  E m i r a t e s  (UAE). I n  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e ,  T e h r a n  r e a c h e d  s e p a r a t e
a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  K u w a i t ,  S a u d i  A r a b i a  an d  Q a t a r  i n  J a n u a r y  and Augus t
121968 an d  S e p t e m b e r  1969 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n  t h e  s e c o n d  c a s e ,  w h i l e
i n i t i a l l y  r e f u s i n g  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  B r i t i s h  s p o n s o r e d  
c o n f e d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  G u l f ' s  s m a l l  s h e i k d o m s ,  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  t o  t h a i  
p o i n t  u n d e r  B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  f e a r  t h a t  s u c h  
c o n f e d e r a t i o n  c o u l d  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  A r a b s '  p o s i t i o n  a g a i n s t  I r a n ,  i i
131971 T e h r a n  s o f t e n e d  i t s  p o s i t i o n  by f a v o u r i n g  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  UAE.
I n  r e t u r n ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  r e a c h e d  a b e h i n d  t h e  s c e n e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  wish
B r i t a i n ,  a l l o w i n g  i t  t o  f u l f i l  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  c l a i m  o v e r  t h e  t h r e e
s t r a t e g i c  i s l a n d s  o f  Abu Musa an d  t h e  G r e a t e r  an d  L e s s e r  Tumbs, n e i r
14t h e  s t r a i t s  o f  Hormoz.  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  g i v e n  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  she
d i s p u t e s  o v e r  B a h r a i n ,  t h e  c o n t i n e n t a l  s h e l f  an d  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  
t h e  UAE, and t h e  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  I r a n i a n  p o l i c y  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  A r a b - I s r a e l i  
c o n f l i c t ,  i t  was t h e  c a s e  t h a t  by  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  when 
I r a n  an d  t h e  Arab o i l  p r o d u c i n g  s t a t e s  j o i n t l y  s u c c e e d e d  i n  t u r n i n c  
OPEC i n t o  an e f f e c t i v e  c a r t e l ,  I r a n  h a d  s e t t l e d  many o f  i t s  d i f f e r e n c e s  
w i t h  t h e  G u l f ' s  Ara b  s t a t e s  e x c e p t  I r a q .  T h i s  h a d  c o n t r i b u t e d  
e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  p r o m o t i n g  b e t t e r  r e g i o n a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  b a s e d  on 
common i n t e r e s t s ,  a n d  e x p a n d i n g  t r a d e  b e t w e e n  I r a n  an d  t h e s e  s t a t e s  
a s  w e l l  as  E g y p t ,  t h e  l e a d i n g  member o f  t h e  Ara b  r a d i c a l  camp.
The c a s e  o f  I r a n i a n - E g y p t i a n  r e l a t i o n s  w i l l  b e  l o o k e d  a t  l a t e r .
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As for Iranian-Iraqi relations, however, the dispute over the 
Shatt-al-Arab had taken a turn for the worse with the breakdown of 
diplomatic relations and increasing border infiltrations and 
skirmishes between the two sides.15 This was despite the fact 
that Tehran appeared very eager to negotiate its differences with 
Iraq following the solution of the Bahrain problem. Addressing the 
UN General Assembly in October 1970, the Iranian Foreign Minister,
A. Zahedi, declared:
We do not demand exclusive domain over it [Shatt-al-Arab].
We seek no more than is accorded to us by the practice of nations 
under well established rules of international law, as shown in the 
case of Danube, the Rhine and the Scheldt rivers. [And that 
his government was] ... ready at any time, at any hour, at any 
moment, anywhere, to start negotiations with the Government 
of Iraq, for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of 
the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, on the basis of boundary to be set 
at mid-channel on thalweg and freedom of navigation for all 
countries throughout the entire river, in accordance with 
the accepted principles of international law.16
This eagerness, however, did not pay off immediately for several 
reasons. First, the foreign policy of the Iraqi Ba'th Government 
was still heavily influenced by "nationalist-ideological" values, which 
sought an "Arab common policy" to preserve the Arab character of the 
(Arabian) Persian Gulf against Iranian claims, on the one hand, and 
stressed the strengthening of Iraq's relations with "the Socialist 
Camp and the Third World", on the other. As a corollary to this, 
Baghdad opposed 'pro-capitalist' forces, whether Iranian or Arab, 
in the Gulf. Second, the Ba'th regime was facing growing domestic 
opposition and it was, therefore, in its interest, not to press for 
an immediate settlement of its dispute with Iran. Third, the Baghdad- 
Moscow relationship was being cemented rapidly, particularly in view 
of their Friendship Treaty of 1972, and as a result Baghdad was feeling
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more confident of Soviet support for its regional stance. On the 
other hand, the Iranian resource capability was not as yet strong enough 
to be effective in persuading the Ba'th regime towards a negotiated 
settlement. Consequently, the Iranian-Iraqi dispute over Shatt-al- 
Arab and its consequent aspects, such as the Iranian support for 
Iraqi Kurdish secessionists and the Iraqi backing and sheltering of
Shah groups, continued to strain relations between the two 
countries.17 It was not until 1975 that the changing domestic 
and regional circumstances made it more urgent and desirable for both 
sides to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. Before evaluating 
this, it is necessary to have a brief look at the concurrent rapid 
friendly development in Iranian-Egyptian relations, which together with 
the improvement of Iran's relations with the conservative Arab states 
was important in bringing about the Iranian-Iraqi agreement.
The transformation of the Iranian-Egyptian relationship from one of 
hostility during the 1950s and 1960s to one of friendship and close 
cooperation in the 1970s exemplified not only the changing regional 
position of Iran and the strengthening of the Shah's policy of 
regional cooperation in support of his drive to turn Iran into a 
regional power, but also the rapid changes in the Persian Gulf-Middle 
East region in the last few years. The Tehran-Cairo rapprochement 
largely began with the change in the Iranian policy on the Middle 
East conflict and the weakening of Egypt as the leading radical pan- 
Arabist force following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This, with the 
strengthening of Iran's regional position, eventually led to the 
restoration of diplomatic relations, after a ten years break, between 
the two countries shortly before President Nasser's death in 1970.
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The major factors which subsequently contributed to furthering close 
ties included: (1) the emergence of Anwar al-Sadat's regime as a 
moderate force with growing pro-Western and anti-Soviet behaviour in 
Egypt; (2) the growing Egyptian need for outside capital aid and 
investment, in addition to annual subsidies from Arab oil producing 
states, led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to rebuild its war-torn 
economy, cities and defence forces; (3) Egypt's relative technological 
and industrial advancement in the Arab World, making it an attractive 
source of support for Iran, and its strategic location, with the Suez 
Canal, making it a viable gate to markets and resources in Africa and 
Europe; (4) the rapid rise of Iran as a financial power with a fast 
growing economy and expanding interest to secure access to wider 
markets, industrial raw materials, agricultural products, technology 
and fields of investment; and above all, the Shah's search for 
regional political influence; and (5) the growing coincidence of
interests between Cairo and Tehran in regional and international
, . . . 18 politics.
In the context of these factors, Tehran and Cairo were able to 
strengthen their political and economic relations very rapidly after 
1970. At the political level, Sadat's increasing opposition to 
Arab 'extremism' and Soviet influence as well as his search for peace 
with Israel and friendship with the United States had particular appeal 
to the Shah, who supported Sadat in all these respects. The Shah 
rejoiced over the increasing closeness of Egyptian ties with the 
conservative Arab states as against the radical ones, and Sadat's 
expulsion of the Soviet military advisors in 1972, and expressed 
solidarity with Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.19 He not 
only supported Egypt's war effort and offered it relief aid, but also,
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reportedly, permitted the stopover of Soviet and Pakistani war supply 
planes en route to Cairo. He was subsequently more persistent
m  Iran's support for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands 
and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, even 
if this would involve the establishment of some form of a Palestinian 
intity adjacent to Israel.21 Moreover, he praised Sadat for his 
peace initiatives; he was the second world leader, after President 
Carter, to support Sadat's historic peace mission to Jerusalem in 
December 1977. He subsequently described Sadat's mission as 
"dignified" and "manly" and expressed Iran's "... warmest feelings of 
friendship and support ... for [the Egyptian leader's] efforts to bring 
peace and stability ..." to the Middle East region.22 m  return, upon 
developing similar regional perceptions, Sadat shared and supported 
the Shah's concern for the security and stability of the Persian Gulf 
against Soviet penetration and 'subversive' actions as well as his 
resolution that the Gulf's security must be a responsibility of its 
littoral states.23 it was such similar concerns which led to the 
coincidence of the two sides' interests and involvement even beyond the 
Persian Gulf-Middle East region. This was exemplified in their common 
political and material support to Zaire against the alleged Soviet 
backed mercenary invasion of the country in 1977,24 and to Somalia 
against the Soviet-Cuban backed Ethiopian Government in the conflict 
in the Horn of Africa since late 1977.23
The development of political friendship and cooperation between 
Tehran and Cairo was complemented extensively by similar rapid expansion 
of economic ties between the two sides. Drawing on its growing oil 
income, and within the frameworks of its economic and regional objectives,
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Iran concluded a major economic protocol with Egypt on May 27, 1974.
The protocol was valued at $1 billion, the aim being to "... expand economic 
and trading cooperation ..." between the two countries. Accordingly,
Iran undertook to help finance reconstruction of the ruined towns in 
the Suez Canal area, particularly Port Said, the widening of the canal, 
the establishment of numerous joint industrial, mining, and agricultural 
ventures in Egypt, and the expansion of certain existing industries in 
Egypt. Moreover, under the protocol, Egypt agreed to offer Iran a 
free zone at a port on the Mediterranean as an outlet for Iranian 
commercial and industrial activities in Africa and Europe, and Iran 
agreed in principle to participate in a multinational project to 
construct a pipeline to transport oil from Suez to Port Said.26 
Subsequently, in September 1975, the two countries also agreed to 
improve their air links and develop a joint shipping line;27 and 
in June 1976, Egypt agreed to grant Iran oil terminal facilities.28 
These fast growing economic ties resulted in a many-fold increase in 
the volume of trade between the two sides, favouring Iran, from 1972.
During the first nine months of 1354 (March 21, 1975 - March 20, 1976),
Iran's imports from Egypt amounted to over Rls. 64 billion, but its 
non-oil exports to Egypt exceeded Rls. 788 billion and, thus, Egypt 
ranked ninth in the world among importers of the Iranian goods.29
The Iranian-Egyptian friendship was significant in terms of the 
Shah's search for both regional political and economic influence. it 
helped the Shall to secure not only access to further economic outlets 
but also an important political leverage, which aided him in improving 
Iran's relations with certain other radical Arab states, particularly 
Syria and Iraq, strengthening the country's ties with the conservative
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Arab states, and isolating the Arab 'revolutionary' groups, especially
in the Persian Gulf. In the past, it was largely the Tehran-Cairo
hostility which had impeded the Shah from seeking better ties with
Egypt's close ally, Syria, and exploiting the traditional rivalry
between Cairo and Baghdad to strengthen Iran's position against Iraq
and other radical Arab forces. Especially after 1973, however,
the development of Tehran-Cairo friendship left Syria and Iraq in
a vacuum and reduced the latter's capacity to exert pressure against
Iran on the conservative Arab states. This, together with the growing
Iranian resources capability and regional strength and Syria's realisation
of this, helped Tehran and Damascus to exchange ambassadors in March
1974, conclude an economic protocol in June 1974 (whereby Iran agreed
to supply Syria with $150 million worth of credits for joint ventures),
and sign a trade agreement promising further economic transations and
31cooperation between the two sides. The development of Tehran-
Cairo friendship and Tehran-Damascus rapprochement as well as Iran's 
strengthening ties with the conservative Arab states, particularly 
those in the Persian Gulf, by late 1974, not only put pressure on 
Iraq through fear of isolation but also coincided with certain changes 
in the behaviour of Ba'th Government.
By now the Ba'th regime, like Iran, had drawn on its growing 
oil income and had begun certain ambitious domestic socio-economic 
reforms, for the successful implementation of which it needed continuous 
domestic stability, regional peace and security, support from regional 
resources and better relations with the West. This meant that it could 
no longer afford to (i) continue its fight against the Kurdish 
secessionists indefinitely; (ii) isolate itself from the Arab world
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altogether; (ill) overlook the pragmatic needs of its foreign 
policy in a response to a changing balance of forces in the Arab world 
and the Persian Gulf, where Iran was clearly in the ascendent; 
and (iv) pursue an anti-Western policy and deprive itself of 
alternative markets and sources of capital goods and technological 
know how. These considerations on the part of Baghdad were
supplemented by the Shah's concern for the fact that: (1) the
Iranian-backed Kurdish struggle with Baghdad was enlarging and this 
could, contrary to the Shah's determination against 'revolutionary' 
groups, eventually involve Iran in a full scale war with Iraq;
(2) given the Iraqi military capability and territorial proximity 
between Iraq and Iran, the Iranian oil-economic zones were very 
vulnerable to possible Iraqi artillery and air strikes; and (3) Iran 
was undergoing a very crucial period of its economic development and 
military build-up, and, therefore, it would not be in its interest, 
in any way, to engage in a war with Iraq.33 Consequently, both sides 
found it most beneficial to negotiate their differences as soon as 
possible. They entered serious discussions in late 1974 without much 
success. However, while attending the OPEC summit in Algiers, the 
Shah and the strong Iraqi vice-president, Sadam Hussain, held an 
unprecedented meeting, upon the Algerian President's mediation, in 
March 1975. The two leaders signed a historic communique, which 
provided for the settlement of Shatt-al-Arab dispute and its negative 
consequences between their countries. It was agreed that the concerned 
parties should demarcate their land frontiers under the terms of the 
long-inoperative 1913 protocol.34 Moreover, Iran pledged to end its 
support for the Kurdish movement and Iraq undertook to end its support 
for anti-Iranian groups. Concerning their border secruity, as was
245.
detailed subsequently, both sides agreed to prevent any subversive
individual, seeking to infiltrate each other's territory for the
purpose of causing "disorder"; in such a case each government would
35make such individuals known to the other immediately. Furthermore,
the joint communique, which was issued at the end of Premier Hoveyda's 
official visit to Iraq in late March 1975, declared: "They [Hoveyda and
Sadam Hussain] emphasised their resolve to develop relations in all 
fields, to the mutual interest of the two countries. The two sides 
further reaffirmed that the area [Persian Gulf] should be free from 
any foreign intervention" . 3(3
Thus, with the speedy implementation of most of the provisions 
of the agreement and its subsequent protocols, not only were the Shatt-al- 
Arab dispute and its side-effects settled for the present, but also 
Iraq endorsed the Shah's original resolve that the security of the 
Persian Gulf must be the responsibility of its littoral states and, 
therefore, outside powers must be kept out of the region. This Iraqi 
endorsement completed the approval of the Shah's resolve by all Gulf 
states, by the end of 1975, Iran was the only Persian Gulf state, which 
maintained, at least on the surface, peaceful and friendly relations 
(based on the Shah's original perception of regional stability and 
security) with all the Gulf states, in particular, and more generally 
with the Arab countries, except PDRY and Libya.
In view of the Shah's continued military build-up, this only 
strengthened the Iranian regional position and created, as the Shah felt, 
a regional atmosphere whereby he could seek further liquidation of 
what he saw as 'subversive/terrorist' groups in the Gulf and beyond, 
on the one hand, and establish the structural mechanisms of his policy
2 4 6 .
o f  r e g i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  I r a n i a n  l e a d e r s h i p ,  on t h e  o t h e r .
C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  a f t e r  1975, he i n c r e a s e d  h i s  e f f o r t s  i n  o r d e r  t o
p u rsu a d e  th e  G u lf  s t a t e s  t o  ( i )  c o o p e r a te  w i th  I r a n  i n  i t s  r e g i o n a l
a n t i - ' s u b v e r s i o n '  cam paign , and ( i i )  j o i n  I r a n  i n  fo rm in g  a
P e r s i a n  G u lf  " c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y " ,  i n  w hich  I r a n  would need  t o
assume a dom inan t p o s i t i o n . 37 Tha +.,. . ,ne Shah a t t e m p te d  t o  complement
h i s  G u lf  p o l i c y  by a d o p t in g  s i m i l a r  b e h a v io u r  tow ards  t h e  s t a t e s  i n
I r a n ' s  'z o n e  o f  s e c u r i t y '  on i t s  e a s t e r n  f l a n k .  T h is  n eed s  a c l o s e r  
l o o k .
(B) I r a n - E a s t e r n  Zone
The S h a h 's  p o l i c y  b e h a v io u r  in  p u r s u i t  o f  r e g i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  
was n o t  m e re ly  aimed a t  im p ro v in g  I r a n ' s  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  Arab 
s t a t e s .  I t  a l s o  s o u g h t  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  th e  c o u n t r y ' s  t i e s  w i th  t h e  
s t a t e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  A f g h a n is t a n ,  P a k i s t a n ,  and I n d i a ,  which formed 
w hat t h e  Shah r e g a r d e d  as I r a n ' s  ' e a s t e r n  s e c u r i t y  z o n e ' be tw een  th e  
S o v i e t  Union and t h e  I n d i a n  Ocean. The I r a n i a n  l e a d e r ' s  s e a r c h  f o r  
i n c r e a s i n g  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i th  t h e s e  s t a t e s  was m o t iv a t e d  by p o l i t i c a l  
and econom ic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  s i m i l a r  t o  th o s e  which had p rom pted  him 
t o  se e k  b e t t e r  t i e s  w i t h  th e  Arab s t a t e s .  I n  t h i s ,  how ever ,  he 
had  t o  d e a l  w i th  a d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  r e g i o n a l  f a c t o r s  w i t h i n  d i f f e r e n t  
g e o g r a p h i c a l  p a r a m e t e r s .  As was o u t l i n e d  i n C h a p te r  V I, th e  m ost 
im p o r ta n t  o f  t h e s e  f a c t o r s ,  as p e r c e i v e d  by T e h ra n ,  i n c lu d e d :
(1) th e  I r a n i a n - P a k i s t a n i  fo rm a l  a l l i a n c e ;  (2) P a k i s t a n ' s  
c h r o n i c  d o m e s t ic  i n s t a b i l i t y  and i t s  i n a b i l i t y  e i t h e r  t o  a v o id  
dismemberment i n  1971 o r  t o  s o lv e  i t s  p rob lem  o f  B a lu c h i - P u s h tu n  
movements; (3) A f g h a n - P a k i s t a n i  and I n d i a n - P a k i s t a n i  d i s p u t e s  o v e r
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Pushtunistan and Kashmir respectively; (4) Afghan-Soviet-Indian 
friendship (at least until the change of government in India in 
early 1977) and the Soviet interest in securing a direct access to the 
Indian Ocean; and (5) India's growing economic and military 
strength as an Indian Ocean power, which had expanding ties with the 
Arab world and an interest in securing some stake in the wealth of 
the Persian Gulf.
In effect, all these factors were in opposition to the Shah's 
search for a status as a regional power. Therefore, he adopted a 
policy which largely aimed to: (i) keep Iran's alliance with Pakistan
alive and support the country to strengthen its domestic stability and 
prevent its further dismemberment; (ii) check the Soviet
influence m  the zone by seeking to reduce Afghan and Indian dependence 
on Soviet economic aid; (iii) restrain the disputes between Pakistan 
and its neighbours from causing security problems for Iran; (iv) 
undercut Indian ambitions to gain influence in the Persian Gulf at the 
cost of Iran's interests; (v) ensure the safeguarding of Indian 
Ocean approaches to the Persian Gulf and the Iranian sea lanes in the 
Ocean for expanding trade with South-East Asian, Far Eastern, 
Australasian and African countries as well as other parts of the 
world; and yet (vi) increase Iran's access to the markets as well 
as the mineral, agricultural, technological, and industrial resources 
of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and through them to other regional 
countries in support of the growing Iranian resources capability.39 
In order to achieve these regional objectives against the above set of 
conflicting regional factors, the Shah found it not only desirable but 
also necessary to win the friendship and cooperation of the three
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countries concerned at political, economic and, possibly, defence 
levels. In this, the Shah made extensive use of resources diplomacy, 
based largely on Iran's oil and financial strength, to which the 
concerned countries have been very receptive for their own socio­
economic development. He endeavoured to effectuate his policy for 
further cooperation between Iran and its three eastern neighbouring 
countries mainly through seeking to: (1) settle the major political
and territorial differences between Iran and them amicably; (2) 
mediate in order to settle the Afghan-Pakistani and Indian-Pakistani 
disputes; and (3) expand economic ties between Iran and the three 
countries, involving a considerable amount of capital aid and investment 
by the former to the latter. To illustrate this, it is necessary 
to cite a few major examples briefly.
In the first case, a major and long-standing difference between
Iran and Afghanistan, before the 1970s, was over the distribution of
water from the Helmand river, which rises in central Afghanistan and
flows into south-eastern Iran. After discussions in 1972,
however, Tehran agreed that Afghanistan was entitled to take a greater
proportion of the river's water in years of low flow --  a condition
which Tehran had rejected in the past. Consequently, the two
countries concluded an agreement in March 1973, whereby the Helmand
river problem was settled amicably and a major constraining factor
40in Afghan-Iranian relations was removed. Similarly, Tehran
attempted to resolve its political differences with India over 
Iran's traditional support for Pakistan over Kashmir. It did so, 
by refraining from making public statements on the issue in support 
of Pakistan from the second half of the 1960s, and giving combat
2 4 9 .
41s u p p o r t  t o  P a k i s t a n  d u r i n g  t h e  I n d o - P a k i s t a n i  w a r  i n  1971.
I n  t h e  s e c o n d  c a s e ,  t h e  S h a h ' s  i n t e r e s t  an d  r o l e  i n  m e d i a t i n g
t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  a  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  A f g h a n - P a k i s t a n i  and I n d i a n - P a k i s t a n i
d i s p u t e s  d a t e  b a c k  t o  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 s .  He p l a y e d  a c r u c i a l  r o l e  i n
t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  A f g h a n i s t a n  and
P a k i s t a n  i n  1963 ( t h e y  h a d  b e e n  b r o k e n  o f f  two y e a r s  e a r l i e r  o v e r  t h e
i s s u e  o f  P u s h t u n i s t a n )  and o p e n i n g  a  d i a l o g u e  b e t w e e n  t h e  two s i d e s
42t o  r e s o l v e  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  p e a c e f u l l y .  I t  was t h i s  s t a r t  w h ic h
e v e n t u a l l y  l e d  t o  t h e  e x c h a n g e  o f  o f f i c i a l  v i s i t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  t h e n
King Z a h i r  o f  A f g h a n i s t a n  and P r e s i d e n t  Ayoob o f  P a k i s t a n  i n  1966 an d
an  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e  two s i d e s  n o t  t o  l e t  t h e  P u s h t u n i s t a n
43i s s u e  u n d e r m i n e  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  B u t  w i t h  t h e  ch a n g e  o f  r e g i m e
i n  A f g h a n i s t a n  i n  J u l y  197 3 ,  P r e s i d e n t  Mohammed Daoud,  a s t r o n g
s u p p o r t e r  o f  t h e  P u s h t u n i s t a n  c l a i m  d u r i n g  h i s  p r i m e  m i n i s t e r s h i p
( 1 9 5 3 - 1 9 6 3 )  , s i n g l e d  o u t  P a k i s t a n  a s  t h e  o n l y  c o u n t r y  w i t h  w h ich
A f g h a n i s t a n  h a d  a m a j o r  p o l i t i c a l  d i s p u t e  an d  d e c l a r e d  h i s  r e g i m e ' s
f u l l  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  P u s h t u n i s t a n  f o r
44
" s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n " .  T h i s  r e s u l t e d  i n  an i n c r e a s e  i n  Afghan
f i n a n c i a l  an d  m i l i t a r y  a i d  t o  t h e  P u s h t u n - B a l u c h i  movement  f o r  more
au tono my i n  t h e  N o r t h - W e s t  F r o n t i e r s  and t h e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  r e l a t i o n s ,
45w i t h  b o r d e r  s k i r m i s h e s ,  b e t w e e n  A f g h a n i s t a n  an d  P a k i s t a n .  T h i s
a l a r m e d  t h e  S h a h ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  i n  t h e  wake o f  i n i t i a l  w i d e s p r e a d  
s p e c u l a t i o n  t h a t  Moscow was b e h i n d  t h e  coup  i n  K a b u l .  He p r o m p t l y  
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  I r a n  w ou ld  n o t  t o l e r a t e  any f u r t h e r  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  
P a k i s t a n  a f t e r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  B a n g l a d e s h .  M o r e o v e r ,  h e  p r o m i s e d  
t o  h e l p  B h u t t o ' s  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  s u p p r e s s  B a l u c h i  and P u s h t u n  s e c e s s i o n i s t  
a c t i v i t i e s  a n d ,  i n  t h i s ,  he  was a l s o  d e e p l y  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  e f f e c t
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of such activities on the Baluchi population of Iran.46 However, 
once the Shah was assured of Daoud's determination to continue the 
traditional Afghan policy of non-alighnment, his pledge to honour the 
Helmand agreement of March 1973, and his desire to strengthen Afghanistan's 
friendly relations with Iran, he re-embarked on a mediating role in 
urging Kabul and Islamabad to negotiate their differences. In support 
of this, he promised a considerable amount of capital aid and investment 
to both sides as well as access to Bandar Abbas and chah Bahar ports 
on the Persian Gulf for Afghanistan.47 Thus, he made a major 
contribution to the resumption of talks between Kabul and Islamabad, 
which eventually led to direct discussions between Daoud and Bhutto 
m  1976' Although the problem of Pushtunistan still remained 
unresolved, the two leaders agreed to pursue peaceful negotiations 
and improve their relations in their mutual interests.48 As a 
result, the Shah's anxiety was reduced.
In a similar fashion, the Shah consistently stressed negotiation 
as against confrontation as the only way to resolve the Indo- 
Pakistani disputes. He offered mediation between the two sides 
several times. Although during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, Iran 
supported Pakistan's "just" claim over Kashmir, it confined this support 
to political statements and limited logistic, but extensive relief,
a . 49
Following the war, he offered to mediate and urged both 
sides during separate visits to Islamabad and New Delhi to settle 
their differences peacefully. In the late 1960s, Tehran 
transferred to Pakistan a number of Sabre fighters, which were reportedly 
used against India in the war of 1971. But during the war, the Shah
followed his past policy of non military involvement in support of
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Pakistan. Subsequently, he contributed importantly to bringing about 
the Simla "Peace summit" between Bhutto and Mrs Gandhi in 1973.
He regarded the Simla settlement as the most welcome step in creating 
peace and normalising the situation in a zone which was of great 
significance to the Iranian regional security and stability.50
In the third and most important case, the Shah's search to strengthen 
economic ties with the countries concerned involved the Iranian promise 
and offer of oil at discount prices in the wake of the rising oil 
prices as well as sizable capital aid and investment for joint ventures 
and in support of the development process of each individual country.
During the 1960s, despite Iran's formal alliance with Pakistan and its 
political consequences, its economic relationship with the three 
countries concerned experienced a steady expansion. With Pakistan, 
tms took place largely within the framework of Regional Cooperation 
for Development (RCD), but with Afghanistan and India on a bilateral 
basis. Between 1965 and 1970, the volume of Iran's trade with 
Afghanistan was not much less than that with Pakistan and with India 
it was five times greater51 Although during the same period, Iran was 
largely a junior partner in RCD in comparison with the more industrially 
advanced Turkey and Pakistan, its economic relationship with India 
increased significantly and this was exemplified by the joint Indian- 
Iranian development of the Madras Refinery in India. The economic 
relationship, however, between Iran and the three countries entered 
its most expansionist phase in the early 1970s with the sudden 
rise of Iran as a financial power. In view of his political and 
economic aspirations and the growing need of Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
India for cheap oil and increasing capital, the Shah after 1973 promptly
252.
made generous offers of oil at discount prices as well as capital aid 
and investment to the countries concerned.
During 1974-75, Tehran reportedly promised Afghanistan about
$2 billion aid, committed itself to $647 million for Pakistan, and
52extended $133 million to India, particularly for joint ventures.
The overall Iranian commitment included up to 1978 actual or potential
participation in: a number of agricultural and industrial projects
in the Afghan provinces of Herat and Kandahar, near the Iranian border,
53and the Hajigak iron ore mine, north of Kabul; petrochemicals and
54ship-building in Pakistan; and in India a refinery at Madras, an
iron ore mine at Kurdramukh, and an irrigation canal, helping grow
55foodgrain in the Rajasthan Desert. Moreover, the promised
Iranian aid to Afghanistan was to finance the first Afghan railway,
joining the country with the Iranian railways in the West and the
Pakistani railways in the east. This meant that upon the completion
of the Afghan railway by 1983 as planned, Iran and its major ports
on the Persian Gulf would be directly connected overland not only
with Afghanistan but also Pakistan and India --  an important substitute
56for the unrealised ECAFE Highway. In return, Tehran sought both
economic and political gains. At the economic level, it endeavoured
(1) to widen its access to the markets and resources, in terms of
industrial raw materials, particularly iron ore, agricultural products,
technology and trained manpower, of the countries concerned, among which
India ranked high in the Shah's priorities; and (2) to use these
countries as an outlet to several other "riparian states" of the Indian
Ocean, such as Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore,
as well as Australia. 57
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At the political level, it was Tehran's objective to: (i)
reduce Afghan and Indian dependence on Soviet aid and stimulate the 
two countries to lean more towards the West, respect the territorial 
integrity and stability of Pakistan, and, together with the latter, 
cooperate with Iran against regional 'subversion'; and (ii) secure 
the approval of the three states for the Shah's Persian Gulf policy 
and his concern for the safety of the Indian Ocean against what the 
Shah saw as Soviet 'penetration' and local 'subversion'. Although 
Prime Minister Bhutto and President Daoud, during separate visits to 
Tehran in 1974 and 1975 respectively, endorsed the Shah's Gulf 
policy indirectly and supported him in his view that the Persian 
Gulf and Indian Ocean should be declared a 'nuclear-free peace zone',58 
Mrs Gandhi, during her visit to Tehran in 1974, avoided giving her 
approval in these respects except that she agreed with the Shah on the 
question of a 'peace zone'.59 Mrs Gandhi's reluctance stemmed largely
from India's growing fear of the Shah's military build-up and his 
aspirations towards the Indian Ocean, on the one hand, and her 
country's friendship with the Soviet Union, on the other. Her successor 
Morarji Desai, did not go much further than Mrs Gandhi in his approval 
of the Shah's policies, though the Indian president during the Shah's 
visit to India in early 1978 asserted that "... a constructive 
relationship [between Iran and India] based on political understanding 
and enriched with eonomic cooperation would make for real stability 
and lasting tranquility in our region".60
In order to establish a structure for his policy of regional 
cooperation in support of Iran's role as a regional power, the Shah 
proposed the formation of a "regional common market". He first put
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forward this proposal for an Indian Ocean economic union in 1974. it
was to include not only Iran and the countries of the Indo-Pakistan
subcontinent but also several other states of the Indian Ocean, namely
Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Australia.^ The idea,
however, was rejected at that time by India on the ground that it would
be dominated by Australia. The Shah, however, revived his proposal
during his visit to New Delhi in early 1978 without including Australia 
• 62m  the scheme. India in principle agreed with the new proposal, 
but it was rejected by Pakistan on the grounds that "... the 
setting up of the common market at this stage by the countries having 
erent economic patterns will [not] serve any useful purpose". 
Nevertheless, the Shah was anxious to see the establishment of such 
a scheme, as an extension of RCD, in which Iran would have a dominant 
role, as soon as possible. For this purpose, the Iranian Foreign 
Minister Abbas Ali Khalatbari declared after a meeting of RCD, in 
June 1977, that Iran would welcome "with open arms" requests by regional 
countries to join Regional Development for Cooperation.^^ The 
Shah's proposal of this 'regional common market' was closely linked with 
his proposal for similar economic and defence schemes for the Persian 
Gulf. if realised, these schemes would have provided the necessary 
mechanisms within which the Shah would have sought regional legitimacy 
and support not only for his political and economic aspirations but 
also for another major aspect of his regional behaviour: Iranian
military intervention against regional 'subversion'.
(11) "Anti-Subversion"
Intertwined with regional cooperation was another aspect of the
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Shah's regional policy behaviour which may be identified as "anti­
subversion". The Shah persistently sought to combat what he called
"... the forces of subversion, destruction, sedition and treason"
64not only inside Iran but also in the Iranian region. He was
always very broad and subjective in defining these forces and as a
result, he maximised his discretionary power in identifying and
categorising such forces. It is not, however, the purpose of this
thesis to evaluate the validity of the Shah's underlying values and
reasons for what constitute 'subversion' as against an action for a
legitimate cause. It suffices to stress that, as it appeared from
the Shah's talks and responses, the forces concerned generally
included all those who opposed, either in part or whole, the Shah's
rule and his domestic and foreign policy objectives, whether for
pragmatic or ideological or religious reasons, and which indulged in such
actions which might have appeared to threaten his regime and run contrary
to his objectives and perception of Iran's national security and
interests. Consequently, these forces, on the political spectrum,
ranged from nationalist critics and religious extremists to Arab and
Marxist revolutionaries (some of whom may have been both Arab and Marxist).
The Shah branded these forces as "Marxist", "Islamic-Marxist" or
"terrorist" and their actions against his regime, whether direct or
indirect, as "terrorism". He claimed that communism was outlawed
in Iran and there was no place for the activities of these forces in
Iranian politics. It was, consequently, his regime's national duty
to contain and possibly eliminate such forces not only in Iran but
also in its region, south of the Soviet borders, as well as opposing
65them at the international level.
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I n  t h i s ,  t h e  Shah s o u g h t  t o  a c h i e v e  t h r e e  m a j o r  r e g i o n a l  
o b j e c t i v e s :  ( i )  t o  weaken  t h e  r e g i o n a l  b a s e s  o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  
o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  i n s i d e  I r a n ;  ( i i )  t o  immunise  t h e  I r a n i a n  o i l  
i n d u s t r y  i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  s e a - l a n e s ,  and e x p a n d i n g  r e g i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
an d  e c o n o m ic  i n t e r e s t s  a g a i n s t  h o s t i l e  a c t i o n s  by t h e  f o r c e s  c o n c e r n e d ;  
an d  ( ü i )  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  r e g i o n a l  c o n s e r v a t i v e  f o r c e s  an d  b o o s t  
I r a n ' s  s e a r c h  f o r  r e g i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
p o s i t i o n  a s  a r e g i o n a l  p o w e r .  The S h a h ,  h o w e v e r ,  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h i s  
a n t i - s u b v e r s i o n / c o m m u n i s t  a s p e c t  o f  h i s .  r e g i o n a l  b e h a v i o u r  d i d  n o t  
h a v e  t o  r e s t r a i n  I r a n  f r om  d e v e l o p i n g  f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  
S o v i e t  G o v e rn m en t  o r  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r  any o t h e r  g o v e r n m e n t  w h ich  
s u p p o r t e d  S o v i e t  o r  com m unis t  i n s p i r e d  g r o u p s  an d  d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  t h e  
I r a n i a n  r e g i o n .  He s a i d :  " t h e  R u s s i a n  G o v e rn m en t  i s  one  t h i n g  and
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Communis t  P a r t y  i s  a n o t h e r .  T h a t  i s  why we h a v e  
c o r d i a l  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  USSR, b u t  f i g h t  communism a t  h o m e " . 66 
The ' s u b v e r s i v e / c o m m u n i s t '  f o r c e s ,  w h ic h  t h e  Shah saw a s  m o s t  d a n g e r o u s  
r e g i o n a l l y ,  m a i n l y  i n c l u d e d  t h e  P o p u l a r  F r o n t  f o r  t h e  L i b e r a t i o n  o f  
Oman, t h e  M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  G o v e rn m en t  i n  t h e  P e o p l e ' s  D e m o c r a t i c  
R e p u b l i c  o f  Yemen, and t h e  P o p u l a r  F r o n t  f o r  t h e  L i b e r a t i o n  o f  
B a l u c h i s t a n .  T h e s e  f o r c e s  w e r e  s u p p o r t e d ,  i n  one  way o r  o t h e r ,  by  
t h e  r a d i c a l  Arab  c o u n t r i e s  o f  I r a q ,  S y r i a  an d  L i b y a ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
USSR an d  C h i n a ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  C h i n a  c h a n g e d  d r a m a t i c a l l y  a f t e r  
1974 m  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  Shah a g a i n s t  S o v i e t  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  r e g i o n .
The r e c e n t l y  e m e r g e d ,  S o v i e t  b a c k e d ,  M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  
E t h i o p i a  was r e c e n t l y  a d d e d  t o  t h e  l i s t  o f  t h e  f o r c e s  c o n c e r n e d  67
The Shah s o u g h t  t o  e n f o r c e  h i s  a n t i - s u b v e r s i o n  p o l i c y  w i t h  
s a n c t i o n s  f r o m ,  and i n  s u p p o r t  o f ,  h i s  p o l i c y  o f  r e g i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n .
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He used the latter to build up a regional consensus and cooperation as 
a means to gain regional legitimacy for the former. In this, he 
attempted to exploit the anti-radical attitude of the conservative 
and moderate states, particularly in the Persian Gulf, which also 
felt threatened by what the Shah referred to as 'forces of subversion'. 
The Shah's proposals concerning the need for the formation of a regional 
'common market' and 'collective security' aimed at achieving, among 
other political and economic objectives, a structural framework 
whereby Iran could be provided with a 'carte blanche' for intervention 
in its region in the pursuit of the Shah's anti-subversion policy. 
Similarly, the latter policy was used to: (i) prevent the "subversive
forces" from not only threatening Iran and its regional interests, 
but also weakening the regional status quo and the Shah's policy of 
regional cooperation; and (ii) justify the continuous Iranian 
military build-up. Although the Shah, up to 1978, attempted to 
enforce his anti-subversion policy largely by acting upon formal 
requests from 'friendly' governments, except in the case of the 
Iranian support for Kurds against Baghdad Government and Iran's 
military takeover of Tumbs in the Persian Gulf in 1971, he made it 
clear that, should he deem it necessary, he would not be restrained by 
the lack of such a request. In an interview in January 1974, in a 
reply to a question about what Iran would do if one of the Persian 
Gulf Sheikdoms were occupied by an extremist force, the Shah said:
Its very difficult to envisage it if [we] were not asked to 
intervene by these countries themselves. I have proposed a 
regional pact, an agreement, a treaty ... for the security of 
iis region So far we [have] got no answer. The entrance of 
the Persian Gulf is a question of life and death for us. To 
keep it open, with or without the cooperation of others, is 
nother answer to your question why do we spend money on defence.
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From the beginning of the 1970s, the Shah's anti-subversion
actions intensified largely in parallel to the increasing Iranian 
resources capability. They resulted in a number of limited Iranian 
regional military actions, both direct and indirect. The direct form
involved the deployment of the Iranian combat troops; and the indirect 
form mainly concerned Iranian military aid, without combat troops, 
to 'friendly' governments. The best examples of the first were: 
the Iranian military occupation, in November 1971, of the small islands 
of Greater and Lesser Tumbs; and the deployment of the Iranian forces 
m  the Sultanate of Oman since 1973. Iran carried out both its 
military actions primarily in order to strengthen the conservative 
status quo and safeguard the entrance of the Persian Gulf and the 
Iranian coastline industries and ports against the so-called forces 
of subversion, particularly the PFLOAG. Tehran had made a traditional 
claim over the strategic islands of Abu Musa and Tumbs. As for Abu
Musa, Tehran reached an accord with the Sheikdom of Sharjah, which 
agreed to the extension of Iranian control over the island, in return 
for some political and economic rewards, before the British departure 
from the Gulf. But in the case of Tumbs, Tehran failed to reach
an agreement with Ras al Khaimah. As it considered its control of 
the islands to be a matter of necessity, Tehran declared that 
with the impending departure of the British from the 
Gulf, the return of the islands was imperative to 
Iran's security, since they commanded the entrance to the Persian
r le 70ulf . Consequently, Tehran resorted to its military power and
occupied the islands forcibly, involving some fatal casualties on 
both sides, just prior to the British departure. The direct Iranian
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military action, the first of its kind, took place largely in the
wake of the Shah's fear that the failure of Iran to take over the
Tumbs then could easily have resulted in their domination by the
Soviet backed "subversive" Arab forces, of which PFLOAG had, by now,
71caused a great deal of anxiety for the Shah.
The PFLOAG, by 1971, had become fully operative in a "people's 
war" in the Omani southern province of Dhofar against the Sultan 
Qaboos' regime. The initial successes of the PFLOAG in extending its
>
control over Dhofar had gravely concerned not only Sultan Qaboos and
other conservative Arab governments in the Gulf, but also the Shah,
particularly in the light of increasing guerrilla activities inside
Iran by certain radical groups, which the Shah since called "Islamic- 
72Marxists". Consequently, upon a request from Sultan Qaboos, the
Shah joined Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Britain in sending military
aid to the Omani Government in early 1972. Within two years of
this, as the overall military capability of Iran was growing fast,
Tehran deployed about 2,000-3,000 of its special counter-insurgency
forces, backed by fighter-bombers, heavy artillery and helicopter
troop carriers, against the PFLOAG in Oman. The Iranian forces
operated independent of the Omani forces and they formed the largest
foreign force on Omani soil. They started their major offensives
in December 1973 and played a decisive role in weakening the stronghold
73of the PFLOAG in Dhofar. As a result, on December 12, 1975, Sultan
74Qaboos declared "the final destruction" of the PFLOAG. This
declaration was, however, premature to an extent; the PFLOAG continued 
its activities at least until 1977 and the Iranian troops were still in
Oman in 1978. Nonetheless, the Shah succeeded in winning the friendship
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of Sultan Qaboos as a close ally, who praised the Shah for his
"heroic role" in defending Oman against the "Communist-backed rebels"
and committed his regime to work together with Iran in order to ensure
75the stability and security of the Persian Gulf. In line with his
aid to the Muscat Government, the Shah declared Iran's readiness 
"... to assist any Persian Gulf country needing and requesting it
—j r
to maintain its security and stability". Of course he also made it
ci^^r that such Iranian assistance was also available to 'friendly' 
governments beyond the Gulf. Consequently, he gave military aid to 
the Pakistani and Somali Governments against the Baluchi Popular 
Front for Armed Resistance and the Ethiopian Marxist—Leninist Government 
respectively.
Iranian aid, without combat troops, to these two governments 
provide the best examples of the country's indirect regional military 
actions. In the case of Pakistan, the aid took place largely during 
1973-1975, when the Baluchi Popular Front stepped up its activities 
against Bhutto's Government. The Front, which reportedly commanded 
6,000 to 8,000 men, received support not only from the Pakistan's 
national Opposition Party, the North-West Frontier Province-based 
National Awami League, but also from Afghanistan, Iraq, PDRY, PFLOAG, 
and the Soviet Union. The Iranian military aid to Islamabad included 
the loan of 10 helicopter gunships and heavy logistic support against 
the guerrillas as well as acting against them directly whenever 
they tried to seek sanction among the Iranian Baluchies.77 in the
case of Somalia, the Iranian military aid to the government of Mohammed 
Siad Barre reportedly began in late 1977. it took place in the light 
of a number of rapid developments in the Horn of Africa since 1974.
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Before the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie's traditional regime and 
its eventual replacement by a Soviet backed Marxist-Leninist government, 
close ties of imperial comradeship existed between the Shah and 
Seiassie. Also Somalia's growing ties with the Soviet Union and 
radical Arab states and its revolutionary pronouncements under 
President Barre had become a source of worry for the Shah. However, 
the rise of the Soviet backed regime of Mengistu in Addis Ababa in 
1974, the development of a rift between Somalia and the Soviet Union, 
which became apparent as early as 1976, and the subsequent conflict 
between Somalia and Ethiopia resulted in a dramatic change from a 
Soviet-Somali to a Soviet-Ethiopian alliance. This changed the 
general situation in the Horn of Africa and President Barre appealed to 
tne West, the Arab world and Iran for military and economic support 
to compensate for the loss of Soviet aid in favour of Ethiopia and to 
strengthen his country's position in its conflict with the Soviet and
Cuban backed government of Ethiopia. In a common anti-Soviet/communist 
cause, the Shah joined the conservative-moderate Arab states, led by 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt in granting extensive military aid to Somalia 
against Ethiopia. By February 1978, Iran emerged as the major 
military aid donor to Somalia. Its aid during the first quarter of 
1978, was reported to consist of over ten shipments of mortars, heavy 
artillery ammunition and ground-to-air missiles as well as personnel.78 
Tehran, however, claimed only the shipment of "light arms" and denied any 
involvement of Iranian personnel in Somalia.79 The sudden growth of 
closer ties between Iran and Somalia was highlighted by Barre's
official visit to Tehran in December 1977. while the Somalian president 
praised the Iranian foreign policy position as "positive", deserving 
his "commendation", the Shah respected his former adversary as an
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outstanding personality" and promised Iranian aid to Somalia against 
the Ethiopian subversion. Both leaders agreed "on the need for the 
Indian Ocean to remain stable and secure". The Shah regarded the 
security of the Indian Ocean from communism/subversion as vital to 
Iran's sea-lanes and stability of the Persian Gulf.80 For this 
reason the Horn of Africa figured prominently in the Shah's overall 
security considerations; consequently, Barre's friendship was very 
important to the Shah in terms of his regional political-military 
and economic objectives.
It was remarkable that up to 1978 the Shah had managed the anti­
subversion aspect of his regional policy behaviour with a great deal 
of independence and self-interest. The general regional reaction 
was watchful and cautious about his actions and none of the regional 
states, including Iraq, PDRY, and the Soviet Union, had succeeded 
in deterring him from indulging in military actions as freely as he 
had. Even m  the case of the Iranian military takeover of Tumbs, 
the regional (particularly Arab) reaction was at the political level. 
While the conservative Arab states and Egypt expressed their guarded 
verbal disapproval of the Iranian action and the Soviet Union maintained 
silence, Iraq and Libya retaliated by breaking off diplomatic relations 
with Iran and nationalising the British share in their oil industries 
for what they called the "Iranian-British collusion" against the Arabs. 
They suspected London to have been behind the Iranian takeover.81 
There were, however, several other factors which helped the Shah in 
his behaviour. They included: the increasing Iranian resources
capability; the rapid changes in the regional political and economic 
situation; and, above all, the Shah's policy of regional cooperation
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as well as the changing international environment. The latter will be 
looked at in the conclusion of this thesis. All this, however, does 
not negate the fact that the Shah's whole process of turning Iran 
into a guardian and deterrent regional power also had serious 
repeicussions for both Iran and its region and both his domestic 
and regional policies were self-defeating in many ways. This, however, 
forms the subject-matter of the next chapter.
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Chapter IX
Repercussions of the Shah's Policies
There is no doubt that, particularly since the start of the 
1970s, the Shah's efforts in realising Iran's potential as an oil- 
based power and using this potential to maximise the Iranian economic 
and military capabilities in conjunction with a regional policy 
emphasising cooperation' and 'anti—subversion' were effective in 
enabling Iran to appear and act as a powerful and influential state 
in its region. In terms of its national growth, economic-industrial 
and military input, trade, aid and investment in countries of the 
region as well as diplomatic and military activities, Iran stood out 
impressively in its region. In these areas, it achieved a capacity 
to strengthen its bargaining position in the conduct of its regional 
relations, winning friends and pursuing a resolute stand against what 
the Shah regarded as 'subversive/communist' forces. Consequently, the 
Shah undeniably made some progress in the pursuit of his objective 
of strengthening and exerting Iran's position as an anti-Communist 
pro-Western power in its region. But this progress failed to 
transform Iran into a self-generating industrial and military power as 
promised by the Shah. In fact, the Shah's economic, military and 
regional policies suffered in many respects from the lack of a sound base 
as well as self-generating potential. They were not only 
unsuccessful in fulfilling their original objectives as planned but 
also caused serious tensions within Iran and its region. This was 
largely because the policies were, on the one hand, over-ambitious 
in their objectives poorly planned, badly coordinated and mismanaged;
j ~
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and, on the other hand, based on a frail domestic political structure. 
While it falls outside the scope of this thesis to evaluate the domestic 
implications of the policies, the remainder of this chapter will 
examine them critically in terms of their major regional repercussions. 
We shall, however, first look at the Shah's economic and military 
policies and then draw their implications in conjunction with the 
Shah's regional behaviour for Iran's regional standing.
As discussed in Chapter VII, the Shah promptly magnified the 
scope and accelerated the implementation of his economic and military 
policies during 1971-75 mainly in the light of the increases in Iran's 
oil revenue and on the basis of an understanding that such revenue 
increases would to some extent continue for at least the next decade.
He declared that the overriding objective of his policies was to 
transform Iran into a non-oil self-generating industrial and military 
power by the mid-1980s. To achieve this, he directed his policies 
towards extensive and rapid industrialisation and militarisation of 
Iran largely through the implementation of capital-intensive and 
technologically advanced programmes. Needless to say, it was obvious, 
at the time, to the Iranian planners that the achievement of the Shah's 
objective within the given period of time was beyond Iran's non-capital 
and non-foreign exchange resources in relation to trained manpower, 
managerial ability, technological know-how, industrial innovations and 
techniques and infrastructural, administrative, and social capabilities. 
Bat it was assumed that, given the availability of and continuous rise 
in the financial and foreign exchange resources from oil, Iran's 
limitations in the above areas could be overcome by adopting a policy 
of reliance on imports. This policy was to be phased out gradually
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as Iran continued to build its own self-generating capability.
As a result, at a very high capital cost, Iran embarked on massive 
importation of highly advanced capital goods, including arms, technology, 
expertise and, to an extent, trained labour force in support of a 
rapid economic-industrial and military build-up. Meanwhile, it 
envisaged a number of measures to improve Iranian administrative 
efficiency, infrastructural capacity and social services, which were 
contained in the revised Fifth Development Plan.
While encouraging both domestic and foreign/private participation 
in the Iranian capitalist-oriented economic expansion, particularly 
in the industrial sector, and calling for more social equality under the 
Fifth Plan, the Shah's economic policy still essentially remained 
heavily centralised: it aimed largely at economic growth rather than
economic development. Under the Fifth Plan, the 'social services' 
sector, including education, was still given a low priority. Of 
the total Government allocation only 21 percent was projected for
social affairs' as against 34.2 and 31.5 percent for economic and
2defence affairs respectively. However, as an official Iranian
source stated: given the nature of his rule, the Shah could not afford
a more decentralised policy of economic development; he could not 
handle more extensive socio-political reforms, including redistribution 
of wealth, than what he had already instituted, in order to further 
the social and political opportunities for the Iranian people in 
all parts of the social and political spectrum. This was despite
warnings by some of his advisors that such reforms were basic to a 
successful and efficient implementation of his economic-industrial
4and military plans.
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Consequently,the Shah's overall policies of accelerated economic- 
industrial and military build-up soon proved to be beyond Iran's 
capacity to absorb at the rate envisaged by the Shah. After two
years of high government spending, heavy importation of advanced 
industrial and military capital goods, and increased foreign investment 
(particularly by multinational corporations mostly in specialised 
and capital-intensive industries, led by petrochemicals and rubber) 
by the end of 1975, Iran was confronted with a serious shortage of 
trained manpower and technological, infrastructural and administrative 
bottlenecks, as well as a spiralling inflation, a drop in its 
agricultural production and social imbalances. This also led to
an increase in corruption at all government and non-government levels 
which was traditionally endemic in Iran and was now exacerbated by 
the injection of huge sums of money into the economy.-* Since the
cities, especially Tehran, were the major centres for the sudden 
increase in capital accumulation and economic-industrial activities, 
the rural population, more rapidly than had been expected, began 
migrating to the cities in search of better employment and wages.
This resulted not only in the swelling of the population of the cities 
Tehran's population alone rose from about 2.5 million in 1970 to about 
5 million in 1977 - but also in a continuous drop in Iran's agricultural 
production relative to its rising national consumption.^ By 1978,
while the Iranian cities suffered from the acute social problems of 
over-crowding and unplanned urbanisation, the decreasing rural population 
was losing its incentive to maintain or even increase production as the 
promise of success in the cities lure more and more people away from 
the land. Thus despite the Shah's claims for successful land-reform 
and for the success of incentives designed to encourage increased
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agricultural activity, Iran, since the early 1970s had become a net
importer of livestock and agricultural goods. During 1977 alone,
Iran had to spend about $2,500 million (10 percent of its oil income)
on importing food. in the same year, it concluded an economic
agreement with Brazil so that it could trade oil for food.^ Meanwhile,
the whole process had caused a serious dichotomy in the standard of
living between the rural and urban population: in the absence of a
comprehensive wealth redistribution policy, the standard of living
of the rural masses continuously lagged behind that of their urban 
9counterparts.
In addition to his failures in halting the increasing social 
despair in the cities and the decline in agricultural production, the 
Shah failed to achieve any major increase in the output of the non-oil 
industrial sector of the economy, although he heavily stressed the 
importance of non-oil industrialisation. Although massive public and 
private investment occurred under the Fifth Plan, most of the major 
economic indicators show a relative decline in this sector. The 
economic growth rate in the 'non-oil sector' declined from 14.4 
percent in 1976/1977 to 9.4 percent in 1977/1978.10 While during
1970/1971 the sector s production made up for 48.3 percent (valued at 
over $131 million) of total Iranian non-oil exports, the corresponding 
figure for 1974/1975 was only 1.3 percent higher, that is 49.6 percent 
(valued at over $288 million at constant p r i c e s ) i n  terms of 
export-import relations, non-oil exports fell from 22 percent of 
imports in 1959 to 5 percent in 1975/1976.12 During 1974 the
non-oil exports counted only for 1.6 percent of the Iranian GNP, 
while the share of oil exports was 42.9 percent (excluding income
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13earned by foreign oil companies) and of imports was 23.7 percent.
Despite the development of modern industries, such as petrochemicals,
pharmaceuticals, rubber, electrical appliances, automobiles and transport,
and metallurgical industries, the Iranian traditional industries, led
by textiles, carpet and food packaging, still provided most of Iran's
14non-oil exports and absorbed most of the country's labour force.
This was largely because the modern industries were relatively capital-
intensive, with multinationals having important shares in them; and
multinationals were interested in those stages of production in the
industries concerned, which proved most beneficial to them. As two
writers conclude, "(b)y and large ... it seems that only the final,
or the very last few stages are undertaken in Iran. As a result, in
most cases the multinational enterprises are involved in assembly
activities, with a relatively small share of the total value added of
15the product being attributed to the Iranian econony". Even so,
the non-oil industry were heavily protected by considerable subsidies 
from the oil-sector. This meant that the products of most of the non­
oil industries had not yet been put to the full test of international 
competition and should Iran run out of oil, the country's economy 
could be left in an extremely vulnerable position. The Shah's 
efforts to maximise Iran's military capability irrespective of its 
toll on economic development were also responsible for the slow progress 
and discouraging position of the non-oil sector.
He justified his highly expensive military build-up on two major 
grounds: First he argued, the military build-up, apart from safeguarding 
Iran's sovereignty, stability, security, oil wealth and economic 
development, necessarily complemented the country's economic development
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in such areas as trained manpower, technology, know-how, and basic 
intrastructure (port and storage facilities, roads, rail networks etc.). 
Second, the high defence expenditure had not restrained Iran's 
economic development simply because the civilian sector of the economy 
could not absorb what was being spent on the defence build-up.16 
These, however, were the very grounds on which the defence build-up 
proved particularly costly to Iranian economic development.
The Shah attempted to create, along with his drive for accelerated 
industrialisation, an extremely modern military establishment. The 
US Congressional Staff Report of July 1976, saw this occurring 
"... in a country that lacks the technical, eductional and industrial 
[as well as infrastructural] base to provide the necessary trained 
personnel and management capabilities to operate such an establishment 
effectively".17 Consequently, the military sector, instead of
helping the economic sector, became locked in a serious competition 
with the latter to attract and train the limited number of highly 
skilled people and to maximise its access to and use of the country's 
limited scientific and technological skills and infrastructural 
facilities for its own success. In this, the military sector was 
helped by the priority given to it by the government.18
Moreover, the high military expenditure added significantly to 
Iran s rising inflation (about 30 percent in 1976/1977) and was at the 
cost of more rapid development of the "social sector", which was 
essential for the economic development of the country, where a 
majority of the population was still illiterate and where acute 
social inequalities and untreated diseases, particularly in the rural 
areas, were still major problems. For example, despite all the triumphant
Claims by the Government since the mid-1960s, about 60 percent of the 
Iranian people still could not read or write. This was attributed 
largely to the low government investment in education and the poor 
educational system. An official Iranian report, released in September 
1976, stated: "In the last seven years, some 3.3 percent of GNP and
6 percent of the national budget have been devoted to education.
On an average, the world's developed countries spend 7 percent of GNP 
and 25 percent of their annual budgets on education. Thus, in 
Iran, education could have enjoyed a higher priority". It complained
that from what had been invested in education, Iran had not made the 
appropriate gain. It attributed this mainly to poor educational 
management, which "lacks the desirable levels of technical, administrative 
and executive skills" and its failure to create the "right conditions".19 
Given this situation, one does not need to go into further detail to 
understand some of the major reasons for the lack of rapid improvement 
in Iran s trained manpower and socio-cultural conditions so necessary 
even for the execution of the Shah's industrial and military programmes.
Furthermore, the success of the military sector itself in meeting 
its objectives was limited in relation to its massive costs. By 
1978 many of the Shah's ambitious defence programmes had run into 
serious difficulties. This was, in turn, attributable to the lack of 
sufficient progress in the economic-industrial and social sectors.
The US Congressional Staff Report of July 1976 concluded that, in 
implementing the Shah's military programmes, Iran definitely lacked 
not only the necessary technical, educational and industrial base but 
also the needed "... experience in logistic and support operations and 
[it] does not have the maintenance capabilities, the infrastructure
• r
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and the construction capacity to implement its new programs independent 
of outside support". Moreover, it stated:
Most informed observers feel that Iran will not be able to 
absorb and operate within the next five to ten years a large 
proportion of the sophisticated military systems purchased from 
the US unless increasing numbers of American personnel go to 
Iran in a support capacity. This support, alone, may not be 
sufficient to guarantee success for the Iranian program:
The schedule for virtually every major program except equipment 
deliveries to the point of entry into Iran has slipped 
considerably due to the limitations noted above;2!
All these factors cast serious doubts on the Shah's claim that, as a 
result of his massive military build-up, Iran had already achieved a 
military deterrent capability against what he perceived as direct and 
indirect threats from the Soviet Union and other radical forces of the 
region, and that, consequently, the country was marching firmly towards 
becoming a world military power by the second half of the 1980s.
This was despite the fact that on paper Iran seemed to possess an 
impressive military inventory and its limited military offensives, 
against PFLO in Oman under exceptional circumstances were fairly 
successful.
As a result, by 1977, Iran's general economic and social 
situation appeared grim. The country was beset by numerous problems, 
including spiralling inflation, increasing corruption at all levels, 
involving some members of the royal family and top government officials, 
and mounting social-economic inequalities, widening the gap not only 
between the country and the city people but also between the privileged 
and wealthy minority and the unprivileged poor majority.22 Although 
no reliable official statistics are available, by unofficial estimates 
a large elite of about 15-20 percent of the population who benefited
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most from the oil wealth, the Shah's policies and their consequent
opportunities and who formed the upper social strata, led an amazingly
lavish and extravagant Western style life; whereas the remainder, who
made up the lower social strata, lived largely in improverished
conditions in envy of those with wealth, but struggled to improve their
own social conditions and fulfil their rising expectations in whatever 
23way possible. While, however, the poor became restless with the
lack of social opportunities and the growing shortage and high cost of 
their basic needs, including food and housing, a majority of the rich 
felt increasingly frustrated with the overcrowding and increasing 
industrialisation and congestion of the cities. This was in the 
face of an imminent slow-down in the general level of economic activity, 
and the fact that the oil income was proving insufficient to finance 
the Government's lavish spending, particularly as the Shah was not 
prepared to moderate his costly military programme, as well as the 
people's growing expectations, caused the Shah not only to seek 
foreign loans, but also to force a change of cabinet. He
admitted that in the last few years, Iran's high economic growth, which 
was directed by his own policies, had caused "dislocations and backlash" 2~*
In August 1977, he replaced his trusted and longest surviving 
Prime Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, by his more technocratic and 
disciplinary Internal Affairs and Oil Minister, Jamshid Amuzegar.
The latter immediately promised to curb inflation, government excesses, 
and corruption, institute measures necessary to achieve more social 
equality and justice, and ensure a proper process of social-economic 
development in the interests of all Iranians, particularly the poor 
and unprivileged. He called on the Iranians to give up their
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"luxurious and idle living" in order to save Iran's "oil wealth"
2 6for the sake of a better future. His government undertook a
thorough review of Iran's Sixth Five-Year Development Plan, for 1978-83, 
which was supposed to have been published in October 1977. The Plan 
was considered to be creating a turning point in Iran's national 
development. In a private interview, a high level Iranian planner 
revealed as early as September 1976, that the Shah had been warned 
that unless the Government succeeded in curing Iran's social-economic
27ills under the Sixth Plan, the country faced, indeed, a bleak future.
It was, however, clear that these ills could neither be cured, 
nor prevented from expanding merely by certain social and economic 
measures alone. There was an urgent need for reforming one of their 
very important root causes: Iran's chronically frail domestic political
structure. The political system, which had been built largely to 
cater for the Shah's absolute rule, could not effectively cope with 
the capitalist oriented social and economic changes to which the Shah 
aspired. It had denied Iranians the political "safety valves" 
which were necessary in order for them to cope with these changes and 
to be able to express their consequent grievances, demands and 
frustrations openly and legally. Despite the rapid social and 
economic changes, the Shah had failed, to a large extent, to reform 
the political structure from that of the second-half of the 1960s.
The traditional institution of monarchy had not only remained 
intact as a source of legitimacy, authority and power, but had also 
strengthened its position in relation to the economic and social changes. 
In reality it ruled the country with absolute power on the basis of the 
support that it drew from the armed forces, SAVAK, the bureaucratic
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and administrative apparatus, the rising oil-based middle class and a
portion of uneducated peasants and workers, who supported the
monarchy because of their low social-economic consciousness and their
traditional loyalty to the Shah. Below the institution of the monarchy
(see Chapter IV) the political system provided for the people's
participation in the decision-making process mainly through their
election of representatives to the lower house of parliament, the
Majlis, and the execution of policies. As previously, however,
elections were largely controlled by the government and only government
parties were allowed to contest them. Until 1975, two crown
controlled parties, Iran Novin, and Murdoom, contested all elections.
The former was always the Government Party and the latter served as a
token opposition. Contrary, however, to his professed belief in 1960
that a one-party system was an absolute 'dictatorship' and 'communistic'
and not to be permitted in Iran, the Shah, early in 1975, proclaimed the
Iranian system a 'one-party system'. He merged the previous two
Parties into one and called it the 'Hezbi Rastakhiz Melli' (the National
Resurgence Party) and banned all other parties. He called upon
Iranians to join and support this party and participate in politics
through either the 'right' wing or the 'left' wing of the Party.
He called those opposing the party and its Government non-patriots and
asked them either to cease their political activities, to leave the
29country, or else’to face the penalties.
In enforcing such a centralised and absolute system, centring 
largely around his own personality, the Shah successfully drew on Iran's 
petro-dollar wealth and 'social-divisions' as well as SAVAK and its 
method of cultivating a 'politics of distrust' among the Iranian people.
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The increasing oil wealth enabled him to finance ambitious economic 
and military programmes, subsidise every basic commodity and create an 
economic atmosphere in which the Iranian people initially became 
deeply preoccupied with their own personal pecuniary gains in a 
transitional period. This consequently gave a new dimension to the 
'acquisitionary instincts' of many Iranians, who from different points 
of the social scale, interpreted everything in terms of a status 
based on wealth and widening inequality of income. The concept of 
'money' thus became the central theme of many Iranians' activities 
under 'government controlled capitalism'. In this context, Iran 
became a society dominated by complex social stratification. Within 
the 'upper', 'middle' and 'lower' classes dozens of other 'sub-classes' 
developed. The Iranian's position within this social system depended 
on his degree of attained wealth. ^ 0 This divisive social structure
was accentuated by the activities of the SAVAK, which shrewdly 
cultivated a politics of "distrust" so that the people were led to 
believe that they were being constantly watched by its numerous 
members, although the Shah claimed that the SAVAK commanded no more
O Ithan 4,000 members. All this held back even a majority of the
socio-politically conscious Iranians, let alone the uneducated masses, 
from assessing their political and social situation realistically and 
openly.
As a result, the Iranian people in general became hesitant to 
discuss the politics of their country freely and objectively and they 
displayed a remarkable 'lack of interest' in participating in politics. 
This was confirmed even by some of the findings of Rastakhiz Party.
In conducting a survey among students of universities and institutions of
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higher education in the first half of 1976, the Party found that only
5.5 percent of the students were interested in pursuing a political
career and "... thought participation in the party could lead to
dialogue and steps to find solutions for problems facing youth".
Moreover, "[o]nly 2.7 percent expected it [the Party] would provide
an opportunity to express views on national questions, 2 percent that
it would prepare them to play a role in society and 3.8 percent that
it would facilitate continuation of education or improve their material
welfare". A majority of students expressed their preference for
education or engineering as a career above all other fields. Although
the Rastakhiz Party interpreted the outcome of the survey as a
recognition by the Iranian youth of Iran's growing need for trained
personnel in more professional fields, the survey clearly manifested a
32general political apathy on the part of even educated Iranians.
This apathy seems to have been mainly a result of people's fear that 
involvement in politics could easily lead to their suppression and of 
the lack of trust both between the people and government and among the 
people themselves. In this respect, the finding of an Iranian 
Journal, cited by Marvin Zonis in 1972, remained valid until 1977:
The people ... are distrustful. If you want the truth, the 
people have lost confidence in everybody and everything ...
This distrust begins with the people themselves. People are 
no longer sure of their own ideas, beliefs, attitudes, or even 
their decisions. This distrust in oneself, gained through 
actual experience, extends naturally, to others too. They no 
longer trust anyone. They have heard so many lies, have seen so 
much creeping and crawling ... whom can they trust? The people 
do not even trust 'the people'. 33
In such a situation, the people were insecure and divided; 
but the throne managed to become more secure and stronger than ever 
before. The Shah, consequently, succeeded in enforcing his virtually
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one-man-based absolute dynastic rule by suppressing all viable 
alternatives to his regime, pressing for ambitious and rather 
unsuitable economic-industrial and military objectives without giving 
higher priority to improving the social conditions, and forcing both 
old and newly emerged socio-political and religious opposition groups 
either to join and support his system or cease to be active in 
Iranian society. Of course, in the absence of any other formal 
channels, some of the opposition groups refused to succumb to the 
Shah's pressures and opted for underground activities against his 
regime. Although these groups stepped up their activities from the 
early 1970s, in the form of urban guerrilla actions, they were, however, 
small in number and, at that time, failed to pose any serious threat 
against the sanctity and continuity of the Shah's rule.^ The
Shah simply dismissed and discredited their sporadic actions as works 
of 'Islamic-Marxist terrorists' who were sponsored by hostile outside 
forces. The degree to which the Shah centralised politics and
concentrated political and military power in his hands was obviously 
not going to help either political stability or socio-economic 
development in Iran. While the country was undergoing intense 
capitalist orientated socio-economic changes, the Shah could not 
stop the emergence of new social and economic groupings, who wanted 
to fulfil their rising expectations and channel their desires and 
grievences along broader, more flexible and different avenues of 
political participation. Nor could he control the behaviour of his 
subjects in the way he had for much longer, particularly once the 
momentum for 'pecuniary gains' in the transitional period in Iran's 
oil income and economic activity slowed down, as it did after 1977, and 
the people found the necessary opportunity to assess their social and
#
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political situation more rationally and realistically.
By 1977, amid growing economic and social difficulties, the 
political structure became a major source of worry not only for his 
advisors and foreign allies, but also the Shah himself. Under 
pressure from this, mounting foreign criticisms and President Carter's 
stress on "human rights", the Shah found it necessary to make some 
urgent moves in order to "liberalise" the political system to some 
extent. For example, he permitted a degree of guarded criticism by 
the Government controlled press, some members of the Majlis and 
certain key officials, of the Government's execution of his policies.^5 
The SAVAK was instructed not to persecute and torture dissidents to 
the extent it had previously as long as the latter's activities did 
not have the intention or the potential to cause mass uprisings.
A number of political prisoners were pardoned after they expressed 
their support publicly for the Shah's regime, and some dissidents were 
given open trials by civil courts rather than, being sentenced as 
previously by military tribunals. Moreover, a number of important
public servants were delegated sufficient authority to discharge their 
responsibilities with increased efficiency and flexibility and, 
consequently, talk about certain medium-level policies in terms of their 
own initiatives rather than those of either the Shah or his close 
colleagues. ^  The Shah's appointment of a new government under 
Amuzegar was widely regarded as a further step in his attempt to 
continue with the policy of gradual 'liberalisation'.
The Shah himself never clearly explained how far he was prepared 
to take his policy of "liberalisation", particularly in regard to his 
own position in Iranian politics. One of his close advisors, however,
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argued that the Shah had, at last, felt the necessity to disperse 
political power to the extent that his leadership would remain 
centralised but the political process underneath him would become 
decentralised enough to ensure wider public participation and 
administrative efficiency and discretion in the execution of the 
Government's policies. He elaborated further that this could 
ultimately result in the transformation of the Shah's position into 
that of a constitutional monarch. This, however, according to the 
advisor could not be achieved at least until the late 1980s. By 
this time, it would be hoped that Iranians would have achieved a 
greater degree of political maturity and preparedness to understand and 
cope with increasing democratic reforms; and that Iran would 
develop into a more socially balanced industrial society, which would 
provide an effective counter to the armed forces, so that the latter 
could be restrained from taking over political control.37
In this, however, the Shah and his advisors overestimated the 
potential of their attempts to change the political system through 
gradual liberalisation sufficiently to ensure immediate political 
stability and steady socio-economic development. They also under­
estimated the seriousness of the domestic situation, which was 
becoming explosive. Thus, the liberalisation measures soon proved 
to be very limited and too late, and consequently ineffective, 
in easing the situation. If anything, the measures opened the way, 
for the first time in 24 years of the Shah's autocratic rule, for 
the various opposition groups, which had hitherto been suppressed, to 
become vocal and rally public support against the Shah's rule. By 
early 1978 a series of demonstrations were held in the major Iranian
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cities. At first, the demonstrations were mainly spearheaded by
the Shia leaders, the Shah's major religious opponents, who had a 
firm hold over Iran's predominantly Shia Moslem population. This 
group was always a determining force in Iranian politics after the 
conversion of the country to Islam in the eight century. In modern 
times, however, they grew progressively discontented with the increasingly 
autocratic and secular pro-Western modernisation of Iran, partly under 
the Reza Shah and largely under his son. Such modernisation ran 
contrary to their values and public influence. Since they disapproved 
of the Shah's absolutism, his pro-Western behaviour, and the growing 
American influence with its social consequences in Iran during the 1950s, 
they joined many other socio-political groups in leading a violent 
popular uprising against the Shah's rule and reforms, particularly 
the land redistribution which affected their religious holdings, 
in the early 1960s. As today, their leader then was Ayattollah 
Khomeini. Although the Shah succeeded in brutally crushing the
uprising and exiling Khomeini in 1964, he failed to cut off the 
latter's ties with the Iranian masses. In fact, the act of exile 
made Khomeini a martyr and subsequently a symbol of religious-political 
opposition to the Shah's "oppressive" rule. It enabled him to 
advocate the extreme goal of overthrowing the Shah and establishing 
an Islamic republic free of what he called immoral Western influence of
O Othe Shah's so-called modernisation drive.
After 14 years in exile and his son's death at the hands of the
SAVAK, Khomeini found the right opportunity to call his followers out 
onto the streets against the Shah following the latter's liberalisation 
policy and growing socio-economic problems. Contrary to the
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expectation of the Shah and the outside world, the "religious protests" 
soon provided a cover for many secular, intellectual and ideological 
groups, including the National Front, headed now by Dr Karim 
Sanjabi and formerly led by Dr Mossadeq (but which had hitherto 
remained weak and suppressed), and the Tudeh, to come out and 
register their old and new grievances against the Shah's rule. By 
mid-1978, this developed into a nationwide anti-Shah movement, involving 
a large number of partisan and non-partisan intellectuals, students, 
professionals, public servants, government and private industrial 
workers, shopkeepers and craftsmen, as well as religious zealots.
The catch-cry of these diverse groups became "down with the Shah and 
his oppressive and corrupt rule", and "long live Khomeini, Islam, 
democracy, freedom and equality", reflecting not an alliance between 
them, but rather a coincidence of their common opposition against the 
Shah. In this, as subsequently became clear, the influential
Khomeini and his orthodox followers, who formed the Shah's religious- 
political opponents wanted an Islamic Iran, governed by Sharia 
(Islamic law), with balanced socio-economic development but free of 
foreign interference and what they regarded as the Western based 
immoral aspects of the Shah's modernisation drives. The intellectual 
and secular groups, excluding Tudeh and certain other leftists who 
were very much in the minority and aspired for a 'Marxist/Socialist' 
system in Iran, wanted a Muslim but democratic Iran with political 
freedom and civil liberties. And the poor masses wanted more
social justice and a bigger share of the oil wealth. Although the 
opposition was thus very factionalised, lacking a common platform for 
governing Iran following the Shah's departure, it maintained and
strengthened its anti-Shah unity over time irrespective of heavy human and
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material losses.^0
At first, the Shah tried to dismiss the opposition's mass protests 
as work of a minority of "religious fanatics" and "communists", 
who had joined together in a "black and red reaction" with foreign help 
against Iran's progress and independence. He considered such a 
reaction to be inevitable in the course of building a progressive and 
democratic Iran. While warning the opposition against any
excesses and ordering his security forces to contain its protests, 
he promised to persevere with his policy of gradual "liberalisation".41 
However, as it became evident that the opposition had a broad popular 
support and, consequently, its massive demonstrations and strikes were 
successfully paralysing the government machinery, essential services, 
many industrial plants and businesses and were about to be 
extended to the oil industry —  the capital backbone of the Shah's
• the Shah had to concede the fact that he was facing the worst 
crisis in the 25 years of his absolute rule. In August, he
replaced Prime Minister Amuzegar by the reconciliatory Senate 
president, Jaffer Shariff-el-Immami, who had been known for his 
religious puritanism and connections with the Shia leaders. He 
promised Islamic based reforms, freedom of the press and political 
activities, release of political prisoners, free elections with 
participation of all political parties except those serving foreign 
interests, to punish all those responsible for killings, misconduct
and corruption, and to stop government excesses and bring about more 
social equality and justice urgently. He called upon Iranians to 
unite behind him for the good of Iran. ^2 Immami immediately sought 
to appease the religious opponents and weaken the opposition by closing
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down night clubs, gambling casinos, changing the Iranian calendar from
imperial back to Islamic, abolishing the post of women affairs
minister in the cabinet and banning public drinking and all forms of 
43pornography. These concessions, however, also had their
negative effects. They were seen by many Western oriented Iranians, 
who had so far benefited from and supported the Shah's modernisation 
measures, as damaging to the course of Iran's progress and as 
threatening their interests. This made them suspicious of the 
Shah for his commitment to them.
Nonetheless, now that the opposition had broken the myth of the 
omniscience of the Shah and the invisibility of his secret police, the 
above promises and measures were incapable of reducing the public outcry. 
While the opposition rejected the concessions as insufficient and 
demanded the unconditional abdication of the Shah, and Iran's 37,000
011 workers began a partial strike, which soon developed into a 
prolonged full scale one, on 8 September, the Shah imposed martial law on
12 major Iranian cities. This marked the end of the Shah's liberalisation 
policy and made nonsense of all his promises. In the face of a 
determined and emotional opposition, the martial law only led to more 
clashes between the protestors and troops, causing hundreds of 
casualties, which in turn, increased public dislike for the Shah and 
violent protests against him. With the continuous loss of his 
credibility among the public, the Shah became increasingly dependent
on his loyal armed forces, which he had trained and equipped to protect , 
him and Iran as one, not only against a foreign enemy but also now 
against the Iranian people. While the opposition was appealing to 
the brotherhood feelings of the troops, and this was gaining the sympathy
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of some of the junior officers and conscript soldiers, if not the middle 
and high ranking officers f4the Shah finally played his long-held card 
in early November. In a desperate attempt to stop the increasing 
bloodshed and the paralysis of government and economic life to 
undermine his authority further, he put Iran under military rule, 
headed by General Ghulam Reza Azhari, replacing Shariff-el-Immami. 
Meanwhile, for the first time, he publicly admitted his past mistakes 
and excesses in both the political and the socio-economic realm.
He stressed that such mistakes, particularly political repression and 
brutality by SAVAK, would not be repeated and that all those responsible 
for this and Iran's socio-economic ills would be punished; and that the 
^l^tary Government's prime task was to restore law and order so that 
elections for a civilian government could take place early in 1979.45
With this measure the Shah, however, made yet another mistake.
As could have been expected under the existing circumstances the
military rule was not a viable alternative to a political solution to
the Iranian crisis. By imposing military rule, he in fact set
the stage for a final but bloody confrontation between his fairly
inexperienced troops, who had had no experience in handling massive
riots since 1963, and the inflamed and persistent opposition.
Consequently, while the troops dug in so as to enforce strictly military
rule, the opposition leaders, Khomeini and Dr Sanjabi, rejected the
m41itary government and ordered their followers to increase their protests 
46and strikes. Within five weeks, not only were hundreds of people
killed but also the whole Iranian economy came to a virtual halt and 
on 11th December, the opposition showed the extent of its mass support 
by drawing about two million people to a peaceful demonstration in
Tehran alone. The oil production of Iran, the world's second
largest exporting country, dropped from 6 million barrels a day early 
in the year to almost nil in December. This caused serious concern 
not only for the Shah, but also for his Western allies, who became 
extremely worried at the prospects of another oil shortage and an oil 
price rise. The crisis also caused thousands of Iranians to leave
the country and transfer massive amounts of capital to foreign banks.49
By the end of 1978, amid increasing bloodshed and strikes, the in­
effectiveness of the military government against this, and the 
opposition's persistent calls for the Shah's removal as a prior condition 
for it to form or participate in a national government, Washington, 
which had so far supported the Shah unequivocally, also began to doubt
whether the Shah could survive. On 9 December, President Carter
50expressed this publicly, and following this it was clear that
Washington had no option but to press the Shah to establish an effective
civilian government by transferring most of his absolute power to such a
government which might be sufficient to placate the opposition, and thus
51transform his position to that of a constitutional monarch. The Shah
himself, too, felt the urgency for such action. He consequently sought the 
support of his 'moderate' political opponents, led by the National 
Front, to form a government at the cost of much of his own absolute 
power. After a long search, he finally succeeded in finding Dr 
Shahpur Bakhtyar, a long-standing political opponent of the Shah and 
deputy leader of the National Frong, who agreed to form a government,
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p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  Shah t r a n s f e r  m o s t  o f  h i s  pow er t o  h i s  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
l e a v e  t h e  c o u n t r y  a t  l e a s t  t e m p o r a r i l y  an d  n e v e r  r e t u r n  a g a i n  a s  an  
a b s o l u t e  m o n a r c h . 52 O ut o f  much c h o i c e  t h e  Shah a c c e p t e d  B a k h t y a r ' s  
c o n d i t i o n s  and  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  B a k h t y a r  G o v ern m en t b y  t h e  
I r a n i a n  p a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e  S h ah ,  on  t h e  1 7 th  J a n u a r y  1 9 7 9 ,  l e f t  I r a n  f o r  
a h o l i d a y  a b r o a d .  The B a k h t y a r  g o v e rn m e n t  w a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e j e c t e d  by 
b o t h  K hom ein i an d  S a n j a b i  a s  ' i l l e g a l ' ,  f o r  i t  was fo rm e d  u n d e r  t h e  
Shah and  l a c k e d  p o p u l a r  s u p p o r t .  53 A l th o u g h  B a k h t y a r  i n i t i a l l y  h a d  
t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  h i g h e r  r a n k s  o f  t h e  a rm ed  f o r c e s ,  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  
K h o m e i n i ' s  r e t u r n  from  e x i l e  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h e  S h a h ' s  d e p a r t u r e ,  
K h o m e i n i ' s  p o p u l a r  s t r e n g t h  and  l a c k  o f  s u p p o r t  f rom  t h e  lo w e r  r a n k s  
o f  t h e  a rm ed  f o r c e s ,  t h e  B a k h t y a r  g o v e r n m e n t  c o u l d  n o t  s u r v i v e  more 
t h a n  a m o n th .  T h i s  o p en e d  t h e  way f o r  K hom ein i  t o  s e t  up h i s  p r o m i s e d  
I s l a m i c  R e p u b l i c  an d  end  t h e  2 ,5 0 0  y e a r  t r a d i t i o n  o f  m o n arch y  i n  
I r a n .  The S h a h ' s  d e p a r t u r e  may w e l l  p r o v e  t o  b e  p e r m a n e n t  and  
K hom ein i may w e l l  s u c c e e d  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  h i s  " I s l a m i c  R e p u b l i c " .
B u t  c a n  t h i s  s o l v e  t h e  I r a n i a n  c r i s i s ,  g i v e n  t h e  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  and  
ec o n o m ic  c o m p l e x i t y  an d  d i v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  I r a n i a n  s o c i e t y ?  I  s h a l l  
p u r s u e  t h i s  f u r t h e r  i n  t h e  c o n c l u d i n g  c h a p t e r .
As w e l l  a s  f a i l i n g  d o m e s t i c a l l y ,  t h e  Shah  c a n n o t  lo o k  
b a c k  and  c l a i m  much s u c c e s s  f o r  h i s  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c i e s .  On t h e
r e g i o n a l  f r o n t ,  t h e  S h a h ' s  e f f o r t s  i n  a c h i e v i n g  h i s
o b j e c t i v e s ,  ( s e e  C h a p te r  V I I I )  p r o v e d  l a r g e l y  u n s u c c e s s f u l  due n o t  
o n ly  t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  c u l t u r a l ,  r e l i g i o u s  and  p o l i t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e tw e e n  I r a n  and t h e  A rab s t a t e s  a s  w e l l  a s  I r a n  and  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  
A f g h a n i s t a n ,  P a k i s t a n ,  and  I n d i a  b u t  a l s o  t h e  S h a h ' s  p o l i c i e s
t h e m s e l v e s . I l i s  r a p i d  b u i l d - u p  o f  t h e  I r a n i a n r e s o u r c e s  c a p a b i l i t i e s
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and his search for regional stability and support for Iran's position 
as a paramount regional power had caused several regional developments 
contrary to his objectives. First, although many regional countries, 
including the conservative and moderate ones, led by Saudi Arabia and 
India, were cautious in not criticising the Shah's policies openly, 
they were extremely worried by his ambitions should they result in the 
establishment of Iranian economic and military dominance in the region. 
Consequently, most of the regional countries, while many of them 
consented to the Shah's Gulf policy and made use of his economic and, 
at times, military offers for their own national development and security, 
declined to agree with proposals concerning the formation of a regional 
'common market' and Persian Gulf 'collective security'. This certainly 
amounted to a serious setback for the Shah's ultimate goal of establishing 
the regional structure in backing the position of Iran as the type of 
regional power he envisaged.
Second, the Shah's policies aimed primarily at strengthening 
Iran's relations with the conservative and moderate states in the 
region and also at bolstering their position. It was, however, some 
of these very states which reacted sharply against the Shah's search 
for regional supremacy. They did so by intensively seeking to 
maximise their own resources (particularly military capabilities) in 
order, among other things, to counter balance the Iranian military 
build—up. In this, Saudi Arabia took the lead. Given the Saudi oil
wealth and consequent political leverage, the country's leadership had 
little difficulty in attracting Western support not only for accelerating 
its socio-economic development but also for building up its armed forces 
and equipping them with the most advanced non-nuclear weapons in the
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Western inventory. The Saudis' purchase of 60 F15 fighters, which 
was approved by the US Congress in May 1978,was the latest manifestation
Saudi military build-up also tended to lead the other smaller but oil
rich Gulf states, led by Kuwait, to strengthen their defence
capabilities and provided a source of justification for such 'radical'
countries as Iraq and PDRY to increase their defence expenditures
in order to guard themselves against possible consequences of the Iranian
military build-up. As a result, the Shah's military policy played
an important role in precipitating an intensive local arms race in the 
55Gulf region and in prompting Iran's eastern neighbours, especially
Afghanistan and India, to pay attention to their respective defence
56strengths more than ever before. A competitive arms build-up at
the cost of effective socio-economic development and political reforms 
could easily lead to instability and insecurity as well as interferences 
by outside powers in the Iranian region rather than to the reverse, 
which was what the Shah's policies supposedly sought to achieve.
Moreover, the Shah's policies and the fear of possible Iranian 
regional hegemony were apparently a major consideration in the Saudis' 
continuous attempts, particularly after 1974, to influence OPEC 
politics vis-a-vis Iranian interests. In this Riyadh drew heavily on 
two major factors. First, Iran lagged behind Saudi Arabia in both
in order to implement and keep up the momentum of his ambitious 
economic and military programmes and respond to the resultant rising 
expectations of the Iranian people and armed forces; he was therefore
of the country's determination in this respect.54 The Iranian and
Shah needed increasing oil revenue
interested in further oil price rises which needed to be undertaken
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through OPEC. Second, Saudi Arabia was the leading OPEC producer with 
the largest proven oil reserves, but, unlike Iran, it did not need 
further increases in its oil income, for its rate of earning
was already more than sufficient to finance its extensive programmes 
of national development and defence build-up and give it one of the 
world's largest surplus revenues. Consequently, in using its strong
position in OPEC, Riyadh sought to keep the primary souce (oil revenue) 
of the Shah's drive for regional paramountcy in check by striving either 
to freeze or keep, as low as possible, further oil price increases.
During 1975 and most of 1976, Riyadh resisted any major price increase.
At the OPEC Conference of December 1976, while Tehran had taken the 
lead for a crude price increase of 15 percent, Saudi Arabia firmly 
opposed such an increase and bargained for either no increase or a 
very small one. Finally, when Iran and most of the other OPEC members 
agreed on a 10 percent rise from January 1, 1977, with a further 
5 percent at mid-year, Saudi Arabia, joined only by the United Arab 
Emirates, decided to permit only a 5 percent increase in its crude 
price. Announcing the decision, the Saudi Oil Minister, Sheikh 
Yamani, also stressed that his country was planning to increase its 
output by nearly 20 percent so that it could lessen the impact of the
decision by other producers to charge higher prices for their oil.58
The Saudi decision entailed several major repercussions for Iran. In
the short term, it resulted in the diversion of some of the Iranian
customers to Saudi Arabia and a substantial drop in the country's oil 
exports. this drop during January 1977 amounted to 1,500,000 barrels
a day. In order to compensate for this drop to save the ailing
Iranian economy from running short of funds, the Iranian cabinet agreed
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immediately to raise about $500 million in loans from American and 
European banks.60 In the long term, it meant that Riyadh had
clearly the necessary leverage to check the rate of growth in Iran's 
oil income and, consequently, influence the Shah's economic and military 
build-up as well as regional behaviour in his search for regional 
supremacy. Moreover, it firmly established the fact that it was 
Saudi Arabia, not Iran, which held the key to OPEC politics and was 
most important to the West and the less developed countries as both 
oil and capital supplier. It was these considerations, which prompted 
Tehran to denounce Riyadh for seeking "to declare war against OPEC"
and to declare that "Yamani proves himself to be a stooge of' capitalist 
circles".^ The consequent rift which developed between Tehran and 
Riyadh had a strong potential to damage the Shah's efforts to achieve 
his national and regional objectives.
Third, in the conduct of his policy of regional cooperation, the 
Shah over-committed Iran financially to a number of regional countries. 
During 1974-1976, when Iran's growing income from oil was at its peak, 
the Shah promised huge sums in foreign aid and investment to many 
states, particularly Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Sudan and Lebanon. Consequently, most of these states included 
important projects, for which finances were supposed to come from Iran, 
in their development plans. But as the domestic economic difficulties 
and high military expenditure in the face of a relative decrease in 
Iran's oil revenue pressed the Shah after 1975, he found himself largely 
unable to fulfil his financial commitments. He therefore announced a 
major cutback in Iranian foreign aid in general and the suspension or
slow disbursement of agreed commitments. This resulted in some of
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the recipient governments becoming disillusioned with and distrustful 
of Tehran. They consequently turned for capital aid to those very 
alternative sources which the Shah sought vigorously to out-manoeuvre, 
mainly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya and, most importantly, the 
Soviet Union.
Afghanistan provides a classic example in this respect. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, Tehran promised the Daoud Government
about $1.2 billion in aid during 1975-1976 so that it could reduce its
6 2dependence on the Soviet Union for Afghan economic development.
Relying on this promise, Daoud included a number of important projects,
most significantly the first Afghan railway network, in his Seven
Year Development Plan (1976-1983) to be financed from Iranian aid.
But by the end of 1977, Tehran had disbursed only $io million to Kabul
and it had become clear to Daoud that the promised Iranian aid was not
forthcoming on time, though he needed it badly in order to carry out
his projectsConsequently in his quest for aid from alternative but
non-Soviet sources, he undertook a trip to India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and Libya in early 1978. But amid serious economic difficulties
and political unrest, Daoud's Governemnt was overthrown in a military
coup, led by the Afghan underground left-wing People's Democratic
Party, in April 1978. As The Economist straight afterwards argued,
the Shah's failure to fulfil his aid promise may have well contributed
to the overthrow of Daoud's regime and its replacement by what Tehran
64saw as a hostile pro-Soviet regime.
Fourth, the 'anti-subversion' aspect of the Shah's regional 
behaviour amounted almost to a policy of 'no change' in the Iranian
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region. The Shah's determination to combat any force or development, 
which he regarded as 'subversive/communist', and therefore, threatening 
to Iran's interests and security, seemed very much self-defeating.
It was almost inevitable that such forces and developments with the 
potential to pose a threat to Iran would frequently arise. The 
Iranian region, apart from being of immense economic and strategic 
importance to outside powers, was composed mainly of changing states: 
they differed greatly from each other in terms of their socio­
political systems, stages of socio-economic development and national 
wealth. As a result, they were undergoing' rapid socio-economic and 
political changes, which would necessarily stimulate both old and new 
groups with different socio-economic aspirations and political demands 
and gave rise to developments causing disruptions contrary to the 
Shah s notion of regional stability and security. For example, the 
Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Oman and Baluchistan, which the 
Shah earnestly sought to eliminate, were primarily the products of 
such changes, though they were backed by certain outside powers with 
vested interests in the region. They largely represented those groups 
which opted out of their respective governmental systems for ideological, 
ethnic and pragmatic reasons, and sought to achieve structural changes 
for what they believed to be best in improving the social and 
economic conditions in their respective societies. The most 
effective way to deal with these groups was not to seek their elimination 
by the use of brute military force, as the Shah believed, but to help 
improve their political and socio-economic conditons, which was what 
primarily induced them to resort to 'revolutionary' activities. It 
was for this very reason that despite the triumphant claims by the
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Iranian, Omani and Pakistani Governments, the military operations 
against PFLO and PFLB were not all especially effective and their 
resistance was not altogether suppressed. The existing slow-down in 
their activities might well prove to be temporary because their causes 
were not effectively redressed.
In conclusion, it needs to be stressed that the Shah's domestic 
and regional achievements appeared more impressive on paper than they 
were in reality. His policies failed to achieve their own projected 
objectives. They were over-ambitious, poorly planned, badly 
coordinated and mismanaged; and they were, therefore, rather 
unresponsive and counter-productive in relation to Iran's means and 
needs. On the domestic front, the military build-up took a great 
toll of economic and social policies, which achieved little in terms of 
creating the desired self-generating non-oil potential for Iran to be 
a viable and effective regional and, consequently, world power in its 
own right. In this respect, Iran's gains from its non-replenishible 
oil resources were quite minimal. On the regional front, while 
Tehran's economic and military policies caused anxiety and provoked 
serious reactions, particularly on the part of Saudi Arabia, the Shah's 
regional behaviour with its emphasis on 'cooperation' and 'anti­
subversion' was largely unproductive in terms of helping him in 
achieving both his domestic and regional objectives.
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Chapter X 
Conclusion
One of the striking features of the Shah's rule was the 
similarity between the circumstances of his rise and fall from power.
His assumption of effective power in August 1953 was marked by bloodshed, 
popular discontent and the belief’that he was an American 'puppet'. So was 
his downfall in January 1979. While in power, he succeeded largely in 
establishing his absolute rule throughout Iran, making his subjects 
succumb to his wishes and maintain silence about his leadership and 
policies, maximising Iran's control over its oil resources, undertaking 
a speedy process of capitalist oriented socio-economic development which 
focussed on industrialisation, and building up very sizable modern armed 
forces. He also succeeded in strengthening Iran's regional and 
international position in the context of evolving changes in regional 
and world politics, as well as cultivating global prestige, for himself 
as the 'king of kings' and 'light of the Aryans'. In all this, his 
major objectives were to strengthen the position of the monarchy as 
pivotal to Iranian politics, on the one hand, and to build a strong, 
prosperous and independent Iran with the necessary potential to become a 
world capitalist power in its own right, on the other.
The Shah's.goals and policies were, however, full of inherent 
contradictions and weaknesses. They could not ensure the continuity of 
his rule on a popular basis nor, ultimately, hold back an overwhelming 
majority of the Iranian people from rejecting him as the 'enemy' of Iran 
and an 'agent' of the United States. If anything, they stimulated and 
unleashed the very trends and forces which eventually caused the Shah's
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downfall. Despite all his efforts, the Shah never succeeded in 
consolidating a process of balanced political and socio-economic 
development, whereby he could build a sound domestic system and change 
Iran progressively according to the needs, resources and rising 
expectations of a majority of its people. Nor did he ever manage to 
scotch the indignity of his initial reliance on the CIA for wresting 
power from Mossadeq, nor to break free from his initial dependence on 
the United States and thus balance Iran's relations with that country 
with a symmetrically 'interdependent' relationship.
The Shah's dual objectives which he pursued throughout his rule, 
to strengthen the monarchy and to transform Iran into a strong modern 
pro-Western state, were constantly in conflict with each other. So 
were the policies which he adopted in realising these objectives.
Given the nature of his throne, the Shah continuously sought to make 
his position indispensable to Iranian politics through centralising 
power as much as possible. For this, perhaps like any other absolute 
ruler, he pursued a policy of severe political repression and 
manipulation of political, economic and social processes. Thus he 
successfully denied Iranians not only the basic political freedoms 
and civil liberties but also the rights and opportunities to fulfil 
themselves to the best of their abilities and to participate creatively 
in building a modern society. The end result was the emergence of an 
expanded and costly but, as in the past, very top-heavy, incompetent 
and corrupt state machinery and a repressed nation, which was dominated 
by increasing class consciousness and socio-economic inequalities and 
injustices. This nation, where the people were forced to respect the 
Shah and his policies and where the cost of the administrative, security
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and military apparatus exceeded the amount spent on social welfare by 
a large margin, was largely governed by the Shah's notorious secret 
police (SAVAK). It was dominated by the personalisation rather than 
the institutionalisation of politics. It lacked the necessary 'safety 
valves', whereby its people, individually or collectively, could 
lawfully voice their grievances, demands and expectations. It was 
entirely unresponsive to any such demands. It was a national tragedy 
to observe that before 1978 SAVAK had become so omnipresent that 
a majority of Iranians could not even trust each other, let alone the 
government. They had, however, become increasingly resentful of the 
Shah's system, with which they could not identify themselves.
Meanwhile, in order to build a strong modern Iran and, of course, to 
support ' his throne, the Shah was pursuing a capitalist oriented 
process of socio-economic development. This process, however, needed 
and unleashed mostly the opposite of what the throne required for its 
centrality in politics. In order to prove productive and serve the 
cause of stability, the development process needed, most of all, a 
governmental system which would allow increasing political and economic 
decentralisation, public participation and individual initiative, and 
thus put more stress on social development and the progressive 
redistribution of wealth. In the long run, only such a system could 
have proved to be effective in coping with the socio-economic changes 
and consequent public demands and expectations unleashed by the process 
of development. The Shah's system, however, was far from this. It 
was largely geared to meet the absolute needs of the throne rather than 
what was required for the successful functioning of the process of 
development. As a result, there was a basic conflict between the 
needs of the throne and those of the process of development or, in
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other words, between what the Shah wanted for his own position and what 
he desired for Iran. Most of the Shah's policies were, consequently, 
torn in opposite directions. This had, indeed, created a basic 
dilemma which he could not resolve without eventually either abandoning 
his absolute power or else reverting to a strictly centralised 
development policy, more compatible with the needs of his throne. 
Undoubtedly, by 1977, he had become very conscious of the dilemma, 
which forced him to begin what he called a process of gradual 
'liberalisation' of the Iranian system.
This process, however, proved to be too slow and too late, 
particularly in view of the fact that the Shah's economic and military 
policies had proved to be beyond Iran's non-oil and non-capital 
resources, had failed to achieve their objectives and had produced 
an extremely unbalanced socio-economic environment. This situation, 
which was clouded further by political repression, was no longer 
acceptable to a majority of Iranians, including some of those who 
benefited most from the Shah's policies. Thus, the necessary grounds 
were all but ready for all sorts of people with old and new grievances 
and demands to participate in the 1978 mass movements and eventually 
force the Shah from his throne. There is no doubt that in the mass 
movements, the religious zealots, led by Khomeini, played an instrumental 
role in serving the cause of Islam against the Shah's pro-Western, 
corrupt and 'immoral' dictatorship. Their role, however, must not be 
overestimated, for the mass movements were not essentially religious.
In fact, a large number of people who followed Khomeini were not 
necessarily practising Muslims. Nor did they agree with Khomeini's 
idea of an 'Islamic Republic'. They followed him because they shared
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a common opposition with him to the Shah's rule. Nevertheless, because 
the Islamic message had a wider appeal to the Iranian masses, who had 
been imbued with it for centuries, Khomeini and his zealots were 
ultimately able to seize political power. Khomeini, however, may not 
command the degree of popular support for his 'Islamic Republic' that 
he did for his anti-Shah stance.^
While failing to secure popular support, the Shah never 
succeeded in freeing his regime from its early dependence on and 
close identification with the United States. He was continuously 
suspected by a majority of his people of being an American 'agent'. 
Although in the 1960s he tried to diversify the sources of 
dependence, he could achieve no more than what was permissible within 
the framework of that dependence in the context of changes in 
regional and global politics. This meant that while he could achieve 
a greater degree -of operational flexibility in the conduct of Iran's 
affairs, he could not reorient Iran's mode of development and foreign 
policy interests to the point of breaking with the United States or 
the international capitalist market. It was, nonetheless, on this 
basis that he succeeded in normalising Iran's relations with the 
Soviet Union, improving the country's regional position and eventually 
realising, in conjunction with OPEC, Iran's potential as an 'oil power'. 
As a result, by the early 1970s, the Shah was in a fairly strong 
position. He could bargain effectively in his dealings not only with 
his adversaries but also with his allies; he was in a position to use 
his oil strength to balance his relationship with the United States 
without necessarily breaking away from the capitalist camp.
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However, he  f a i l e d  t o  do t h i s .  I n s t e a d ,  upon t h e  B r i t i s h  w i th d ra w a l  
from th e  P e r s i a n  G u l f ,  he  r e s o l v e d  t h a t  I r a n  s h o u ld  t a k e  o v e r  c e r t a i n  
B r i t i s h  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and a c t  a s  t h e  'g u a r d i a n '  o f  t h e  r e g i o n .  He 
c o n s e q u e n t ly  embarked on an e n l a r g e d  and a c c e l e r a t e d  i n d u s t r i a l  and 
m i l i t a r y  b u i l d - u p .  In  o r d e r  t o  im p lem en t  t h e s e  program m es, w hich 
w ere  beyond I r a n ' s  n o n - c a p i t a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  he  r e s o r t e d  t o  a  p o l i c y  o f  
a c c e l e r a t e d  i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  h i g h l y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  c a p i t a l  g o o d s ,  m i l i t a r y  
a r s e n a l s ,  t e c h n o lo g y ,  e x p e r t i s e  and t r a i n e d  p e r s o n n e l ,  from th e  
W est,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .  T h is  m ea n t ,  i n  e s s e n c e ,  t h e  
r e i n f o r c e m e n t  o f  I r a n ' s  e a r l y  dependence  on th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  i n  a 
d i f f e r e n t  form . The dependence  was now b a s e d  more on I r a n ' s  n eed s  
f o r  n o n - c a p i t a l  and n o n - o i l  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  i t s  r a p i d  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  
i n t o  a r e g i o n a l  and e v e n tu a l  w o r ld  power th a n  on th e  p o l i t i c a l ,  
economic and m i l i t a r y  needs  o f  t h e  S h a h 's  reg im e  f o r  i t s  s u r v i v a l ,  
as i n  t h e  1950s.
The U n i te d  S t a t e s  p l a y e d  a d e te r m in in g  r o l e  i n  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  
t h i s  dependence  w i t h i n  th e  fram ew ork o f  t h e  'N ixon  D o c t r i n e ' .  The 
D o c t r i n e ,  f o rm u la te d  in  1969-70 , u n d e r l i n e d  A m e r ic a 's  new d e s i r e ,  
i n  th e  wake o f  i t s  h u m i l i a t i o n  i n  I n d o -C h in a ,  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a  w o r ld  
sy s te m  whereby th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s ,  t h e  c e n t r a l  pow er ,  would h e lp  
g e n e r a t e  s t r o n g  r e g i o n a l  a c t o r s ,  w hich w ould  s e c u r e  t h e i r  own and 
Am erican i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  r e g i o n .  As was s u b s e q u e n t ly
c o n f i rm e d  by an o f f i c i a l  o f  th e  S t a t e  D e p a r tm e n t ,  W ashington  chose  
I r a n  as one o f  t h e  t e s t  c a s e s  f o r  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  D oc tr ine ."^
In  p u r s u a n c e  o f  t h i s ,  d u r in g  a s t a t e  v i s i t  t o  T eh ran  i n  May 1972, 
P r e s i d e n t  Nixon p e r s o n a l l y  a s s u r e d  th e  Shah t h a t  t h e  US was r e a d y  
t o  s e l l  him any c o n v e n t io n a l  weapons sy s te m  t h a t  he  w a n te d .  T h is  
d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  w hich was c o n f i rm e d  i n  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o
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the American bureaucracy, "... was unprecedented for a non-industrial 
country; there was appa-rently no major interagency review of arms 
sales to Iran prior to the visit".
The decision not only opened the door to large increases 
in sales to Iran, but also effectively exempted sales 
to Iran from the normal arms sales decision-making 
processes in the State and Defence Departments. In so 
far as is known, the May 1972 decision ... [was] never 
formally reconsidered, even though the large oil price 
increases in 1973 enabled Iran to order much more than 
anyone anticipated in 1972.4
Moreover, the United States supported the Shah's economic 
policies and met almost all of his requests in this area. Together 
with the arms sales, this resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
volume of trade between the two sides, which was overwhelmingly in 
favour of the United States. This was largely manifested in the 
US-Iranian agreement of August 1976. Under the agreement 
commercial trade between the two sides was to rise from $10,000 
million since 1974 to $40,000 million during 1976-1980; and their 
military trade, which had totalled about $10,000 million since 1973, 
was to be extended by another $15,000 million during the same period.^ 
The change of the US administration from Republican to Democrat 
under Jimmy Carter did not alter the basic spirit of the Nixon 
Doctrine, governing US-Iranian relations. Despite his stress on 
'human rights' and the strict supply of arms to countries other than 
US Western allies, in November 1977, President Carter pledged support 
for the Shah's leadership and policies and praised him as a "strong 
leader"; he declared "[w]e look upon Iran as a very stabilising force 
in the world at large".^ He consequently responded favourably to
virtually all military and non-military requests made by the Shah, 
though the Congress had become increasingly critical of this attitude.
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As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  S t a t e  D ep a r tm en t  c o n t in u e d  t o  p o i n t  t o  I r a n  
as  a s u c c e s s f u l  c a se  o f  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  N ixon D o c t r i n e .  T h is  
r e f l e c t e d  th e  f a c t  t h a t  W ash ing ton  was a p p ly in g  th e  D o c t r in e  w i t h i n  
w hat was r e f e r r e d  t o  as  t h e  ' t w i n - p i l l a r '  p o l i c y  to w a rd s  t h e  P e r s i a n  
G u l f ,  r e f e r r i n g  t o  A m erican s u p p o r t  f o r  b o th  I r a n  and S a u d i  A r a b ia  in  
e x e r t i n g  th e m s e lv e s  as tw in  pow ers  on b o th  s i d e s  o f  t h e  G u l f .  T h is  
p o l i c y  was b a s e d  on th e  a s su m p t io n  t h a t  b o th  c o u n t r i e s  s h a r e d  common 
" b a s i c  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  p e a c e ,  s t a b i l i t y  and econom ic d e v e lo p m e n t" ,  and 
t h a t  th e y  w ere  b o th  " r e s p o n s i b l e "  p ro -W e s te rn  a c t o r s  i n  t h e  reg ion ."^
They h a d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  ample g ro u n d s  f o r  b u i l d i n g  a ha rm on ious  and c o o p e r a t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e i r  own r e g i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  and t h o s e  o f  
t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .  I n  t h i s ,  how ever ,  as  i t  t u r n e d  o u t ,  W ash ing ton  
u n d e r e s t im a t e d  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t s  be tw een  th e  
two c o u n t r i e s  w hich  was i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  and 
v a r y in g  n a t i o n a l  and r e g i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s .  I n  t h e  m id -1 9 7 0 s ,  t h i s  was 
m a n i f e s t e d  n o t  o n ly  i n  t h e i r  c o m p e t i t i v e  aims r a c e  b u t  a l s o  i n  t h e i r  
d i f f e r e n c e s  w i t h i n  OPEC o v e r  o i l  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  was i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
Nixon D o c t r in e  t h a t  t h e  US Government s o u g h t  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  i t s  
s p e c i a l  a l l i a n c e  w i th  I r a n ;  t o  p r e s e r v e  w hat U n d e r s e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e ,
P h i l i p  H ab ib ,  c a l l e d  A m e r ic a 's  " im p o r t a n t  N a t io n a l  I n t e r e s t s  t h e r e " ; 8 
and t o  ' r e c y c l e ' ,  as many o t h e r  W e ste rn  c o u n t r i e s  ( n o ta b ly  B r i t a i n ,
F ra n c e  and West Germany) w ere  d o in g ,  t h e  money w hich i t  had  p a id  and 
was g o in g  t o  pay  t o  I r a n  f o r  i t s  o i l  an d ,  t h u s ,  h e lp  t h e  US w o rs e n in g  
b a l a n c e  o f  pay m en ts .  I n  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  o t h e r  m a jo r  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  
w ere  A m erican m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  and e n t r e p r e n e u r s  d e a l i n g  w i th  I r a n ,  
as  w e l l  as t h e  A m erican arms d e a l e r s  and com pan ies .  I n  1976,
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Anthony Sampson found : "N e a r ly  e v e ry  arms company now lo o k ed  to w a rd s
th e  Shah . . .  The Shah seemed t o  be  l u r k i n g  e v e ry w h e re ,  u n d e r  e v e ry  
b a la n c e  s h e e t ,  i n s i d e  e v e ry  p r o j e c t i o n  o f  f u t u r e  e a r n i n g s " . 9 From th e  
b e g in n in g  o f  t h e  1 970s ,  c o n s e q u e n t ly ,  t h e r e  was a d r a m a t i c  u p s u rg e  
m  th e  number o f  A m erican c i v i l i a n  and m i l i t a r y  p e r s o n n e l  in v o lv e d  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  f i e l d s  i n  I r a n .  At t h e  s t a r t  o f  1978 th e y  numbered a b o u t  
3 7 ,0 0 0 ,  and t h i s  number had  been  p r e d i c t e d  t o  r e a c h  50 ,000  t o  6 0 ,000
by th e  e a r l y  1980s .  T h e i r  l o n g - t e r m  p r e s e n c e  was c o n s id e r e d  to  be
e s s e n t i a l  f o r  th e  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  S h a h 's  programmes o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
and m i l i t a r y  b u i l d - u p .  T h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  e n t a i l e d  f a r - r e a c h i n g  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  I r a n i a n  p o l i t i c s ,  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  
U n i te d  S t a t e s  and i t s  r e g i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d i n g .
The o v e r a l l  r e s u l t ,  how ever ,  was t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  in  t h e  1 9 70s ,  
became more d e p e n d e n t  on t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  and c o n s e q u e n t ly  more open 
to  Am erican p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and  s o c i a l  i n f l u e n c e  th a n  e v e r  b e f o r e ,  
though  th e  n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  dependence  was d i f f e r e n t  from  t h a t  i n  t h e  p a s t .  
P a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  view o f  a f a s t  g row ing  number o f  A m ericans ove rshadow ing  
i n f l u e n t i a l  p o s i t i o n s  i n  th e  I r a n i a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  economy, armed f o r c e s  
and s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s ,  a m a j o r i t y  o f  I r a n i a n s  became i n c r e a s i n g l y  c o n v in c e d  
t h a t  th e  Shah was e s s e n t i a l l y  an A m erican  'p u p p e t ' ,  who had  s o l d  t h e i r  
c o u n tr y  to  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .  They f e l t  t h a t  t h e i r  c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t y ,  
t r a d i t i o n a l  b e l i e f s  and v a lu e s  as  w e l l  as  t r a d i t i o n a l  y e a r n in g  f o r  
f reedom ' and ' j u s t i c e '  were b e in g  s e r i o u s l y  t h r e a t e n e d ,  and t h a t  t h e i r  
n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  were b e in g  e x p l o i t e d  f o r  wrong p u r p o s e s ,  b e n e f i t i n g  
f o r e i g n e r s  more th a n  I r a n i a n s .  The f r e q u e n t  c o m p la in t  h e a r d  i n  t h e  
s t r e e t s  o f  T eh ran  was t h a t  w h i l e  many w o rk in g -a g e  I r a n i a n s  ( e s t im a te d  
a t  a b o u t  30 p e r c e n t )  w ere  e i t h e r  unem ployed o r  c o u ld  n o t  f i n d  work 
m atch in g  t h e i r  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  th o u s a n d s  o f  f o r e i g n e r s  w ere  b r o u g h t
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in at high wages to do the jobs for which Iranians could have been 
trained locally and employed at much lower wages. They felt that they 
had been led in a direction which was not of their own choosing and 
contrary to their needs and expectations. They could not help but 
to implicate the United States continuously in what the Shah was 
imposing on them.^
Given this situation, the Shah could not rightly claim that 
he had (or was soon about to have) the right bases for achieving 
his 'Great Civilisation', that is, transformation of Iran into a 
mighty, prosperous and 'democratic' world power. In fact, until the 
time of his fall, the Shah's vision of Iran in reality had not 
developed beyond what may be called a 'dependent regional power', 
that is to say a power which, based on its oil income, had achieved 
certain economic and military capabilities, but lacked the necessary 
self-generating potential to sustain itself and function effectively 
without heavy long-term reliance on the United States.
In evaluating the years of his rule in terms of both his domestic 
and foreign policy objectives, it must be concluded that at the end 
the Shah was largely the victim of his own behaviour and policies, 
which were contradictory in themselves and incompatible with the needs 
of the Iranian society. The degree of support which he received from 
the United States was in the long run counter-productive. Nevertheless, 
now that the Iranian people have succeeded in sending the Shah into 
exile and in dismantling his ruling apparatus, the leading question is:
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can K h o m e in i 's  ' I s l a m i c  R e p u b l i c '  o f f e r  them w hat th e y  w ere  d e p r iv e d  
o f  u n d e r  t h e  S h a h 's  a b s o l u t e  monarchy?
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details see: Kayhan International, 29 January 1977.
62. The exact amount of Iranian aid to Afghanistan was never
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